Monday, November 04, 2024

Against Hyperpharisaical Commensality

I have always found the world an unpleasantly strange place, and moreover an ever-newly-unpleasantly strange place, meaning that I have not only always found it a place that is not normal according to my own lights but that I have always found it a place in which I am always discovering something new that is not normal according to my own lights. But every so often—say, once every three or four years—I alight on some statelette of affairs that does not merely reinforce my sense that this world is not for me but makes me suspect that this not-for-me world is an entirely different one from (and naturally an altogether worse one than) the one I inhabited only yesterday (or whenever else I last woke up from a longish nap), a statelette of affairs akin in its globally impinging quality to the governing conceit of a certain episode The Twilight Zone (not the original Rod Serling-produced one but its mid-1980s revival) wherein a man discovers upon browsing one of his single-digit-aged child’s picture books that every common noun in the English lexicon is “mapped” to a different referent from the one with which he has always associated it—that, say [for I haven’t seen the dad-blamed episode in nearly forty years] “dinosaur” denotes a fruit he has always known as an “apple,” while “apple” denotes a vehicle he has always known as a “truck,” etc. The most recent such alightment occurred about three weeks ago as of this writing (April 26, 2024) in the context of what has become a sort of local genre of domestic drama, so often does it occur—indeed nearly as often as I experience one of my milder attacks of Weltentfremdung—namely, one of those moments when my mother, knowing as she does of my longstanding Anglophilia yet watching as she does a great deal more British television than I do nowadays, tells me of some entity or mode of behavior that she has just seen for the first time in a British television show and that she therefore cannot help suspecting is quintessentially British, the aim of this impartment of course being to elicit from me a confirmation or denial that I have seen or heard tell of this entity or mode of behavior from some certifiably UK-sited source. Usually these quasi-queries center on some extremely well-defined something whose Britishness I can instantly confirm with a self-satisfied yawn—for example, elevenses or Radio Five Live. Less often they center on something which I have never heard of but my ignorance of which I can shrug off with more or less total complacency because I have ceased to take much of an interest in the British versions of such things as niche-formatted radio stations and arcanely scheduled mealtimes. But this quasi-query was altogether different and different in a way that was deeply unsettling. Its point of reference was a scene in an episode of that 1990s detective show centering on a detective played by the woman who had starred in the execrable 1980s sitcom Keeping Up Appearances. The scene was one in which the detective, a sexagenarian lower-middle-class Northern Englishwoman, and her equally elderly husband were having dinner in their dining room with her teenaged or twenty-something-year-old male Dr. Watson-style business partner-cum-sidekick. My mother said that she had been struck by the fact that throughout the meal all three diners had kept their knives and forks in their hands and their hands in rapid motion. This was a moment like no other such moment because I could in no wise sympathize with my mother’s bemusement—not only because I could not recognize the comportment of the diners as characteristically British but also because I could not recognize it as even vaguely un-American, or to be more precise, not recognize it precisely as uncharacteristic of me or any other American I knew, very much including my mother herself. This is not to say that I did not find the dining-scene conjured up in my mind by her description odd or even semi-barbaric; it is merely to say that I found the antigraphic description—that of a dinner table at which the diners were intermittently and repeatedly laying down their knives and forks and allowing them to sit unused—equally odd (if prospectively more civilized), equally non-bell ringing and by no means apple-pie-esquely American. In my mind’s eye this description did not evoke a distinct mode of dining at all but merely a distinct way of pacing the meal, of incorporating into it time-outs (but how would these time-outs be timed? With an actual timer, perchance an egg-timer brought in from the kitchen?) wherein everybody allowed his digestive system to catch up and stopped chewing the fat in the literal sense to chew it in a figurative one. But that could not have been what my mother had in mind because she was an American—albeit also a Southerner and hence a type thereof known for being exceptions to the rule in point (but of course she was and is also a Floridian and all Floridians are now officially non-Southerners)—and Americans are notorious for wanting to get through everything very much including meals as quickly possible. And so to impart clarity to my conception of this meta-culinary state of affairs, I had no choice but regrettably to break Dr. Johnson’s commandment “Never mention a man in his own presence” (for for various reasons that would take too long to enumerate here I believe his advice applied as categorically to one’s treatment of the present wo-man as to one’s treatment of her wo-less counterpart) and ask her how she personally plied her cutlery at table. She said that while holding her fork in her left hand and her knife in her right, she would cut several bite-sized pieces off the course-eme that required cutting, then lay her knife down, transfer her fork to her right hand, and spear and consume each of the pieces in turn. I found this disclosure at once both quite useful and quite vexing—useful because it immediately put me in mind of three comments on American mensal comportment that I had heard long before; vexing because these comments had always bemused me as much as my mother’s on the table scene from the British TV show had done (and were still doing). The chronologically earliest of these comments dated from nearly a quarter-century ago, from my graduate-school days. Its source was a fellow-graduate student who had spent several years in France for research, and the comment was something to the effect that the French were equal parts amused and revolted by the way Americans handled the knife and fork, the way they would saw away with the knife using the right hand (presumably while using the fork with the left hand to hold the cutlet autc. in place) only to switch the knife to the left hand and the fork to the right when it came time to tuck in in the fullest sense. The chronologically second-earliest of the three dates from much later, probably from about 2018. It hails from my audition of the presumably much-earlier-recorded Desert Island Discs interview of David Byrne, a man whom I have come to despise perhaps more ardently than any other living human being—by this I mean not that I may despise him more than everybody else despises him (although that is not all that improbable) but that I may despise him more than I despise everybody else I despise. I don’t despise him so much only for the comment now in point, but that comment is certainly at the very top of the reasons that I do—or to be more precise, this entire interview definitely includes all the reasons at the top of that list, and at the moment I can’t recall any of the others with precision (and no, I’m not going to go back and listen to the interview, for thanks to Gerald Murnane I have learned that fact-checking such recollections is the worst thing one can do to them both qua things-in-themselves and as nutriment for thought). I loathe the interview because it is less a presentation of Byrne’s six or seven favorite records than a presentation of the six or seven thousand things he loathes most about America. He would not have more eloquently expressed this loathing if he had filmed himself projecting from his fundament a cannonade of excrement onto a wall-map of the United States (for of course in virtue of its difficulty such a performance would have been much more eloquent than merely defecating onto such a map placed on the floor). Anyway, Byrne started out by making a ginormous fuss about the fact that he had been born in Scotland and spent the first half-dozen (or at most half-dozen-and-a-quarter) years of his life there; he spoke of that country as if he had only just emigrated from it the day before, as if its folkways still struck him as being as natural and civilized as they had the day he left it and the U.S.’s folkways as perverse and barbaric. Of course the very notion of anyone’s thinking of the Scots—the people who invented the fried Mars Bar and Buckfast-binging—as the epitome of a civilized nation is laughable. But anyway, as already implied, prominent among his list of American howlers (and they really did make him howl with bemusement and derision) was the Yanks’ manner of eating—which manner according to his description corresponded quite closely to the description of her own modus edendi that my mother would later disclose to me, the only difference being that according to Byrne, Americans would cut up the entire piece of meat before taking their first bite. At the time of course it was news to me that Americans ever did this, but even if it hadn’t been, I would still have wished Mr. Byrne to go back to Scotland and thereupon to be boiled in his own haggis and buried with a steak of thistle or shortbread in his heart. To be sure, I knew I didn’t cut up cutlets autc. completely before tucking into them, and the idea of doing so struck me as a bit infantile, or rather, auto-paternalistic—in other words, it smacked a bit of acting as a parent towards oneself or treating oneself as a very small child, because of course when toddlers are making the transition from semi-solid pap to fully solid food they have to have their meat cut up completely for them by an adult. “All the same,” I thought, “what difference does it make whether one cuts up one’s food ahead of time or as one goes along inasmuch as, for all the monopolistic proverbiality of the donning of trousers one leg at a time qua touch of nature that makes the whole human world kin, one can don one’s trousers both legs at a time if one is strongly enough determined to do so, whereas if one tried to eat one’s fully solid food more than one bite at a time one would choke to death on it a few toothless gulps into the meal?” Onto my final, most recent, example: it hails from an interview with Monty Python’s John Cleese. I believe I heard the interview very shortly after its recording, which means it probably dates from Cleese’s most recent spate of rather indiscriminate public appearances as a cantankerous octogenarian, which means I probably couldn’t fact-check it even if I wanted to. At some point in it, apropos of nothing I can even vaguely recall, Cleese mentioned that when dining with his fellow-Python member, the American-born-and-raised Terry Gilliam, Gilliam had behaved as Americans do at table by passing his fork from one hand to the other and using it to spear the piece of meat that he had just cut and that a fellow-Brit who had also been present on the occasion had been absolutely outraged by this. So here—and now I am placing myself back in the shoes of myself when these three recollections came rushing back to me immediately after my mother’s revelation of her personal modus edendi—so here was a third piece of evidence in favor of the notion that there was a characteristically American way of wielding cutlery and that quite a lot of foreigners did not approve of this American way. To be sure, inasmuch as Cleese had given no sign that he shared in his fellow-Brit’s outrage, this memory-snippet was also a piece of evidence that not every foreigner in the world was offended by this American way, that this way did not mark the ne plus ultra of ugly-Americanness, but the notion of an American modus edendi was still quite unsettling on its own, and unsettling in particular for me qua American because, get this—and sit down if you’re not already sitting—beyond being pretty sure that I did not cut the meat completely to bits before tucking into it, I could not for the life of me remember a single facet of my own modus edendi: I could not remember in which hand I habitually held the knife and the fork to begin with, or whether or how often I habitually switched either utensil to the other hand, or whether or how often I habitually put down either utensil. In the matter of cutlery- wielding I felt completely dépaysé, as the French say, at least when they aren’t too busy gaping at the dinner-table antics of Americans to talk, and I would have to wait until my next cutlery-exacting meal to find out where the true pays of my modus edendi was situated. Of course the discerning reader is likely to have just caught a scent of rat emanating from the immediately preceding sentence—not because I have given him any reason to suppose that I am partial to the taste of that animal (and for the record, I have not as yet been cursed with the opportunity to find out whether I am or not) but because he presumes that I could not have aimed to suss out my own cutlery-wielding habitus without thereby rendering myself self-conscious of that habitus and therefore incapable of wielding my cutlery as I had customarily been wielding it; he presumes that in next betaking myself to the dinner table, I would be forced either to conform to the supposedly quintessentially American way of cutlery-wielding I had just learned of or to go out of my way to wield my cutlery in some way that bade defiance to that way. But as luck would improbably have it and did have it, my next meal followed the revelatory episode by so many hours, and I was so hungry when it at last ensued, that I was not thinking at all about the episode or about my modus edendi when I tucked in, and as luck perhaps even more improbably would have and did have it, I happened to recollect the revelatory episode well before the end of the meal, such that I actually managed to catch myself in flagrante delicto; I managed, in other words, to observe that I was sawing away at a burrito with a knife in my left hand while holding the bite-sized bit of the burrito downward of the knife impaled in place with the tines of a fork in my right hand, and to realize that I was swallowing a bite that had itself just been part of the burrito and concomitantly subjected to the same treatment with the same knife and fork held in the same hands. And so I could not but conclude that my modus edendi did not correspond in any respect to the modus edendi I had lately been given to re-understand as quintessentially American—that, indeed, to the extent that the British modus edendi consisted in keeping one’s knife and fork in one’s hands and in constant motion, per my mother’s description of the television scene, my modus edendi was decidedly British. But by then I had come to find that at least to some Britain-originating lights this extent was at minimum decidedly limited, for within minutes of describing to me the episode from the sitcom and revealing her modus edendi to me, my mother had in response to my bafflement thereat (which bafflement I had been as powerless to conceal from her as I have since proved to be powerless to conceal it from the world via the opening of this essay) sent me a YouTube video entitled something very close to “British versus American dining etiquette.” Formally speaking, the video consisted of a dialogue between a very young British woman—apparently a specifically English one, to judge by her accent—and a very young American man, a dialogue wherein the woman described the British modus edendi with an air of insufferable superiority, thereby eliciting from the young man a series of gasps of incredulity liberally seasoned with mortification at his own Yankish barbarousness. At least I assume there was a series of such gasps, because I did not get past the first of them, owing to my need to quell the outrage that had accompanied my incredulity in lieu of mortification at the very first article of the girl’s description. That article consisted in her saying with her version of the proverbially perfectly straight face that chez les Brits one always corralled together the smaller bits of food on one’s plate using the back side of the fork—that is to say, with the fork pointing its tines away from oneself and the food rather than with it pointing the tines towards oneself and cupping them around the food. Talk about doing things arsiversi—a.k.a. ass—or arse backwards back in the days when a fork only had two tines and so probably couldn’t be used in such an arsiversi way on either side of the Pond. Anyhow, my first thought on hearing this talk of an arsiversi-orientated fork was that if it reflected an actual pan-British practice it had driven the final nail into the coffin of my Anglophilia—and naturally driven it thereinto with the back of a fork rather than with the front of a hammer. But my second, and almost immediately subsequent, thought held out the prospect of the subsistence of my Anglophilia, and not least because in my mind’s ear it was spoken in the organically skeptical Cockney accent of Bob Hoskins, which I am not going to attempt to replicate here through orthographical libertinage, although I won’t shrink from approximating its vocabulary: “Hang about,” Bob says to me in me mind’s ear just then, “although you’ve never left the continental United States, in your two-and-a-half quid and two bob years in this country you have breakfasted, dined, and supped with people hailing from all six inhabited continents. Granted, in the light of your lifelong lifestyle and culinary preferences, the majority of these commensal episodes (here I parenthetically note that my inner Bob Hoskins has a cussed tendency to transmogrify temporarily into an inner Sir Thomas Browne) have centred on what we Brits call pub food and you Yanks call bar food—i.e., food requiring little or no use of cutlery. Still, that must leave at least a thousand meals in which you and your tablemates were fully engaged with cutlery from soup to nuts, if you’ll pardon me French.” I did pardon his French and did concede that I must have shared at least a thousand cutlery-intense meals with foreigners. “Well, then: out of all those thousand-or-more meals, can you recall one in which you noticed anything peculiar about what any of the foreigners were doing with their knives and forks, or one in which any of them singled you out for piss-taking on account of your way of handling yours?” I had to concede that I could not recall a single meal in which I had noticed the one or any of them had ridiculed me for the other. “Well, then, in the light of this, don’t you think there’s something just a mite suspicious—not ‘suss,’ mind you, ’cos as you know, contrary to the belief of the stinking so-called Millennials who’ve taken command of the Zeitgeist since me untimely death, ‘suss’ is a verb, not an adjective—don’t you think, I say, there’s something a mite suspicious about this whole notion of a peculiarly ‘American culinary etiquette?’”  I indeed conceded that there was, especially as ever since my bairnhood (a word, incidentally, that on account of its Scottish provenance I doubtless never would have dared speak in the living Bob Hoskins’s presence) I had and have been criticized for paying too much attention to supposedly trivial constituents of other people’s behavior: I have after all produced a nearly two-hour long essay on certain other people’s pronunciation of the word grocery, an essay in which, moreover, I make plain that I have had a sort of Mia Farrow in Rosemary’s Baby-esque time convincing certain other people that this irregular pronunciation is ever pronounced. And I did after all just evince a pang of guilt at my counterfactual use of a Scotticism in the presence of an Englishman who has been dead for more than a decade. To be sure, I am willing to entertain the notion that certain general modes of cutlery-wielding are more common in certain corners of the Occident than in others but only in conjunction with the application of Lord Rochester’s apothegm Man differs more from man than man from beast to this intersection of gustation and geography; in other words, with the concession that on the whole the average Yank plies his knife and fork in a manner that differs more widely from that of the next Yank than from that of the next Englishman, Frenchman, German, aut al. At bottom, I am inclined to think of cutlery-wielding as exhibiting much the same sort of dizzying multifariousness as that which Dr. Johnson ascribed to shaving: “[O]f a thousand shavers, two do not shave so much alike as not to be distinguished”—distinguished, for example, by the shaver’s “holding the razor more or less perpendicular; drawing long or short strokes; beginning at the upper part of the face, or the under; at the right side or the left side.” (Life, Friday, 19 September 1777, p. 611 [New {2008} Penguin edition]). And it would indeed be surprising if cutlery-wielding did not exhibit such multifariousness, for like shaving, it entails the application of one’s hands to the second or third most sensitive part of one’s own person through the medium of sharpened metal. One is entitled to wield a razor or a knife and fork just as one sees fit because at least tactilely speaking one does after all know one’s face better than anyone else and because placing these implements on or in the wrong part of it at the wrong time could result in a painful or even fatal injury—a sliced off nose-tip, a gouged-out eye, a severed vein or artery. And because the use of cutlery is additionally associated with ingestion, it perhaps requires even closer and more complicated personal supervision than the use of the razor. One must establish a personal rhythm in one’s knife-and-fork use, lest one choke for want of adequate space between mouthfuls or starve owing to a surplus thereof. This is another reason I cannot accept the notion of a national cutlery-wielding style, for every nation is surely quite heterogeneous in eating habituses, and no particular style is suited to more than one of them. It is impossible to imagine a slow eater like my mother tolerating a style like the one in the British sitcom in which the cutlery must be kept in constant motion, or an impatient eater like the present writer tolerating a style like the one affected by my mother and disdained by David Byrne, the one in which the food has to be completely apportioned before one eats a single bite of it. So whence in the devil’s dungeon has this notion that there is an American style of cutlery-wielding, a British style of cutlery-wielding, and so on arisen? I conjecture that it arises from two causes of two different Aristotelean types. The efficient cause of it, the cause of it in the sense that one billiard ball is the cause of the movement of another billiard ball that it bumps into (to employ Hume’s famous efficient causality-problematizing example perversely enough), would seem to be the generalizing complement of the phenomenon whereby people assign—or affect to assign—the authorship of ancient commonplaces like “Look before you leap” and “A stitch in time saves nine” to their parents and grandparents or the provenance of pan-Anglosopheric phatic endearments like “Hon” and “Love” to their native town. In other words, I suspect that in these causal terms it has arisen from certain Brits’, Yanks’, Frenchmen’s, aut al. observing that they themselves serve themselves at table in a certain way, then observing two or three of their fellow-Brits, Yanks, Frenchmen, serving themselves thereat in that selfsame way, and therefrom inferring that all Brits, Yanks, Frenchmen, aut al. serve themselves thereat in that way and that no Swede, Italian, Dutchman, aut al. ever serves himself thereat in that way and always serves himself in a completely different way that is peculiar to the nationality of which he is a member or polity of which he is a citizen. Such inferences are so readily refuted by experience that I cannot but suspect that they are in most cases not actually inferred and only feigned to be inferred because the pretended inferrer takes his interlocutor or audience for a chump. As to the final cause of the notion, otherwise knowable as its aim or motive, I dare say the reader supposes I have already revealed it in exposing the efficient cause—in other words, that people are inclined to take their own modi edendi for those of their native country en bloc because they wish to drum up touristic interest in that country and to take the modus edendi of every foreigner they meet for the modus edendi of his country because they wish to discourage tourists from visiting that country. And I dare say that is part of the final cause and perhaps even the nearer-to-hand part thereof or at least the part thereof that most of the takers are more likely to be conscious of. Nevertheless, I suspect that something much broader in scope and much more sinister in purport is ultimately being aimed at. I suspect this on considering the resemblance I remarked between modes of shaving and modes of cutlery-wielding and the inclusion of “Etiquette” in the title of the British YouTube video. For it seems odd to apply the principle of etiquette to such activities, activities that in their manifest diversity would seem to have proved themselves impervious to regulation by any sort of rulebook, activities that seem, to put it rather more bluntly, to have proved to be the gosh-damn business of nobody but the person engaging in them. “Ah,” the reader is doubtless just now demurring, “but shaving differs quite materially from eating in that it is an activity engaged in in solitude and therefore the shaver’s own business in a much fuller sense than eating can ever be an eater’s.” But it seems to me that this objection is easily dispatched. For while a man certainly shaves in solitude by default, he will shave without fuss or embarrassment if he can’t manage to be on his own when it comes time to shave, and it is hard to imagine many things more absurd than a man suddenly switching from upward razor strokes to downward ones when his downward-stroke favoring best pal walks into the room. And it is equally absurd to imagine anyone’s suddenly switching his entire mode of wielding his knife and fork in the middle of a meal on encountering a disapproving gaze from a commensalist who he only then notices is wielding them in a different manner from his own. The happy truth is that in the entire Western world there are really only two rules of etiquette in the robust sense that apply to the act of dining in company itself: don’t chew with your mouth open and use some form of cutlery on food that has not officially been designated as “finger food.” Every other prescription pertaining to that act is pure tosh with mere arriviste pretensions to rule-dom. Even the much-ballyhooed and decried requirement to distinguish between the salad fork and the main-course fork is basically a server-side only requirement: while it is just—if only just—conceivable that an Occidental host or hostess would incur opprobrium by failing to provide both types of fork to his or her guests, it is virtually impossible to conceive of any Occidental eater’s receiving a serious tongue-lashing from his fellow guests for using the salad fork on the main course or vice-versa. The truth is that at table everyone is too gosh-damned interested in gratifying his own appetite to pay much attention to anything that doesn’t tend to spoil that appetite by the most direct and visceral assault—and yes, I do think the sight of someone grabbing fistfuls of spaghetti with his bare hands and then forcing his neighbors to watch the pasta’s masticative transformation into farina in his pie-hole counts as such an assault; and, no, I don’t think the sight of someone switching any sort of fork or knife from one hand to the other counts thereas. And basically in the modern Occident, in Europe and America of the past five hundred years, all etiquette in the robust sense, in other words, all etiquette that is of a sort more or less exactly synonymous with good manners or good breeding, has concerned itself with the corporeal comportment of the individual only to the extent that it impinges on the immediate well-being of his fellow-individuals. The sort of etiquette that by contrast concerns itself with the individual’s regulation of his own body in intrinsic terms–with placing one’s left foot in exactly such-and-such a place exactly at a such-and-such a distance from one’s right foot, with standing up perfectly straight and perfectly perpendicular to the ground, with perfectly vertically bisecting one’s person with one’s column of shirt buttons—this sort of etiquette has been largely confined to the military.  Of course, though, the YouTube video now in point is not the first attempt by certain of our fellow-Occidentals to persuade us that the hyper-personal military-style of etiquette is the most important sort of etiquette and perhaps indeed that hyper-personal self-regulation is what etiquette is really all about—that anyone who is not fully schooled in some real or imagined list of rules about such behavior is a boor at best and probably a full-blown lout. But I don’t think these attempts at hoodwinking us into mistaking military-style etiquette for etiquette tout court have been being made for all that long. Indeed, the earliest one that occurs to me dates from no further back than the first year of this century. I am thinking here of Gosford Park, the film directed by the professional Hollywood maverick Robert Altman and written by the professional British toff Julian Fellowes. Wikipedia describes it as “a satirical black comedy mystery film,” but its comedy is of an insipidly sallow hue, and whatever mystery may nominally lie at the center of its plot (whose nominal particulars I own I have completely forgotten) is but a MacGuffin for its real goal and purpose—namely the mystification of the minefield of comportmental minutiae that must be traversed by every servant and guest at the stately English manor house that forms its setting. Dramaturgically the film is dominated by Tarkovsky-length shots in which some old salt-cum-big shot of the household staff reads some new hire the riot act about not only his own duties but also the titles of other servants and the gadgets and gewgaws handled thereby—about the difference between a tweeny and a topsy and a snuffer, a snaffle, and a snifter, and so forth; or almost more than figuratively sends a guest packing for showing up for a meal a half a minute early or late, or asking with Oliver Twist-worthy diffidence for some super-recherché requisite of dining or toiletry like a salt-cellar or hand-towel. And of course the aim and object of all this spectacular badgering is to inculcate in plebs on both sides of the Pond that each of these titles, folkways, and articles is a precious and inalienable appenage of the English aristocracy handed down as gingerly as gelignite in airtight glass cases from generation after blueblood generation extending all the way back to William the Conqueror’s time, if not King Arthur’s. Of course even the most casual student of English history—or, to be more precise, English literarily mediated history, the history of English customs and institutions as revealed in novels, plays, diaries, and the like written by Englishmen and Englishwomen (and to a lesser extent by non-English Britons—i.e., Scotspeople and Welshpeople)—knows, the Byzantine domestic rigmarole depicted in Gosford Park was invented almost out of whole cloth in the mid-nineteenth century, during the early ascendancy of Victorian England’s counterparts to America’s robber barons, newly knighted or enobled former office clerks and small-goods merchants whose millions amassed through shrewd investment in heavy industry enabled them to purchase the distressed estates of decayed aristocrats or build gargantuan manor houses of their own and subsequently encouraged them to fill these houses with servants bound to take advantage of their masters’ arrivistic ignorance in devising ever-more ingenious means of bossing them and each other about. (For tedium-forestallment’s sake, I shall tender but one example in evidence of the recentness of the rigmarole and pluck that example from the very center of the English literary canon—Stefano in Shakespeare’s Tempest. From the dramatis personae and a snatch of dialogue we learn that he is the King of Naples’ butler, but his demeanor could not be more unlike that of the sternly impassive and sober bearing of the stereotypical butler of twentieth and twenty-first century cinema and television—for he is loudmouthed, hot-tempered, and perpetually inebriated. But one ceases to find this characterization incongruous once one learns that in Elizabethan and Jacobean times, a butler was exclusively the keeper of a household’s wine cellar. Accordingly, a dramatist of those times must have found a drunken butler as irresistibly plausible as a chubby, gluttonous cook. For an example in Shakespeare of a character with a butleresque social habitus we must turn to an entirely different title and function, that of the steward as exemplified by Twelfth Night’s quasi-Puritanical cross-gartered Malvolio. And yet the butler of twentieth and twentieth-first century cinema and television—in other words, the dramaturgical representation of the butler of Victorian England—is not simply the Elizabethan and Jacobean steward by another name; for the steward was the administrator of an entire estate including its grounds and tenancies, whereas the Victorian butler was merely the administrator of an estate’s household staff; rather, the Victorian butler is simply a more evolved version of the Elizabethan and Jacobean butler, a butler who with the changing times was required to sober up and assume a broader range of duties. Presumably with the burgeoning of the fine-wine industry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it became ever more necessary for a household’s guardian of wines to keep closer track of their whereabouts and to know more about particular vintages, varietals, terroirs, and the like, and therefore to spend less time hitting the bottle himself; and the butler’s resultant gravitas and competence in the matter of wines presumably led to his being entrusted with keeping track of the whereabouts of other entities—notably his fellow servants and the commodities employed and consumed by them.) I suppose that that quasi-digression in referencing two Shakespeare characters involved two examples not one, but I shan’t apologize for mentioning Malvolio alongside Stefano, because the Malvolio-ization of the butler coincided with and participated in another phenomenon that must be understood if one is to appreciate the dashed bounderishness of the attempted redefinition of etiquette through which we are living—namely, the development and propagation of etiquette in the abovementioned wholesome, broad, robust sense. Not long before Shakespeare’s day, the aristocracy began to be polite to each other in a wholesome, broad, and robust way, and over time, roughly between the early seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, this new form of politeness spread from the aristocracy to all the lower orders of society apart from the peasantry. It spread partly because of course the members of the lower orders wished to be thought posher than they actually were but also because it made life easier for everyone by not keeping everybody constantly on tenterhooks about whether he was being sufficiently deferential to someone who just might be his social superior as measured by some criterion or other of which he was unaware. Samuel Johnson lauded this all-purpose version of politeness as “artificial benevolence.” One sees evidence of its spread in the complete dislodgment of “thee” “thou” and “thy” from everyday speech. Now one tends to think of these words as hyper-formal because of their use in addresses to the Deity in the King James Version of the Bible, but they were in fact familiar forms like their counterparts in the continental languages—du, dein, tu, toi, etc. In everyday speech they were used only in addressing one’s social inferiors or equals—family members, friends, and servants (yes, even if one oneself was a servant, provided the addressee was a servant of inferior function). The last gasp of conversational thee and thou occurs in early eighteenth-century plays and novels, where it is employed exclusively by hotheaded young male aristocrats evincing their itch for a duel-challenge by presuming to “thee” and “thou” fellow bucks of equal or higher social status. Anyway, this pan-societal propagation of good manners was already complete by the time the abovementioned ex-office clerks and small-goods merchants took possession of their McManors en avant la lettre, which meant that these newly minted McLords of the McManor were already in possession of manners as polished as anyone would need for everyday non-sexual intercourse with people of any social stratum. At the same time, jumped-up ex-office clerks and small-goods merchants that they were, they could not but feel a bit insecure around established lords and ladies with mile-long pedigrees and family trees with semi-fossilized roots (not to mention untitled gentry with league-length pedigrees and family trees with fully fossilized roots). And at the same time prime, they could not but feel both inclined and obliged to entertain as guests these selfsame established lords and ladies qua their neighbors and official social equals. Consequently, in presenting themselves to these aristos and gentros at home they could not but feel inclined to risk erring on the side of propriety, to risk seeming to adhere to too many rules of comportment for fear of adhering to too few of them; sub-consequently they all too readily acquiesced in being assimilated to the pedantic comportmental machinery of their servants—i.e., the abovementioned new-school po-faced, jurisprudentially sober butlers and their equally po-faced underlings. Although nominally these pedants’ masters, they allowed themselves to be bossed about by them regarding their each and every movement (yes, yes, yes, including that sort of movement) and thereby—while doubtless occasioning much behind-the-glove sniggering among the ultra-poshies themselves—to give their merely upper-middle-crusty visitors the impression that this was the way all people of quality had always behaved.  So here, more than a hundred-and-fifty years ago, within the confines of the manor house itself, we already had the pattern or archetype of the YouTube lecture on the correct way to hold and use a knife and fork. Why, then, have the rest of us only been beaten over the head about such minutiae since the dawn of the present century? (“Since the dawn of the present century indeed?” the reader or listener is perhaps now belatedly interjecting, “What about that massive cudgel of a twentieth-century etiquette-guide, Emily Post’s?” But Emily Post’s guide was in spirit and substance the antithesis of the YouTube lecture, aiming as it did to facilitate the adaptation of the old-school near-universal etiquette to the widest possible range of social settings, to make it possible for people of the most widely divergent means to offer and receive hospitality to and from one another with grace and tact—to allow, for example, a servantless host or hostess to receive guests used to being waited on hand and foot and allow such guests to accommodate themselves to finding their hands and feet unattended.) To answer this question in full and in depth—or as much fullness or depth as it appears to admit—would require the regurgitation of a shelf or two of treatises classifiable under a handful or two of academic subject-headings, but it is as easy as pease-porridge pie to answer it to the extent that it can be answered by a description of the most historically proximate social phenomenon that is most readily abetted by the supervention of the over-the-head-beating—namely a convergence of the material interests of parties that in principle have nothing in common with each other or may even be ferociously opposed to each other, à la the famous coalition of bootleggers and Baptists in the Deep South during the Prohibition years. In the present case there are at least three such parties: that of the peasantry, that of the aggregate of pedants, the exponents-cum-fetishists of pedantry, whom we may with remarkable prosodic felicitousness christen the pedantry, and that of the aggregate of people unduly concerned with their personal health and well-being, whom we must, alas, refer to with remarkable prosodic wretchedness as the collectivity of valetudinarians. Evidences of the increasing prestige and power of the peasantry over the course of the second half of the twentieth century are too numerous (and politically scabrous) even to begin enumerating. Suffice it to say, the attribute of the peasantry most in point here is their utterly unregenerate slatternliness or slovenliness, their utterly unapologetic lack of attention to their mode of self-presentation. As for the pedantry, we are all used to hearing of their relatively recent ascent to ascendancy under the auspices of panegyrics and philippics on technocrats or experts. And the valetudinarians have quite recently come to the forefront of Occidental society’s collective consciousness via the innumerable accommodations of them in public life—from emotional support animals to triple-boldface warnings of the presence of humdrum food ingredients to mandatory masking during the event that cannot be named. The valetudinarians resemble the peasantry in their passion for the removal of impediments to their immediate somatic well-being and in their lack of shame or guilt at the suffering the indulgence of their passion may occasion their immediate neighbors. “I do not know,” quoth Dr. Johnson, “a more disagreeable character than a valetudinarian, who thinks he may do any thing that is for his ease, and indulges himself in the grossest freedoms: Sir, he brings himself to the state of being a hog in a sty.” Actually that is just the old-school G-rated version, so to speak, of Johnson’s remark, the version that made it into Boswell’s biography of him (Life, Tuesday, 16 September 1777, p. 604). In the passage in Boswell’s diary on which it is based, one sees that among the “grossest freedoms” indulged in by valetudinarians, Johnson specifically numbered “farting in one’s presence” (or something very close to that; regrettably the volume of the journal is not one that I own or can any longer readily maintain; at any rate, I am quite sure he used the word “fart”). Of course then as now, breaking wind unreservedly in company is something for which peasants are even more notorious than valetudinarians. The reason Johnson did not see fit to fulminate against the brazen flatulence of the peasantry is presumably that although he was far from wealthy, as an educated city-dweller of his time he could be more or less certain that he would never have to share a dinner table with any peasants—although admittedly his social standing did not prevent his being occasionally committed to debtor’s prison, where he may very well have had to break bread with members of the peasantry’s urban counterpart, the lumpen proletariat. Of course, we nice, normal would-be-law-abiding citizens of the early twenty-first century are not so fortunate as Dr. Johnson, for on pain of a fate far worse than debtor’s prison we are required to share dinner tables and articles of furniture exacting even greater intimacy with both valetudinarians and peasants without emitting the faintest whimper of a complaint. But equally of course, now that I have conjured this image of valetudinarians sitting more than figuratively cheek by jowl with peasants, the reader or listener is starting to wonder just how all this commensality, co-row-of-plane-seats-ality, and so forth is supposed to work in practical terms given that while the valetudinarian feels no guilt or shame at venting his own bodily exudations, he is as desperate as can be to avoid contact with the bodily exudations of others, and in particular with the types of bodily exudations that are most typically exuded by peasants and that I refuse to be enough of a lexical peasant or valetudinarian to specify.  That is quite a reasonable object of wonderment, but as I said before, we are dealing here with a coalition of parties with incommensurable agendas, which more or less necessarily means (as I own I have not yet said) that we are dealing with a coalition of people who are allied with each other only by way of being largely unaware of each other and who therefore cooperate with each other only indirectly, by directing their ire and aggression at a third party whom they both happen to regard as their enemy. In the abovementioned example of the coalition of bootleggers and Baptists, the common enemy of the two B’s was the ordinary moderate drinker who would have been content to down a beer or shot or two at Martini’s Bar a few times a week after work, and in the coalition now in point, the coalition of the peasantry and the valetudinarians, the common enemy is the ordinary exponent of old-fashioned good manners who simply wishes to cause and be caused as little discomfort to and by his tablemates, row-of-seat-mates, et al., with the minimum amount of fuss. The following parable of sorts will perhaps clarify how the conspiratorial magic trick works. Picture to yourself a three-seated airplane seat-row in the middle of which sits a nice, normal person flanked by a valetudinarian and a peasant. I suppose you will want to know which of the two, the valetudinarian or the peasant, is sitting by the window and which by the aisle. That is an interesting if ultimately immaterial question. One assumes that the valetudinarian will have strongly preferred to be sitting on (or against? or along?) the aisle for faster access to the toilet, but on reflection one dares not assume that he is actually sitting there because the peasant, although doubtless shameless enough to void his bladder or bowels in situ, is doubtless also aware that the airline’s rules are not yet so lax as to allow passengers that luxury, and so he will likely likewise have preferred the aisle seat as affording him the next best thing thereto; moreover being shamelessly pushy by nature, he will not unlikely-ly have insisted with a peremptory jerk of the chin or thumb on the valetudinarian’s making room for him should he have found him in the aisle seat before him. In any case, there the three of them—the valetudinarian, the nice person, and the peasant—are sitting, and the valetudinarian and the peasant, each of them actuated by his own type-characteristic motive, break wind loudly and almost but not quite simultaneously and therefore in such a way and at such a time as both not to mistake the other’s fart for his own and to identify it as the other’s. The nice person utters not a word of reproach to either of them and does not even dare raise his hand to his face to ward off the noxious vapors attacking his olfactory bulbs from both sides, but he cannot forbear from betraying a faint trace of aversion in the form of the slightest suspicion of a grimace. The valetudinarian and the peasant both notice the grimace, and each of them thereupon simultaneously interprets the aversion specifically as an aversion to his own pet obsession and interpellates the other peteur as a fixator on the same obsession—the valetudinarian on an obsession with doing what is immediately best for one’s own health, the peasant with gratifying one’s immediate somatic impulse. Thus, in that selfsame instant the two of them silently form a sturdy if unfounded bond of solidarity with each other and of hostility toward the nice person, now understood by the peasant as an abominably uptight spoilsport and by the valetudinarian as an abominably “unempathetic” non-carer about the survival of other people. And subsequently-cum-consequently, however inconspicuously the nice person may comport himself throughout the remainder of the flight, each of his slightest stirrings will be resented by each of his row-mates as a violation of the row-mate’s signature habitus. If, for example, he should find himself unable to refrain from sneezing, the valetudinarian will thereupon contract a homicidal loathing of him for having exposed him or her, the valetudinarian, to what he or she, the valetudinarian, will ineluctably regard as the cluster of viruses or bacteria that is or are bound to nullify his or her years of painstakingly implemented prophylactic measures and carry him or her to his or her grave within days if not hours of his or her egress from the plane; and the peasant will just as fiercely hate the sneezer qua disturber of his or her aural tranquility, qua interrupter of, say, his or her non-headphoned audition of the yobbos’ war chant over the loudspeaker of his or her personal telephone—for although the peasant venerates the removal of all curbs to somatic gratification, he or she attaches no importance whatsoever to the somatic comfort of others as an end in itself. As to the role played by the pedant in this abominable spectacle-cum-ordeal, it is roughly that of what the pop-psychologists would call an enabler, albeit only an enabler in absentia, which is why it will not quite do to call him a director or a conductor and why in introducing him back into the discussion I shall regretfully have to leave behind my parable. But of course even before launching properly back into the discursive mode I really must apologize for availing myself of the term enabler at all in the light of its just-mentioned pop-psychological provenance given that pop-psychologists figure among the most prolific and the most prolifically execrable of pedants—i.e., the pedants whose terminology is typically most tin-eared and wide of the mark. At this moment, though, it seems to me that enabler is exceptionally both succulently fleshy-eared and bull’s eye apple-hitting, for as I understand it an enabler is specifically a person who encourages people to engage in certain types of bad behavior whether he has any intention to do so or not. This is not to say that I am saying that the pedant is knowingly and passionately opposed to the bad behavior typically engaged in by the valetudinarian and the peasant; to the quasi-contrary, in virtue of his utter lack of finesse, of savoir vivre, of any affinity with or appreciation for the overall effect of personal comportment in a practicable social setting, the valetudinarian and the peasant could not find a warmer friend or a more loyal ally (to name an entity craved with especial ardor by today’s peasants and valetudinarians) in the pedant; I am simply saying that although a goodly proportion of the pedantry are also valetudinarians (although not peasants, for reasons that I shall refrain from explaining not out of fear or coyness but out of deference to the gratuitousness of explaining them [but to sum them up in a kind of proverb lest you think I am being disingenuous: The biggest nerds tend to be the biggest snifflers and vice-versa]), the pedant qua pedant has no specific interest in health or comfort as ends in themselves. Qua pedant he is solely interested in inculcating the miniscule pseudo-letter of his pseudo-law, and if the valetudinarian and the peasant can keep indulging in the grossest freedoms like hogs in sties while he goes about his inculcating rounds, that’s no skin off his skyward-orientated snout. “B-b-b-but,” the reader or listener is now doubtless stammering or spluttering in incomprehension or outrage, “isn’t there not only a social but a logical contradiction between modes of behavior like peasantism and valetudinarianism that involve letting it rip, letting it all hang out, and so on, and the militaristically pedantic approach to etiquette that involves the hyper-regimentation of the movement of each and every muscle at each and every microsecond?” Indeed there is such a contradiction (I rejoin), but don’t you see: in an age such as ours in which peasants and valetudinarians call the shots this contradiction has proved an infallible recipe for success for the hyper-pedantic etiquette consultants. For once people have been convinced that etiquette at its core and foundation is so complicated and involves such an inordinate degree of self-regulation that it cannot possibly be mastered by any human being, they will almost inevitably conclude that it is not worth devoting the slightest scintilla of attention to their manner of presenting themselves to their short-term neighbors—that they might as well go to the supermarket in their pajamas, curse like sailors if not paratroopers in front of children, eat soup and porridge “doggie-style,” etc. And indeed it is the drawing of this very conclusion that has been strenuously inculcated at least with the full cooperation of the etiquette pedants via Gosford Park’s unofficial sequel, the BBC “drama” series (and fellow Fellowes-vehicle) Downton Abbey. In the first season of the series, everybody in the eponymous monastery-turned-manor house, from his Lordship himself to his favorite mastiff, is as dour and foul-mooded as a dyspeptic high-Church warden’s widow, crushed as they all supposedly are under the weight of centuries of baronial ceremony. Some of this ceremony takes the form of the sorts of factitious house rules that we have already discussed, but a good bit of it hails from the decorum common to all decent society of the very early twentieth century—for example, the custom of “dressing for dinner,” which one finds being as religiously observed by the parvenu American publicity agent J. Ward Moorehouse in John Dos Passos’s USA trilogy, whose first volume was published just under a century ago. Anyway, about midway through the third season of DA, there is a prominent addition to the dramatis personae—some female cousin, a crapulous uncorseted septuagenarian American, a sort of extremely late-blooming flapper still reeking from bathtub gin consumed before the start of her transatlantic voyage, who immediately proceeds to let loose, or rather looser, in all sorts of objectionable ways. (Of course, I shall take the very American liberty of parenthetically remarking, no social portraitist on either side of the Pond has ever “punched right-Pondward” in presenting an interloping boor; one never sees movies in which a well-bred American household is barged in on by a lager-guzzling yob from Chatham or the old East End, the closest approach to such a presentation being the bestowal of a very slightly sub-posh Manchester accent on Frasier’s Daphne Moon.)  Her example soon infects the entire family: his lordship and ladyship’s eldest daughter elopes with the coachman; his lordship, riven with despair not so much at his daughter’s misalliance as at his own inability to part with his hereditary uptightness, blows his brains out, thus rendering the coachman the new his lordship and leaving his daughter (a.k.a. the new her ladyship) no scandalous option left but to embark on a series of amours with her husband’s prize stallions. And all of this is implied to be very, very, very, very, very, very, very, very good indeed with all the subtlety and understatement of the string of adverbs I have just employed. I exaggerate a bit, but not by much, at least to the best of my patchy recollection of the show, of which I never went out of my way to watch a single second—which meant that what with its being broadcast in Chuck Close-dimensioned high definition video and stadium-PA-system surround sound over every television in every building I entered in the course of its run, I ended up watching a thousand or so hours of it. Anyhow, at the end of this mini-rant I suppose the reader or listener is now much inclined dyspeptically to interject, “However aesthetically objectionable you may find Downton Abbey, how could even a single flake of skin be desquamated from your skyward-oriented snout by its wild popularity? Must everything that is wildly popular meet your exacting aesthetic standards? Wasn’t Downton Abbey just another example of good-old-fashioned wholesome escapism? You are sounding exactly like those po-faced church-ladies who fulminated against the corrupting influence of so-called gangster rap in the 1990s.” And of course I am sounding exactly like those po-faced church-ladies of yore, because while no, not everything that is wildly popular has to meet my exacting aesthetic standards, I would dearly like to live in a semblance of a civilization in which no television show that is wildly popular enthusiastically inculcates vice, because as the history of the reception of so-called gangster rap has shown, people do actually tend to imitate the behavior exhibited or described in the so-called media they consume.  Downton Abbey may be wholly chimerical as a depiction of the British aristocracy of the early twentieth century, but as a primer on what one might term Grisham’s law of social contagion it could not be more spot-on. For considering that all other things being equal, all of us, not just valetudinarians and peasants, would constantly give vent to our grossest animal impulses and are checked from doing so only by constant reminders of the benefits of self-restraint, over the long run we cannot help being only as well-behaved as the worst- behaved person in whose company we are habitually present–whether immediately and factually, as in potentially tactile in-person encounters, mediately and factually, as in telephone calls and video conferences, or mediately and fictionally, as in movie and television-viewing sessions. And as we are after all already within figurative spitting distance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the release of Gosford Park and the fifteenth anniversary of the premiere of Downton Abbey, we cannot but already also be within literal spitting distance of an entire generation of young Anglophone adults who have never known any models of decorum superior to the ones supplied by the Gosford Park-Downton Abbey televisual-cum-cinematic industrial complex. Whence, presumably, the recent surfacing on YouTube of po-faced young Brits insisting on my keeping a carpal- tunnel grip on my cutlery throughout a meal and eating my soup with the back of my fork. Fortunately, at least if there be any truth in rumor and damned statistics, today’s very young adults and oldest pre-adults, the younger tranche of the so-called Zoomers, attach no importance whatsoever to watching the latest Netflix releases or the current offerings at the local luxury multiplex, such that however degenerate the etiquette on display in these productions inevitably becomes, all hope is not lost of educating the rising generation in good etiquette by algorithmically forcing on them a steady viewing diet of, say, The Bob Newhart Show and The Sandbaggers, but however successful this virtual finishing school proves to be, until its charter class graduates, we are doubtless in for a bumpy ride. And just how bumpy a ride are we doubtless in for? Let’s just say that I would not be surprised, should fortune grace me with a long enough life and a large enough bank balance, to find myself before the end of this decade being thrown out of a three-star Michelin restaurant with a shirt-optional dress code and no no-farting section by a headwaiter attired in nothing but a so-called nut-hammock—and all for committing the by then-unpardonable social infraction of setting down my cutlery for half a second or rounding up my peas with the front side of my fork.               

THE END

 

                                                                                                                  

Sunday, September 08, 2024

Against Linguistic Hyperpharisaism

In this essay I am going to hold forth against a tendency that I probably first noticed only about a dozen years ago, although I have evidence that it began at least a dozen years before that, evidence that I shall eventually find opportunity to share with the reader or listener. The tendency in question is the tendency among police-like entities to censure as rule-violations certain usages of English that in fact cannot be regarded as rule-violations in even the loosest of senses. This tendency is not to be confused with the tendency of such entities to censure usages that may be regarded as rule-violations in at least the strictest of senses, which is why this essay is called “Against Linguistic Hyperpharisaism” and not “Against Linguistic Pharisaism.” To be sure, linguistic Pharisaism, by which I understand the tendency to pounce on every violation of every rule of usage, however trivial or obscure or debatable that rule may be, is a nuisance, but I have no interest in writing an essay against linguistic Pharisaism—first, because there is no attribute or class of attributes that is or are generally agreed to distinguish a rule that must be observed from a rule that need not be, or any criterion or set of criteria by which one might draw such a distinction oneself. I happen to think constructions of the form “me + some noun”—for example, “me and my mother” and “me and my shadow” are to be avoided even in the most informal speech; in my view, even among one’s dearest friends or in the lowest company one should instead say “my mother and I,” “my shadow and I,” and the like. I also happen to think that even a grammatically appropriate “whom” sounds unpardonably stiff in all but the most formal speech; that the utterer of “Whom did you see?” to his next-door neighbor and “The bagboy whom I asked for help with my groceries” to a supermarket manager would have done better to say “Who did you see?” and, provided he didn’t want to dispense with the relative pronoun altogether by opting for “The bagboy I asked for help with my groceries” (which probably would have been just fine), “The bagboy who I asked for help with my groceries.” But I can readily enough imagine that there are people who are absolute sticklers for observation of the who/whom distinction and have no qualms whatsoever about “me and my mother,” and at least as of now I haven’t the vaguest idea of how I might go about persuading such a person to be more laid back about “Who did you see?” and more uptight about “me and my mother.” Not that I despair of ever acquiring the sharpest idea of how I might go about doing that, of working out exactly why “Who did you see?” is acceptable spoken English and “me and my mother” isn’t, but that even if I do acquire that idea it is unlikely to form a practicable basis for an essay against linguistic Pharisaism en bloc because the principle on the grounds of which “Who did you see?” is to be defended it is likely to be quite a distinctly different one from the one on the grounds of which “me and my mother” is to be assailed, and each of these principles is likely to be distinctly different from the principles on the grounds of which any other solecism or pseudo-solecism, from the unattached participle to the split infinitive, may be defended. So basically each of the defenses of or assaults on each of these solecisms or pseudo-solecisms would have to be undertaken in an essay treating of its pertinent founding principle and could not be undertaken in an essay against linguistic Pharisaism en bloc. Another reason why I have no interest in writing an essay against linguistic Pharisaism—or, rather, because, as I have just shewn, an essay against linguistic Pharisaism as a general phenomenon is effectively impossible—on any instance of linguistic Pharisiaism, is that in this age of licentiousness for licentiousness’s sake in all domains of life, there is scarcely any rule of English usage whose wanton violation has not already been graced by its championing essay, and doubtless precious few whose WV has not already been graced by upwards of dozens of such essays, such that in defending the-less-than-strict observance of any rule I am unlikely to be contributing any original insight into that rule or why it need not be strictly observed. And complementarily, in this age of licentiousness for licentiousness’ sake in all domains of life, I cannot but fear that, for all my super-picayune-ness of my pretensions to authority in meta-linguistic matters, in defending the less-than-strict observance of any rule I am all too likely to be abetting my arch-enemies, the champions of licentiousness for licentiousness’s sake in all domains of life; in other words, I cannot but fear that any reader of an essay by me championing the use of “who” instead of “whom” in everyday speech is all too likely to interpret my championing of laxity with regard to that particular rule as a synecdoche for laxity with regard to rules in general, and to receive my essay as the straw that breaks the back of the camel bearing his last residue of resistance to the temptation to freebase crack cocaine during his next bus commute or her last residue of resistance to the temptation to don Yoga pants for her next attendance in the audience at a performance at the Metropolitan Opera. By “linguistic Hyperpharisaism” I understand a phenomenon categorically different from and at least potentially altogether more pernicious than linguistic Pharisaism; a phenomenon that is less worthy of description as a vice or bad habit than as a form of madness—namely, the categorical assailing and rejection of usages that instantiate certain established structural features of our language, features in whose absence English would “in a certain very real sense” no longer be English at all, at least in full. Chief among these stigmatized features is the passive voice as distinguished from the active voice. In the active voice, the subject of the sentence performs the action denoted by the verb: “I ate the sandwich,” “He drives the car,” and “She smiles” are all in the active voice. In the passive voice the subject of the sentence is the entity on or to which the action denoted by the verb is performed: “The sandwich was eaten by me,” “The car is driven by him,” and “Her smile is smiled by her” are all in the passive voice. To me it seems reasonable to regard the passive voice as a radically integral part of the English language because to the best of my knowledge not only English but also all other modern European languages and the two main ancient European languages, Greek and Latin, have a passive voice, although not all of these languages form the voice in the same way as we Anglophones do—in German, for example, it is formed them not with the verb meaning to be, sein, but with the verb werden, meaning to become; and some languages avail themselves of it more liberally than others. French, for example, tends to offer reflexive verbs for use in contexts in which English-speakers would use the passive voice, and German-speakers often achieve a passive voice-like effect with man—their equivalent of our impersonal pronoun one—in the active voice. But none of these languages has dispensed with the passive voice completely, and although of course we should never regard any facet of any other language as a full-fledged precedent to be imported unmodified into ours, it seems entirely reasonable to fight shy of even entertaining the notion of discontinuing any facet of our language that has proved to be a stable constituent of the languages most closely related to ours. But in seeming defiance of reason certain entities with widely acknowledged pretentions to linguistic authority have lately gone much farther than merely entertaining the notion of discontinuing the passive voice and have gone so far, indeed, as to aim full-steam ahead for this discontinuation by categorically proscribing that voice. The more recent versions of Microsoft Word, for example, will not stick at putting a squiggly red line under an occurrence of “The omelet is eaten by me,” “The ball is being kicked by the boy,” or “The woman’s teeth were being brushed by her,” and of course the squiggly red line signals that the underlined string of text comprises a definite error; unlike the squiggly green line it is not meant merely to alert the writer to a choice that may be stylistically ill advised. Admittedly Microsoft Word will not stick at putting a squiggly red line under passive constructions by default; admittedly, the user has to select the option to have them underlined that is presented in the options menu for the spelling and grammar checker. But of course Word would not present that option were it not an option that a substantial proportion of its customers found desirable, as they would do only if they themselves regarded the use of the passive voice as the infringement of a rule; for after all, Word’s spelling and grammar checker does not offer any options that merely cater to the user’s arbitrary preferences: for example, a lipogrammist cannot ask the checker to red-squiggle every occurrence of a word containing a certain letter of the alphabet. Besides, the user is not always in control of which usages are squiggled or whether they receive a red squiggle or the less peremptory green one. At the governmental agency at which I formerly worked, my passive constructions were automatically red-squiggled, and I was as powerless to un-squiggle them as I was to impel my supervisors and coworkers to present me with Word documents that didn’t deserve virtually uninterrupted double red squiggles for egregious actual transgressions of grammar. For a description of these transgressions the reader or listener may turn to my essay “Customizing the Corpse for the Coffin,” as the governmental agency referred to therein is the same as the one referred to herein and just now. But to return to the passive voice as a topic in its own right: notwithstanding my paternity of the three passive constructions cited a few sentences ago, the first three such constructions that occurred to me in the course of composing the sentence containing them, I would be if not the first then very probably not the last person to admit that they aren’t exactly pretty or that they wouldn’t be improved by conversion into the active voice, by being recast as “I eat the omelet,” “The boy is kicking the ball,” and “The woman was brushing her teeth,” but I would be the very last person, or at least the very last sane person, to term them ungrammatical. They are indeed as impeccably grammatical as “The cat sat on the mat” or “The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog.” So why are they and grammatically parallel constructions flagged as grammatically erroneous—or, as Microsoft Word would prefer, “Why is Microsoft Word flagging them and grammatically parallel constructions as grammatically erroneous?” I have in my possession no empirical evidence of any kind that would allow me to answer this question with the remotest approach to certitude—no press release or inter-office memo from Microsoft with “Re: Anti-Passive Voice Initiative” as its subject line, say, or You-Tube footage of an interview in which Mr. Gates or his successor addresses his software’s stigmatization of the voice; nor even, indeed, any remarks from any of my fellow Word-users about the stigmatization, and certainly no complaints thereabout therefrom, but the silence with which the stigmatization has been greeted, in conjunction with numerous criticisms of the passive voice that I have heard being emitted by my fellow-Anglophones, Word-users and non-Word users alike, in recent years, suggests to me an explanation for the stigmatization that may initially seem to bear no conceivable causal relation whatsoever thereto—viz., the pan-Anglospheric reverence accorded to George Orwell’s essay “Politics and the English Language,” in which the author attacks the passive voice with peculiarly excoriating vituperation perhaps paralleled only in the sermons of certain old-school Protestant preachers like Johnathan Edwards—paralleled, that is, in their sermons against Scripturally proscribed sins, mind you, not against the passive voice, against which as far as I know neither they nor any of their contemporaries of any religious or secular profession harbored any grudge. There is undoubtedly something counterintuitive about my ascribing immediate efficient causality of such a recent phenomenon as this stigmatization to an entity of such remote genesis as an essay published nearly eighty years ago, and perhaps there is something especially counterintuitive about my ascribing it to this Orwell essay, for one cannot in good faith assert that that essay fell dead-born from the press when it was first published or that it has ever since  been “forgotten” in even the modern vulgar sense according to which any entity that is no longer a top-ten item in the world’s list of famous entities is forgotten. “Politics and the English Language” has in fact always been enormously popular as an authority on English usage and indeed has probably only ever been exceeded by Fowler’s and Strunk and White in its popularity in that capacity.  But over the past quarter-century or so, Orwell himself has become not only enormously more popular but also enormously more prestigious—not to be sure, on the basis of “Politics and the English Language” but on the basis of two of his novels, Nineteen Eighty-Four and Animal Farm. By a curious paradox that is doubtless resolvable into a law at some resolution, as Anglophones’ taste in literature has deteriorated and their acquaintance with books worth reading has diminished, their respect for the few writers they do still read—all of them novelists—has swelled to outright idolatry. They have ceased to see novelists as fallible portraitists of the world who even at their most faithful are bound to fall short of perfection in virtue of the finitude imposed by the principle of selection, by the impossibility of including everything within the “frames” of their compositions, and come to see them as infallible prophets and oracles whose works must be studied with indefatigable scrutiny for anticipations of anathema-worthy aspects of the present; and conversely the present must be indefatigably studied for descendants of even the writer’s least fearsome bugbears. Basically under this dispensation, anything some great or supposedly great novelist found objectionable is regarded by everyone as the worst thing that could ever possibly exist or happen, and everyone is constantly on guard against manifestations or occurrences of that thing. With regard to Orwell, everyone is terrified of suddenly finding himself “literally living in the world of Nineteen Eighty-Four,” a novel to which “Politics and the English Language” has become a sort of annex or supplement, such that each of its proscribed usages, including the passive voice, has come to be regarded as a constituent of the novel’s dreaded parody of Basic English, Newspeak. It is now universally feared that if expressions like “it is now universally feared” aren’t quashed in the next ten minutes, a year from now we shall all be saying “double-plus ungood” instead of “bad.” But this observation prompts or elicits but most certainly does not beg the question, “Given that Newspeak was based on a real-world systemized mangling of the English language and that ‘double-plus ungood’ really is such a double double-plus ungood substitute for ‘bad,’ might not today’s stigmatization of the passive voice be not entirely unfounded—or, to employ a less double-plus ungood-like construction (the rhetorical term for constructions of that form is litotes [I mention this simply because it has just occurred to me that the original, primal target of Orwell’s meta-linguistic fury may have been not modish Newspeak but the ancient classical rhetoric that was doubtless drilled into him during his schooldays at Eton]) all too well founded? And the true answer to this question is doubtless “Yes.” Of course, if I were—or had been ten seconds ago—a true Orwellian in a comically underused sense (which is to say, one of the two or three main sense-types of ian-ending adjectives derived from writers’ names [adjectives like Shakespearian, Johnsonian, and Dickensian {for it is surely significant that apart from Orwellian, eponymous adjectives denoting only the horrifying or grotesque aspects of a writer’s work take the more foreign-sounding and therefore more off-putting termination –esque, as in Kafkaesque and Dante-esque {although “Swiftian” may be an Orwellian-esque exception}])—I would have simply answered with a one-word reply of “Yes” or at the very least not qualified my windy multi-word assertion with the weasely adverb “doubtless.” But the truth is—and here I am not going to qualify my assertion with “doubtless” because I am absolutely certain of the truthfulness of the predicated state of affairs in point—that there are occasions, or rather events much more frequent than occasions (I would term them “frequencies” if countable “frequency” did not already denote a radio band-length--if, in other words, it were not already an occupied “frequency” linguistically speaking) on which one is not absolutely certain of what one is asserting and yet one finds it worthwhile to assert it, such that if one wishes to be both honest and productive one really has no choice but to answer with a full-fledged sentence a question in principle answerable with a bare “yes” or “no” and to avail oneself of a qualifying adverb like “doubtless.” Of course the world has always teemed with people who answer such questions in such a fashion because they are weasels who don’t believe what they are asserting at all but find it impolitic to say what they really believe, but one mustn’t transform oneself into a “Yes” or “No”-man out of fear of being mistaken for such a weasel, because such fear is itself quintessentially weasely. But the or at least an unqualified truth, the or at least a “doubtless”-free truth, is that the degree of well-foundedness of today’s stigmatization of the passive voice is a phenomenon that requires such qualification as is afforded by “doubtless,” because there are undoubtedly—which is to say not merely doubtless but certainly—quite a number of people who habitually employ the passive voice in a Newspeak-like way—as a way of obfuscating what is most significant about the state of affairs that they are referencing, as a way of making it seem to be about something peripheral to it instead of being about what is central to it by making it unclear who has caused something—generally something bad—to happen, and thereby making it impossible to assign responsibility for the bad event to a specific agent. So a child who having being entrusted with the care of a puppy feeds it to an alligator at the zoo, might say, on being queried by his elders about the whereabouts of the little dog afterwards, “It was fed to an alligator at the zoo” in the hope that his elders assume the zookeeper rather than he, the tot himself, did the feeding. Of course one most often encounters this responsibility-shunting use of the passive voice in bureaucratic (and therefore axiomatically “Orwellian” or “Kafkaesque”) contexts, contexts in which owing to the numerousness and anonymity of the set of suspectable agents, the user stands a pretty good chance of getting away with the use. If Jones, an employee of a government agency or large private company tasked with handling inquiries from the general public is asked by a member of that general public for the whereabouts of some piece of paper submitted for processing long ago and cannot readily locate that piece of paper, he is likely to answer that it possibly “was misrouted” even if he knows from long experience at the organization that it was almost certainly misrouted and that Jenkins in accounts payable almost certainly must have misrouted it. He is likely to answer this for three reasons that I can think of right now (and I am sure there are at least four other likely reasons): that he likes Jenkins well enough not to want to get him in trouble, that mentioning Jenkins’s name in such a context would be tantamount to disciplining him, and he, the inquiry-handler is not authorized to discipline his fellow-employees; and that his and Jenkins’s superiors are not likely to want it disclosed to a member of the general public that there is such a person as Jenkins in accounts payable, lest that member immediately start bawling out Jenkins, which is likely to put the superiors’ noses out of joint for any number of reasons. I hope the scenario outlined in the preceding two sentences justifies my earlier use of the qualifying “doubtless,” because this scenario is certainly tedious enough as it is and on its own. I not only hope but trust that it gives the reader or listener the sense that a “faceless bureaucrat” and even a “faceless bureaucracy” might have uses for the passive voice that are more ethically redeemable than those to which that voice was (or is) put by the abovementioned puppy-guarding child and even more ethically redeemable than the linguistic depravations of Newspeak, whose raison d’être was after all to facilitate the incessant stomping of a boot on a human face. It is not easy to envisage a worthy purpose that would be served by Jones’s bluntly and immediately announcing to the seeker of the piece of paper, “Jenkins in accounts payable lost it.” Of course, there is a danger that after Jones has told the paper-seeker, “It was probably misrouted,” the paper-seeker will never get any further towards understanding what happened to the piece of paper he submitted, or even that the piece of paper will never be found and hence that he will be put through the misery of having to fill out and submit an entirely new piece of paper (or, God forbid, if the misplaced paper-piece is some sort of one-of-a-kind irreplaceable document, forced to abandon all hope of achieving whatever end he hoped to achieve in submitting the piece of paper). Jones himself might simply never approach Jenkins to ask him about the piece of paper, for instance; or Jenkins, on being approached by Jones, might be bawled out and peremptorily told to go take a hike; or Jones, on going to his boss—let’s just call him Smith, although he isn’t really going to be around here long enough to merit a name—to complain about having been bawled out and told to take a hike by Jenkins, might be told by Smith that “for the good of the organization” it would be best not trouble Jenkins any further about the piece of paper (doubtless [!] only because Smith himself is afraid of being bawled out and told to take a hike by Jenkins). But the passive voice will have been the efficient cause of none of these lamentable and reprehensible sequels to the paper-seeker’s inquiry. I am not about to trot out an analogy to any of the usual truisms centering on certain implements and the uses to which they are put (or to which people put them) because every single one of these truisms has become politically incendiary in one direction or another; suffice it to say that the passive voice is at least as deserving of such a truism as most of the implements on which such a truism has been bestowed (or on which people have bestowed such), which is to say that one ought not to disparage anyone for using it, the passive voice, unless one can be sure that the user used it out of blame-shifting motives (because it is often used [or people often use it] out of entirely different motives), and that categorically refusing to use it oneself with the aim avoiding blame-shifting is bound at least occasionally to cause one to shift blame despite oneself. In the opening sentence of my scenario, I quite rightly wanted to make Jones the center of the attention because he was the one who was to use the passive-voice construction “The paper was possibly misrouted,” and making him the focus of attention required making him the subject of the main clause, “he is likely to answer it was possibly ‘misrouted,’” which in turn necessitated making him the subject of two passive-constructions: “tasked with handling inquiries from the general public” and “is asked by a member of that general public.” Disencumbering the opening sentence would have required breaking it up into a pair or trio of separate sentences each with its own subject or pair of subjects, roughly as follows: “At a government agency or large private company Jones’s superiors have tasked him with handling inquiries from the general public. If a member of this general public asks Jones for the whereabouts of some piece of paper submitted for processing long ago and Jones cannot readily locate that piece of paper, Jones is likely to answer that it possibly ‘was misrouted’ even if he knows from long experience etc.” My original version primes the reader from the start to expect Jones to be the employer of the passive voice by contriving to mention him in its second word. My revision, by necessarily mentioning two other subjects of active-voice constructions—Jones’s superiors and the member of the general public—before mentioning Jones himself qua subject, prompts the reader pointlessly to wonder if one of these subjects is going to be the passive-voice user, or possibly even pointlessly to wonder what the deuce this entire deuced rigmarole has got to do with the use of the passive voice and therefore possibly even to stop reading before he reaches the concatenation’s illustrative instance of that use. All the same, a counterfactual reader or listener who encountered the revision first might not find its perverse marginalization of Jenkins particularly off-putting and would after all eventually come to learn that Jenkins was the passive-voice user; such that one might term the revision’s perverse employment of the active voice a latent perversity. There are, however, certain uses of the active voice that are overtly perverse, uses thereof that cannot but strike even the reader or listener unacquainted with passive-voiced alternatives as ridiculous, awkward, or even tasteless. For some reason, I tend to find examples involving the destruction of beautiful man-made structures particularly vividly illustrative of this assertion. Take a sentence like “The original Belvedere Hotel, a magnificent ten-story Belle-Époque building in the neo-Rococo style, was demolished in 1970 to make way for the five-story New-Brutalist Belvedere that stands there today.” Is it in any way improved by being recast as a sentence that reads: “In 1970, the Acme Demolition Company blew up the original Belvedere Hotel, a magnificent ten-story Belle-Époque building,” etc.? Or a sentence like, “The original of this portrait of Joseph Haydn was destroyed in an Allied bombing raid.” Can anyone genuinely prefer its active-voice alternative, “A Consolidated B-24 Liberator bomber plane dropped the blockbuster that destroyed the original of this portrait of Joseph Haydn.”? The sad or happy truth is that what happens to someone or something is often more important than who or what makes whatever happens to it happen and that accordingly a passive-voice construction is often preferable to an active-voice one, although to term such a construction “preferable” misleadingly suggests that one will have generally arrived at it as the result of consciously pondering whether to use the active or the passive voice when one will have generally arrived at it as a matter of course, which is to say, as a result of simply knowing that the scene or situation to be written about is one in which the entity acted upon rather than the agent takes pride of place or center stage. Such being the non-grammatical case, the entire topic of the passive voice is perhaps better addressed by the moralist than by the grammarian, although as my use of the phrase “matter of course” in the last sentence suggests, even the moralist will largely have occasion to address this topic descriptively rather than prescriptively, to point out the inappropriate use of the passive or active voice as a symptom of a generally inadequate moral orientation rather than as a bad moral practice to be corrected in isolation. Even making the avoidance of the passive voice into a certain sort of rule of thumb, the rule of thumb that dictates that the practice in question is to be avoided unless some strong reason for opting for it can be adduced, is dangerous because even rules of thumb “scale” poorly (I just put “scale” in quotation marks because the sense in which I have just employed it is a dubious neologism [as I have confirmed by not finding it in my 1990 Concise Oxford Dictionary], but I didn’t stick at using it because I couldn’t think of a more appropriate word to use, a circumstance that I find disturbing inasmuch as the phenomenon designated by it cannot but be at least as ancient as the blueprints of the great pyramids). What I mean in saying that a rule of thumb “scales” poorly is that while such a rule may be effectively and ethically enough adopted and applied by one person on his own, its inculcation upon a great number of people at once is bound frequently to eventuate in unethical results and hence to prove ineffective or even “counterproductive.” The abovementioned implementation of the proscription of the passive voice by my former employer the governmental agency is a case in illustration of the inefficacy-cum-counterproductiveness of the “scaling” of such rules. Whichever faceless or faceded functionary decreed the organization-wide selection of Microsoft Word’s passive-voice-flagging option was presumably aware of the associations of the passive voice with faceless bureaucracies and presumably imposed the selection with the express aim of reducing the frequency of such acts of administrative buck-passing as one witnesses in my Jones-and-Jenkins scenario, or at least with the more general aim of making the agency’s public image less stereotypically bureaucratic. But as I can confidently attest on the evidence of the tens of thousands of pages of prose that I was obliged to proofread for the agency—pages whose content was ultimately destined for the eyes of the public—its proscription of the passive voice did not make its employees a jot more human-seeming and seemingly only made their writing all the more difficult to render even minimally readable thanks to the pullulation therein of genuine grammatical transgressions, transgressions that had “flown beneath the radar” of the grammar checker, as the most occlusive such transgressions tend to do owing to their inextricability from certain macro-syntactic structures, structures that extend far beyond the relation between, say, a verb and its geographically most proximate subject.

“Something too much of this.” Much as I loathe so-called hard breaks, I am going to have to make such a break now, as I really can’t descry any sub-generic connection between the species of hyperpharisaism I have just described and the one that I am about to describe. Actually that’s not quite true: like the passive voice, the usage wrongly prescribed by this species has come in for some squiggly red underlining by the Word spelling and grammar checker. But because in contrast to Word’s treatment of the passive voice the squiggly red underlining isn’t consistently applied to this usage, here squiggly red underlining isn’t a particularly good starting point for a discussion of that usage’s stigmatization. Anyway, the usage in question is nothing less massive or fundamental to our language than the entire class of words known as adverbs. At the outset I must concede that I have not found adverbs animadverted against nearly as widely as the passive voice; I must concede, indeed, that unlike the passive voice, adverbs appear to be in no immediate or mediate danger of being reduced to the linguistic equivalent of an endangered species, let alone to the linguistic equivalent of a dodo or passenger-pigeon because unlike the passive voice they have not yet attracted the gunfire of the multi-million-strong Anglophone intellectual petite bourgeoisie. Who, then, is or are directing their gunfire at adverbs en bloc, and why am I dismayed by it or their attack given that I have already conceded it poses no so-called existential threat to that bloc? Why, axiomatically, the Anglophone intellectual grande bourgeoisie who, although much smaller in number than their petit-bourgeois contemporaries are axiomatically deserving of much greater deference—not, to be sure, that they are deserving of supinely reflexive obedience but that when a member of their number objects to something or some practice, however irrational or unreasonable their objections thereto may seem to be, one should at least be prepared to entertain those objections, to entertain the notion that this person has espied something objectionable about it that one has oneself overlooked. Now in this case, the case of the proscription of adverbs, I have in fact discovered three intellectual grands bourgeois tendering the objection, although as the first two were and are friends of each other and tendered the objection in virtual unison and within earshot of each other perhaps I should simply count them together as one intellectual grand bourgeois. At any rate, I have concluded that these two are at least tentatively to be regarded as intellectual grands bourgeois because one of them is a sort of art historian who has uttered some remarks about Francis Bacon the younger that struck me as thoughtful and insightful to the admittedly limited extent to which my superficial and indeed merely intellectually petit-bourgeois-worthy acquaintance with Frank’s oeuvre enabled me to appraise them; and because the other is a sort of Shakespeare scholar who has published a few books on the Bard that seem to set forth arguments that strike me as sane and cogent to the admittedly limited extent to which, inasmuch as I haven’t read any of these books, I have acquired an adequate sense of their contents from their 50-to-a-hundred-word-long encapsulations on Amazon. Admittedly, this selfsame Shakespeare scholar of sorts has admitted that he finds the shall/will distinction “tricky,” when any true intellectual grand bourgeois in the grand tradition thereof ought to find the shall/will distinction about as tricky as the backside/hole-in-the-ground one, but as he is barely forty and hence at least technically a so-called Millennial, I am grudgingly willing to grant him a sort of generational handicap and recognize him as an intellectual grand bourgeois for simply being aware that there is or used to be such a point of English usage as the shall/will distinction. But enough about these blokes’ or gents’ credentials—what about their argument? What about the reasons or rationale they adduced in support of their rejection of adverbs? For after all, in stating a few minutes ago that intellectual grand-bourgeoishood automatically made a person’s objections worth entertaining, I did more or less axiomatically imply that these objections would be founded in something solidly entertainable, something capable of being swished against one’s mind’s soft palate a few times, something framable as a “because” clause. But I now see that I was a mile wide of the mark in implying anything of the kind, for on perusing my mind’s tables I find no note therein of anything approaching an argument from these gents or blokes; all I find therein, indeed, is, mutatis mutandis, that logical positivist’s famous or notorious reductio ad absurdum of all morally based arguments against stealing money—viz., “I don’t care for adverbs” and “Adverbs—mmbflbh!” respectively. So in truth I have no idea why either of these blokes or gents doesn’t care for adverbs. But what about my other grand-bourgeois disparager? Well, he was and is none other than the Australian writer Gerald Murnane, who deserves some deference not only as a man of high intelligence and deep knowledge of literature in English but also as a formidable prose stylist. But to the best of my knowledge (a knowledge that could admittedly be bettered, as I have as read less than half of Murnane’s published output), his entire polemic on adverbs consists of a single parenthetical sentence that occurs towards the end of his most recent (and purportedly last) book, Last Letter to a Reader and reads as follows: “I decided long ago that few adverbs are needed in prose.” Apart from its less than fully categorical dismissal of adverbs—i.e., its preference of “few adverbs” to “no adverbs”—and its confinement of the scope of its proscription to prose, this utterance is obviously identical in substance to those of the other two dudes and therefore no more enlightening as regards any thought-trains that either may have preceded it or might yet be adduced in support of it. So basically I have no idea whatsoever why any of these dudes objects to the adverb, such that it follows that nothing but superstitious idolatry of their intellectual grand bourgeoishood could ever impel me to follow their example in shunning that part of speech—and that it further follows that the only reader or listener who could ever be persuaded to follow my example were I to follow theirs would be a reader who both shared with me my superstitious idolatry of intellectual grands bourgeoises and regarded me in particular as an intellectual grand bourgeois. And as for all the loftiness of my de facto appraisal of intellectual grand bourgeoises by comparison with my de facto appraisal of intellectual petits bourgeoises I am certainly no superstitious idolator of intellectual grands bourgeoises, I owe it both to myself and to my readers and listeners to have a go at ferreting or stoating out not only what these gents or blokes could conceivably have found objectionable about adverbs but also what, if anything, actually might be intrinsically objectionable about adverbs and then to have a go at determining whether any of these objectionable qualities are sufficiently objectionable to warrant any sort of prescription of any degree of restraint or restriction of scope in the use of adverbs—from the most tentative of situationally contingent cautionary notes to an outright global peremptory proscription. As we have seen, the art historian and Shakespeare scholar give us nothing to go on. Murnane, in asserting that he has firmly decided that “few adverbs are needed in prose” gives us reason to suppose that he believes that a few adverbs are needed in prose and to conclude that he may believe that quite a few or even many adverbs are needed in poetry.  And as Murnane has published at least one volume of poetry and indeed is—at least to the best of my recollection (which is admittedly not good enough to pinpoint the passage in which he has made the SOA in question evident)—one of those numerous accomplished prose writers who started out trying to be preeminently a poet, one may—or so at least it seems to me—safely conclude that he does not regard adverbs as intrinsically or universally objectionable; whereas one could not (or so at least it seems to me) get away with concluding anything to that effect if he had uttered or written the same string of lexemes and yet been one of those equally numerous accomplished prose writers who think that poetry is so much hifalutin fluff. So Murnane must have thought that adverbs were in some manner appropriate to meritorious qualities in poetry that were either absent from prose or present in prose to a much smaller extent and that adverbs enhanced these qualities or participated in them in a way that made them (adverbs, not the qualities) not infrequently indispensable. Off the top of my head (and this being a mere essay and not a work of scholarship, I think it best not to search any deeper than that-there top), I can think of only three qualities that may be uncontentiously said to distinguish poetry from prose. To give you a sense of the flavor of something that may be contentiously said to distinguish poetry from prose, I refer you to the Theophrastian figure of the three sentence ago—the prose writer who thinks of poetry as so much hifalutin fluff. That writer’s view of poetry arises from resistance to a contentious notion about poetry—that it treats of matters that are in some way too elevated or serious to be treated of in prose.  But it may be uncontentiously said of poetry that it makes more frequent use of figurative language than prose, that even its non-figurative language is more concentrated, “more pregnant with meaning,” than that of prose and that in contrast to prose it involves some attention to that practice confusingly known as prosody—the systematic treatment of the rhythm of language through stresses and vowel lengths, whether formally through meter or informally as in free verse. And in connection at least with this last quality, that of prosody, I am aware of one remark apropos of adverbs that may just furnish us some insight. The remark was made by Jorge Luis Borges when he was interviewed by William F. Buckley in 1977: “If you take an English adverb, or two English adverbs, you say for instance ‘quickly,’ slowly,’ the stress falls on the significant part of the word. Quick-ly. Slow-ly. But if you say it in Spanish, you say ‘lentamente,’ ‘rapidamente,’ then the stress falls, let’s say, on the non-significant part, the gadget.” Of course, Borges isn’t strictly correct here in terming the ly-constituted part of English adverbs and mente-constituted part not-significant, for they signify quite significantly that the word that they terminate is distinct in meaning, and distinct therein in quite a distinct way, from the adjective with which it would otherwise be identical. They signify that quickly means “in a quick way” rather than “quick,” that rapidamente means “de una manera rapida” rather than “rapida.” Still, he is right inasmuch as the “gadgets” do not participate in distinguishing the ways or manners from each other, such that nothing but long-established linguistic etiquette prevents a speaker or writer from simply tacking them onto a string of uninflected adjectives—from saying or writing “I walked slow proud and angry-ly” rather than “I walked slowly, proudly, and angrily” or “Camino lenta, orgullosa, y furiosa-mente” rather than “Camino lentamente, orgullosamente, y furiosamente.” It is this detachable, purely inflective nature of the adverbial termination that seems to have inspired Borges to term it a “gadget” by way of distinguishing it from the organic, infungible nature of the adjectives to which it is appended. Of course, plenty of adjectives are themselves partly constituted by such dead, infinitely repositionable “gadgets,”—gadgets like the prefixes “in” and “un” and the suffixes “able/ible” and “ic”—and the fact that quite by chance (I swear) only one of the adjectives that I have used since “furoisamente” does not contain such a “gadget” suggests that even the majority of English adjectives are so constituted. Still, Borges’s point is broadly very well-taken: we don’t think of an adjective as including a “gadget” as a matter of course, such that even the most “gadget”-ridden of English adjectives such as “indispensable”—which has two monosyllabic “gadgets” (“in” and “dis”) in front and one disyllabic adjective (“able”) in back, such that its only non-“gadgetic” component is its third syllable (“spens”)—sounds less “gadgety” than the humblest and most wholesome of adverbs such as the abovementioned “slowly.” And Borges’s point about English adverbs versus Spanish ones is very strictly well-taken: the fact that in English adverbs the stress always falls on some syllable of the adjectival core rather than on the adverb-signifying termination whereas in Spanish adverbs the stress always falls on the first syllable of that termination makes English adverbs invariably less obtrusive than Spanish ones. Because the English “gadget” is only monosyllabic while the Spanish “gadget” is disyllabic, an important corollary of Borges’s point is that a larger share of the English adverb is significant than the Spanish adverb; and although I am by no means sufficiently familiar with Spanish poetry to replace the conjecture that follows with a full-blown assertion to the same effect (minus its conditional modality, of course), it would seem that the confinement of its “gadget” to an unstressed monosyllable tends to render the English adverb better suited than the Spanish to the construction of the verse forms most widely employed by writers of modern European languages (including English and Spanish albeit excluding French, verse written in which is purely syllabic in meter owing to the language’s effective lack of accentual stress), inasmuch as in poetic meter (as indeed in prose, but in prose one is afforded far more flexibility in determining where the stresses fall) the stressed syllables tend to carry more significance than unstressed ones, and the meters most frequently employed by modern European-language poets—i.e., the iambic and trochaic meters— are based in immediately alternating stressed and unstressed syllables; are meters in which every unstressed syllable is always immediately preceded or followed by a stressed one and vice-versa. And now we are at last perhaps getting close to an understanding of what Murnane may have been driving at in his implication that adverbs need not be used only sparingly in poetry. For it follows that if one is committed to a system such as that of accentual-syllabic metrical versification in which significance is perforce recurrently and frequently backgrounded, and in particular to iambic and trochaic metrical accentual-syllabic versification, it follows that one is especially well served by a grammatical form such as the –ly terminating adverb that confines its less or least significance-rich part to a single unaccented syllable. To be sure, the –ly terminating adverb is not the only English grammatical form by which one is so especially well served. The kind of adjective that is formed by adding y to a noun is another—whence the notorious popularity of periphrastic epithets like “the finny tribe” in certain hypergenteel schools of old-school poetry. But like the –ly ending adverb, the –y ending adjective is at least amenable to being employed in constructions that sound natural enough not to impel the reader of or listener to a poem to assume that it is being used merely to make the line run at the proper rhythm or to the proper length. There are certain other English grammatical forms that cannot but foreground their semantic gratuitousness when they are used in metrical contexts and thereby cannot help betraying a suspicion bordering on certainty that they are being used solely for that line-maintaining purpose. The non-negative, non-emphatic periphrastic do is perhaps the most ridiculous and widely ridiculed of these. As Dr. Johnson points out somewhere in his Lives of the Poets, this form was used with especially abusive frequency in the post-Shakespearean part of the seventeenth century, and the first example that springs to my mind does hail from the run-up to the English Civil War and the pen of the so-called Cavalier Poet (and inventor of cribbage), Sir John Suckling: “Love is the fart / of every heart / It pains a man when ’tis kept close / and others doth offend when ’tis let loose.” Unlike my use of does in the sentence leading up to my quotation from his poem, Suckling’s use of doth cannot be justified on the grounds that it is adding needful emphasis that would be lacking in the non-periphrastic form of the verb of which it is a part.  If I had used hails instead of does hail in that sentence, I would have risked giving the wrong impression of the historical provenance of Suckling’s usage. Just take a look or listen at or to this hails-including version thereof: “…this form was used with especially abusive frequency in the post-Shakespearean part of the seventeenth century, and the first example that springs to mind hails from the run-up to the Civil War.” This alternative do-less version risks giving the impression that I take the run-up to the English Civil War to hail from some other part of English history than the post-Shakespearean part of the seventeenth century. The alternative do-less version of the concluding couplet from Suckling’s poem takes no such risk, as the reader or listener will readily perceive when he reads it or hears me read it thus: “It pains a man when ’tis kept close / and others offends when ’tis let loose.” In point of fact, this alternative version is not even particularly objectionable on metrical grounds, or at least it is no more objectionable on those grounds than the actual do-including version; for the first line of the couplet is in regular iambic tetrameter: “it PAINS a MAN when ’TIS kept CLOSE,” which the second line complicates beyond repair by introducing two further unaccented syllables—i.e., a minim—between the first and second feet, thus: “And OTHers doth offEND when ’TIS let LOOSE,” whereas my alternative do-less version just sort of folds the second syllable “others” into the second half of the first foot and thereby contrives to preserve, if only just barely, the simplicity of the original tetrameter meter. Why then did Suckling opt for the doth-including version at all? Why, presumably, because he meant the poem to be sung, and sung poetry can accommodate numerous successive unstressed syllables owing to musical meter’s foregrounding of the prosodic attribute known as quantity, the variation in the length of sounds—the variation coextensive with the differences between a quarter note and an eighth note, an eighth note and a sixteenth note, etc. By inserting the periphrastic “do” in the last line Suckling could accommodate a melodic line that split up the quarter notes or eighth notes of the second and third syllables of the penultimate line into eighth notes or sixteenth notes and thereby required the coverage of the same duration of music with more syllables of lexical material. Spinal Tap brilliantly satirized this sort of exploitation of periphrastic “do” to musical ends in their song “Stonehenge”—specifically in the lines “Where the banshees live and they do live well” and “Where the moon doth rise with a dragon’s face.” The occurrence of periphrastic “do” in this song is particularly apt because its lyrics are less evocative of Stonehenge itself than of the general paleoantiquarian fascination with British Paleolithic and Anglo-Saxon ruins qua supposed accessories of pre-Christian Celtic and Roman religious rites, a fascination peculiarly characteristic of Suckling’s epoch—the epoch of John Aubrey’s pioneering study of Stonehenge’s less imposing neighbor and cousin, Avebury, and Sir Thomas Browne’s sublime meditation on recently unearthed Saxon burial urns, Hydriotaphia or Urn Burial. “Something too much of this,” but only vis-à-vis the “this” of the digression from the topic of periphrastic “do,” not vis-à-vis the topic of periphrastic “do” itself qua digression from the topic of adverbs in poetry, for at bottom, and as I have already asserted, in terms of its accommodation of the attenuation of significance, the –ly-ending adverb differs from periphrastic do only in degree and not kind. Vis-à-vis the notion of poetic verse qua super-concentrated version of natural language the –ly-ending adverb is still but a pis aller and in a version of poetic verse perfectly embodying that notion, even each and every unaccented syllable would be occupied by a meaning-rich lexeme; and indeed, I don’t doubt that entire schools of versifying have been dedicated to realizing that perfect embodiment or indeed even that entire poems have succeeded in realizing it—although at the moment the only example of such a success that springs to my mind is Gwendolyn Brooks’s “We Real Cool,” not a particularly good poem. And in any case, the set of –ly- ending adverbs is but a subset of the complete set of adverbs, as the very act of referring to the –ly ending adverb axiomatically attests, which suggests that at bottom there is something other than their containment of significance-poor gadgetry that scandalizes Murnane about adverbs, especially in the light of something that I have not yet managed to mention, viz. that in the sentence immediately preceding the one in which Murnane says that he decided long ago that few adverbs were needed in prose, he says that a prose sentence of his own writing that he otherwise finds unexceptionable might have been improved by its exclusion of a –ly-less adverb that it ended up including, namely, the adverb ever. After many hours of fruitless pondering of the question of what this Murnane-scandalizing something might be, I have at last arrived at a tiny, desiccated fruit-eme, a currant or raisin, of an answer that might just apply to the majority of adverbs, including –ly-less ones, although I am unhelpfully unsure whether it applies at all to ever. The answer is hinted at in the word adverb itself, even if that hint does not exhaust the scandalizing quality—namely, the quality of serving an adjective-like function in relation to words and other lexemes that are held to be undeserving of association with adjectives. According to a certain thewy commonsensical metaphysics that is espoused with equal frequency by philosophers, poets, natural scientists, and bum bailiffs and that I believe dates back at least as far as Aristotle, the world consists entirely of things, and these things are distinguishable from each other solely in virtue of their possession or lack of possession of specific qualities. (Jonathan Swift acknowledged the prevalence of this metaphysics in his own time by making the least ambitious reformers at the school of languages of Lagado in Gulliver’s Travels the propounders of a project “to shorten Discourse by cutting Polysyllables into one, and leaving out Verbs and Participles; because in Reality all things imaginable are but Nouns.”) And such a metaphysics naturally maps, as they say, onto exactly two classes of grammatical entities—nouns and adjectives. One sort of apple is distinguishable from another by being “a red apple” rather than “a green apple” or perhaps rather a “golden delicious apple,” which is presumably distinguishable in turn from a “golden repulsive apple.” And while according to this metaphysics things don’t just sit around being green or red or golden or delicious or repulsive—because this is after all a commonsense metaphysics that seeks to account for the world as it manifestly presents itself to us—such that according to this metaphysics things move about in relation to each other and have effects on each other, it regards these processes of movement and effectuality as being on a lower metaphysical level than things or perhaps rather as mere functions of things, such that they cannot but regard the class of grammatical entities that deal with these processes—namely, verbs—as a lower class of grammatical entities than nouns. So when a red apple falls from a tall tree onto green grass (or, say, a the philosopher’s wiggy head) the espouser of this metaphysics takes no interest in the falling as a noun-worthy entity or perhaps finds it impossible to conceive of it as such an entity. It has just occurred to me that this phenomenon is really much of the same stripe of irrationality as the kneejerk allergy to the passive voice on which I have already descanted: the very notions of a thing-like process and a noun-like verb is somehow as horrific to such people as the notions of a thing’s submitting to having something done to it and a verb-form dedicated to designating such instances of submission. This phenomenon also reminds me, albeit only in negative, of the conception of God promulgated in the first book of Kings as follows: “And behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake: And after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire.” Here it is asserted that God is not inside any of the named entities and implied that his presence is consubstantial with his causation of these entities, that God participates in the world as a succession of processes—that he is not in the wind or the earthquake or the fire but is in (or perhaps simply is) the bringing about of the wind and the earthquake and the fire. Our thing-and-noun-fetishizing metaphysicians are atheists vis-à-vis processes and verbs; they concede that God is not in the wind or the earthquake or the fire, but from this they infer not that God is in the process that brings about the wind or the earthquake or the fire but that God or the process does not exist in its own separately considerable right and that therefore the words that designate these processes, verbs like “rend,” “break,” “quake” and “burn” (doubtless gratuitous disclaimer: no form of “burn” or “quake” occurs in the passage from Scripture I just quoted) ought not to benefit from the sort of descriptive largesse furnished to nouns by adjectives, such that to furnish verbs that largesse is in a manner of speaking to lie or perhaps even—i.e., if one can regard the metaphysicians’ thing-and-noun-fetishism as a form of idolatry—to blaspheme. Accordingly, according to these metaphysicians’ lights, when one finds oneself reaching for an adverb-plus-verb combination like “brutally crush” or “burn completely,” one should check this impulse and use the verb on its own unless the English lexicon happily includes a freestanding verb that more or less precisely conveys the sense of the combination. So for “brutally crush” one might substitute “pulverize” or for “burn completely” “incinerate.” But as for the would-be user of “greedily clamber” or “sleepily peruse,” he’s TSOL and must opt for dull unqualified “clamber” or “peruse”—or perchance some impossibly wordy construction like “clamber in an effortful manner” or “peruse in a sleepy fashion.” And the metaphysicians’ stricture on adverbs presumably applies a fortiori to the application of them to adjectives, for if there is one thing, or, rather non-thing, that is more scandalous than a process or a verb that can’t bear not be treated as a thing or a noun it is undoubtedly a description or adjective that can’t bear to stand on its own and must piggyback on another description or adjective—for that is exactly what an adjective is doing when it pairs itself with an adverb (although the obligatorily prepositive positioning of such adverbs [a positioning that belies their adjectival function in invariably echoing English’s obligatory placement of adjectives before the nouns they modify {this in contrast to verb-modifying adverbs, which may either precede or follow the verb}] unhappily turns the vehicle of the metaphor upside-down). And so even so innocent a construction as “an exceedingly tall tree” or even so even-more-innocent a construction as “a very tall tree” has got to go, to be replaced by “a tall tree” or perhaps “a skyscraping tree” or “a cloud-touching tree” or the less hyperbolic if impossibly prosaic “power line-topping tree.” Of course this is all just a—well, of course at least in immediate terms it’s not exactly at thought experiment because I am not at simply toying with the implications of ideas of my own that I am basically favorably disposed to but rather toying with ideas that I am attributing to other people and that I on the whole disagree with; I suppose one might not inaptly if rather uncharitably term the whole thing an exercise in intellectual character assassination, because I am not even sure that Murnane and the far abovementioned YouTube personalities even adhere to the foundational principle I am attributing to them—i.e., the metaphysical supremacy of nouns and things—let alone its implications. And in all frankness and candor, I do not believe that a polemical stance to adverbs needs to be founded in a meta-metaphysical contempt for verbs, processes, descriptions, and adjectives; and indeed, I can think of a certain kind of adverb-usage that one might object to on quite different grounds and that indeed I myself object to on those grounds. This is the kind of usage in which the adverb is at least logically pleonastic, when it denotes a quality or process whose denotation is already bespoken by the lexeme that it is modifying. “Very unique” is the most notorious example of such a usage, and its notoriety is well deserved, for in being unique an entity is already as one-of-a-kind as it can get, such that in saying that it is “very” unique one does not make it a jot more unique than it was in its state of adverbial nudity. But eschewing “very unique” is one of those skills like riding a bicycle that one never forgets once one has learned it. There are numerous other pleonastic adverb-plus-adjective combinations that one avoids less easily because their pleonasm is more discreetly laundered. Take “deafeningly loud.” At first aural blush it simply sounds like a more vivid way of saying “very loud” and therefore sounds entirely innocent, but a moment’s reflection teaches one that it ought to be replaced either with “very loud” itself or (and especially if the sound described is very loud indeed) with “deafening” tout court, for for all the antiquity and lingering currency of the hackneyed oxymoron “deafening silence,” and for all the measurability of decibel levels far higher than those withstandable by the thickest and toughest human eardrum, to call a sound deafening is effectively to assert that it is as loud as a sound can possibly be. The same, mutatis mutandis, goes for “blindingly bright,” not to mention “sense-of-smell-annihilatingly smelly” and “sense-of-touch-annihilatingly numbing” (although I am stumped to think of an analogue applying to the sense of taste, what with its being possible to conceive of intensity of flavor along multiple axes—sweetness, spiciness, umaminess, etc.). And I suppose that, given that in our age of unpenalized stylistic slovenliness a goodly proportion of adverbial constructions that appear in print are probably of this pleonastic sort, certain meticulous stylists like Murnane might reflexively resile from them without pinpointing what is wrong with them and thereupon regard them as an adequate casus belli for an undiscriminating war against adverbs. Still, since the beginning of the twentieth century, there have been enough thing-orientated artistic and intellectual movements in the West, and even the earliest of these movements have enjoyed enough lingering prestige in the twenty-first, that I suspect that most of the present antipathy to adverbs emanates from their less-than-immediate relation to things. For my part, I have little respect for these movements or their prescriptions for the use of language, or indeed for any intellectual or artistic movement that presumes to prescribe how language is to be used, which is not to say that I am an exponent of the least metaphysically fraught official strand of philosophy, namely, nominalism—this first because I am not willing to give up on the idea that language is metaphysically implicated in the world, and second, because nominalism itself is predicated on a fetishization of nouns, as its very name attests. I would like to maintain what I believe to be two mutually non-contradictory convictions—namely, that there is some sort of tight metaphysical connection between language and the world and that there is no need whatsoever to specify a precise metaphysical function for every part of speech. I am willing to entertain the notion that the world fundamentally consists of things and their qualities, as well as the notion that it fundamentally consists of qualities, as well as the notion that it fundamentally consists of processes, as well as the notion that it consists of some mediated combination of two or more of the above. Accordingly apart from vis-à-vis pleonastic constructions like the ones I have lately described, I am quite content not only for an adjective to modify a noun but also for an adverb to modify a verb or an adjective or even another adverb as long as the modification has the ring of actuality. I have employed a construction of this last type, that adverb-plus-adverb type, quite recently in the present essay—specifically when I mentioned “the implications of ideas of my own that I am basically favorably disposed to.” I trust the reader who candidly applies my antique glassware-appraiser’s test to this construction, basically favorably, will find it wholly unexceptionable: it succinctly affirms the perfectly intelligible notion that while I may have certain minor reservations about the ideas in question, I am more partial to them than averse to them; that while I may be shallowly or intermittently ill-disposed or unfavorably disposed to them, I am at bottom or basically well-disposed or favorably disposed to them. Is this a notion particularly hard to wrap one’s head around, as they say? I trust not. But I own that the adverb-modifying adverb evinces a tendency towards a certain mode of linguistic behavior that the verb-modifying and adjective-modifying adverb do not evince and that this certain mode of linguistic behavior is vulnerable to a certain objection that I own I find not entirely uncompelling even if I ultimately reject it wholeheartedly. The tendency in question is a tendency to infinite concatenation or cascading that is attended by the generation of a sort of an endlessly self-nesting adverbial Russian doll or an endlessly self-reflecting adverbial hall of mirrors. A construction of concatenated adjectives presents no meta-conceptual problems however long the concatenation may be. A simple, happy, intelligent, and stout rich man is no harder to picture to oneself than a simple man or a stout man, autc.; despite his possession of four additional attributes he can be taken in at a mental glance just like his one attribute-sporting fellows. But a simply happily intelligently stoutly rich man is a much more complicated critter than a simple, happy, intelligent, and stout rich man. He is not merely a rich man who happens to be simple, happy, intelligent, and stout all in mutually indifferent juxtaposition, but rather a rich man whose richness is fundamentally characterized by its stoutness, which stoutness is in turn fundamentally characterized by its intelligence, which intelligence is in turn fundamentally characterized by its happiness, which happiness is in turn fundamentally characterized by its simplicity. He is also an altogether different sort of critter from any rich man whose richness is modified by this same list of adverbs arranged in a different order—in, say, for brevity’s sake (not that I’ve ever given the ghost of a pygmy owl’s hoot about brevity), reverse order: he is altogether different from a stoutly, intelligently, happily, simply rich man, for this rich man is a rich man whose richness is fundamentally characterized by its simplicity, which simplicity is in turn fundamentally characterized by its happiness, which happiness is in turn fundamentally characterized by its intelligence, which intelligence is in turn fundamentally characterized by its stoutness. Whether either such critter—let alone a critter with even more adverbially nested qualities (e.g., a calmly, sweetly, stoutly, intelligently, happily, simply rich man)—has ever actually existed or ever could exist is a question (or pair of questions) that I confess I am unable to answer, inasmuch as I am unsure whether I can even picture or otherwise comprehend such a critter or any other critter with more than two adverbially nested qualities. All the same, I would be at the very least quite hesitant to call for a ban on cascading adverbs merely on these personal empirical grounds; I would at the very least be quite hesitant to call for a ban on any grammatically coherent construction that did not denote an analytically and a priori self-contradictory state of affairs after the manner of the abovementioned very unique. I own that my reasons for granting such constructional latitude are not transcendentally defensible, but then again neither are those of my de facto adversaries. They would presumably have me believe that the purpose of language is to communicate thoughts and that the mere fact that no immediately graspable thought lurks behind a construction like “a calmly, sweetly, stoutly, intelligently, happily, simply rich man” is proof positive that it “has got no right to take its place in the human race,” or, rather, the realm of discourse generated by that race. I would maintain to the contrary that one needn’t be some sort of Derridean linguistic absolutist-cum-metasubjective nihilist to acknowledge that one often doesn’t know what thoughts lurk behind a given string of words until one has written them or uttered them. And of course they would in return fish out those hoary old Chomskyian examples of strings of words that have durably proved to be nonsensical—“Colorless green ideas sleep furiously” and “Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.” And I would in return rejoin that neither of these word-strings is germane as a comparandum of the sorts of word-strings I have been defending—the first because it contains a manifest oxymoron (“colorless green”) and the second because it is manifestly ungrammatical and syntactically incoherent. I am thinking exclusively but comprehensively of manifestly grammatical and syntactically coherent constructions, constructions among which those including cascading adverbs deserve a prominent place. And I am by no means arguing that one should start plucking adverbs out of the lexical ether at random and stringing these adverbs together until one collapses at one’s desk like an overworked Chaplinesque assembly-line worker. I am merely arguing that if one finds oneself reflexively reaching for a pair or trio of adverbs in a row one should go ahead and slap them onto the page even if one cannot yet explain to oneself how they relate to each other or to the other lexemes with which they are destined to be concatenated. If on reflection—long and sober reflection, mind you—one finds that in conjunction with these other lexemes they amount to an inconceivable chimera, why then one ought to strike them from the page. Otherwise, one should let them stay there. The native genius of our language of our language permits them, and so we should give them the benefit of the doubt as a matter of course. And by “the native genius of our language” I mean the full fund of grammatical resources available to English since, say, Chaucer’s time. While I have no recollection of a chain of cascading adverbs in Chaucer’s corpus and certainly can’t be bottomed to search for such a chain in a Chaucerian concordance, I can’t imagine old Geoff would have stuck at stringing together such a chain. And I own that in giving the green light just now to every construction current in Chaucer’s time, I have doubtless let myself in for being bombarded by all sorts of constructions of which I categorically disapprove—by double negatives, for example. Of course, I would argue that double negatives’ apparent full legitimacy in the English of Chaucer’s time should no more count as a warrant for their free use in our time than very unique’s current partial legitimacy should count as a warrant for its free use therein; I would argue that double negatives should be categorically prohibited because they are intrinsically illogical. But I understand the case of the defenders of double negatives—namely, that the iteration of a negation may as easily emphasize it as nullify it, that the French language furnishes ample proof of a highly logically structured language in which double negatives consistently serve such an emphasizing function, and so on, and I would be perfectly happy, nay positively eager, to call for a truce or even to bury the hatchet with the champions of a general amnesty on double negatives, dangling participles, and so forth, if I could entertain even the faintest hope that my complaisance towards them would be met by a soupcon of complaisance from them towards me qua unabashed employer of the passive voice, cascading adverbs, and so forth. For in matters of language-usage, as in all other departments of life, hyperpharisaism is the helpmeet rather than the adversary of slovenliness. It is always the people who peremptorily insist that the precise angle at which one holds and plies one’s fork at the dinner table is a cardinal and primevally ancient article of etiquette (when it has in fact been an indifferent matter of personal preference since the fork made its two-tined debut back in the late Middle Ages) who most vociferously maintain that one should be allowed to show up at even the traditionally most formal restaurants clad in a tank-top and shorts and shod in flip-flops (or in no footwear at all). Similarly, it is always the people who would categorically proscribe certain organically unexceptionable usages of English who are most enthusiastically in favor of ignoring the most flagrant transgressions of the language’s most organically hard-and-fast rules. This is just the right moment to bring back in Microsoft Word’s spelling and grammar-checker, for that selfsame grammar-checker, although a robot, behaves like just such a combination of a pedant’s pedant and a churl’s churl: for while it merely subsumes an irenic green line beneath the far-abovementioned “me and my mother” and the perhaps even more execrable “between you and I” and gives a free pass to the perennially low-rent “alright,” my typing of “primevally” three sentences ago impelled it to force me to see red, as has my slightly less recent use of “suffocatingly” and “stupefyingly.” To be sure, Word doesn’t have it in for all –ly ending adverbs, as is glaringly obvious from the red-free appearance of “merely,” “perennially,” “slightly,” and “glaringly” in the chunk of Word-word processed text still resident within the confines of my current active window. What, then, is or are the criterion or criteria by which Word is selecting certain adverbs and only certain adverbs for red-underlining? Well, first of all, it is evident that unlike the passive voice, whatever it finds objectionable in the above adverbs is something that it would have us believe all careful users of English rather than a super-careful subset thereof find objectionable, for I have been typing the present essay at home using Word’s default spelling and grammar-check settings rather than at work under the constraints of any modifications of those settings such as the above-described one by which my employer tried to rein in my use of passive constructions. For a very fleeting moment, a moment that elapsed between my conclusion of the immediately preceding sentence and my commencement of the present one, I thought the software must have imposed a syllable limit on adverb-formation and so automatically red-flagged adverbs based on adjectives of more than, say, three syllables, but my recollection of the abovementioned red-free appearance of the abovementioned “perennially” swiftly put paid to this misimpression, and the red-free appearance of “automatically” has just now reinforced the paid-putting. A much older impression of mine is that Word is simply referencing some list of adverbs that it has been taught to regard as non-standard because its designers or the usage-mavens advising them have gathered that these adverbs are not used frequently enough to merit inclusion in the club of real words. I am slowly coming to regard this impression as a misimpression by my discovery, on consulting my trusty eighth edition of  Concise Oxford Dictionary each time Word red-flags one of my adverbs, that about eight times out of ten the offending adverb is listed in that dictionary as absolutely standard. For example, all five of the red-flag adverbs I have just discussed is thus listed therein. From this I am inclined to infer that while Word may not exactly have it in for all –ly ending adverbs, it does harbor long-term unfriendly designs on them. Why am inclined to infer this? Why, because while one cannot of course expect any two corpuses of words to be exactly mutually coextensive, to contain no words not included in the other and exclude no words not excluded by the other, it seems reasonable to expect any grammatically classed sub-corpus of the lexicons of two of the Anglosphere’s leading usage authorities to overlap in large measure and to diverge only vis-à-vis words rarely used in any part of the Anglosphere. I am unsurprised to find Word red-flagging parotitis and parpen even though they occur in the Concise Oxford Dictionary because I didn’t know these nouns from Adam’s apple until I went searching for inkhorn words on concluding the preceding sentence, but I would be surprised to find Adam’s apple missing from the COD (for I am happy to report that it is not missing therefrom) or to find Adam’s apple or apple on its own being red-flagged by Word, as I am happy to report that neither of them has been in any of its occurrences in the present sentence. And if I did find Adam’s apple and apple on its own being red-flagged alongside nouns as common as Adam’s apple and apple, I would indeed begin to wonder if Word did not at harbor at least long-term unfriendly designs on nouns, if they were not at least hoping that people would give up using nouns altogether in the not-too-distant future. And such indeed is what I recently started to wonder mutatis mutandis regarding Word’s attitude to adverbs and their general usage. Of course no sooner did I begin to wonder this than I began to wonder why Word was not flagging all adverbs or at least all –ly-terminating adverbs, and perhaps owing mainly to Word’s tight association with a man who is one of the grand exponents of this strategy-genre, my collateral wonderment soon terminated in the fairly firm inference that in this selective adverb-flagging I was dealing with a so-called nudge strategy. The reader is doubtless familiar with how such a strategy works. Some worthless busybody of a mayor or governor wants to get all the children in his jurisdiction to stop eating chocolate bars qua supposed health hazard supposedly a hundred times more toxic than rat poison. He could simply order a citywide or statewide ban on the sale of chocolate bars, but that would inevitably produce a so-called backlash from the children and their parents. So he decrees instead that all supermarkets and convenience stores must display their stock of chocolate bars on shelves immediately adjacent to the ones displaying their stock of rat poison. Upon the issuing of the decree the children continue to seek out their favorite chocolate bars, but now each time one of them goes to select a chocolate bar he is obliged to set his eyes on a box of rat poison within eyeshot of it. Thus (at least so the line of thinking behind the strategy goes) a sort of Pavlovian connection between chocolate bars and rat poison is established in the children’s minds, such that soon the children are avoiding the chocolate-stroke rat poison aisles en masse, either because they are afraid of picking up a and consuming a packet of rat poison by mistake or because they have come to find chocolate as unappealing as rat poison. Of course the connection won’t be established with citywide perfection, such that at some point some hapless tyke undoubtedly will grab and consume a packet of rat poison by mistake and perish as a result, but that is but a regrettable cost of progress—if one even dare term it a “cost,” for the goal of the policy is after all to reduce the citywide consumption of chocolate bars, and a dead child is most certainly one less chocolate-bar consuming child. Word’s selective proscription of adverbs strikes me as just such a policy—which is to say, I suspect that Word is hoping that by getting people to avoid typing certain less common adverbs like stupefyingly they will eventually get them to avoid at least all ly-ending adverbs altogether.  If, after all, even a passionate adverb enthusiast such as the present writer cannot manage to keep track of which adverbs are and aren’t forbidden by Word, how much in the way of meta-adverbial consciousness can one expect from Joe Cubicle-Filler who just wants to finish bashing out today’s five hundred-word report for the boss so that he can switch back to attempting to complete Level Fifteen-Quadrillion of Undead Wizard War? After only a few such daily report out-bashing stints, he will almost inevitably get the impression that all ly-ending words are off-limits and start avoiding them as a matter of course for expediency’s sake. Of course this sinister notion of the devisers of Word as a cabal of lexicographical expurgators winnowing away an entire category of English vocables cannot but call to mind the lexicographcical anti-architects of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty Four enabled to issue slimmer and slimmer editions of the dictionary of Newspeak thanks to their elimination of words deemed superfluous because supposedly conceptually reducible to more primitive lexemes—bad to ungood, horrible to double-plus-ungood and the like. But, the lexicographical philosophy underlying Newspeak is but a corollary of the KISS-ian principles inculcated in Orwell’s “Politics of the English Language,” which are in turn logically downstream of the noun-fetishizing linguistic metaphysics I described a few thousand words ago, which shares headwaters with the proscription of the passive voice that I discussed at the beginning of this essay. All these  precepts and interdicts share the assumption that (and here I believe I am about to quote either Teddie Adorno or one of his translators, more or less word for word) whatever is worth saying at all can be said simply and that any detour from the path of simplicity must betoken some form of evasiveness. “If you had nothing to hide,” the promulgators of these dicta are all effectively saying, “you’d be speaking boldly in your own voice, and you wouldn’t be hiding behind all those fancy fifty-cent words. You would, linguistically speaking, be walking down the middle of the middle of the High Street in broad daylight with your hands up in the air instead of crouching behind a heap of big boxes in a warehouse down the backest of back alleys at midnight.” “Hang on a bit,” the reader or listener is bound to wish interject at this point, “the promulgators of Newspeak were after all the bad guys in Orwell’s novel. How, then, can they have ‘lived the same dream and wanted the same thing’ as Orwell himself?” Why simply because Orwell himself was without knowing it a bad guy, a man of the Devil’s party, a party Orwell, the Newspeak promulgators, and Microsoft’s grammar-censors were and are mere subsidiary demons, the leaders of factions or chapters who may be at loggerheads on minor doctrinal points but are of one mind with each other and with their master on all the major ones.  Orwell’s “Politics and the English Language” is animated by the same spirit as the one that animates Word’s adverb elbow-butting grammar checker, and it is a petty, peevish, and spiteful spirit, a “hobgoblin of little minds,” as Emerson would have said—or might very well not have, as for aught I know the sage of Concord regarded the obdurate exclusion of adverbs as the wisest of consistencies.  Whatever earthly powers may be employing or employed by these spirits and whatever agenda or program these powers are purporting to pursue, their incursions on our liberty, the liberty of ordinary speakers and writers of English, must be resisted as a matter of course. And so I say and write unto you, my fellow Anglophones and Anglographs both fulltime and part-time, whenever you find yourself reaching for an adverb, or even an entire sausage-string of adverbs, you just go right ahead and plop it down on the page and--“and let the grammar-checker be damned?” you interject with breathless glee. “Not quite damned,” I caution with rueful judiciousness, “let’s say rather darned.” Because there is always a chance that the grammar checker is flagging you not for the use of the adverb per se but rather for forming the adverb with a bare –ly when it should be formed with –ally, or forming it with -ally when –illy is called for or vice-versa. And so it is always a good idea to have an older dictionary like my COD ready to hand. To be sure, I think it is the God-given right of every Anglophone or Anglograph to form an adverb from any adjective he likes regardless of whether that adverb is listed in any dictionary ever published, but certain rules for when to use a bare –ly rather than –ally and so on presumably apply as tightly to those neo-adverbs as to the dictionary-listed ones, which means that you and I ought to get those rules straight straight-away, but that straightening is both a two-pipe problem and the topic of a separate essay, and moreover a sort of essay I am not in the habit of writing, but the undeniable urgency of the matter may just require me to break that habit.  

 THE END