I own that the very notion of writing a twentieth-anniversary essay on “Proprietary Names: The Name/Proprietary Names: The Place” has an air of fatuous pomposity about it—not because it appears to presume that somebody besides the author of that essay takes enough of an interest in it to appreciate an “update” of it, for I suspect that at least a more-than-figurative handful of people do take at least that much interest in it, but because it appears to presume that somebody other than its author has been counting the years since the moment of its completion, and I would seldom if ever presume that even the members of the just-mentioned handful have been doing that. And even if they have been doing that, they will have remarked that the essay bears a 2006 post-date and hence drawn the conclusion that I am innumerate–a conclusion that presumably will have redounded even more resoundingly to my discredit than the conclusion that I am fatuously pompous (a conclusion that in any case will have doubtless followed therefrom [for I suppose no-one comes across as more fatuously pompous than a fellow who presumes to say anything about anything without being able to get his dates right]). But I can in point of fact clear myself of a charge of innumeracy at least as prosecutable on the evidence of that post-date, for in point of fact I finished writing the essay in 2004, and that 2006 post-date is merely the result of my resignation to my inability to place it with any literary or para-literary journal, online or otherwise, within the first double-dozen months of its completion. (That moment of resignation, incidentally, coincided with a moment of resolution—the sensible resolution never again to bother trying to place any of my essays with any journals of any genre, online or otherwise [not that I am by any means ungrateful to the pair or trio of journals who have seen fit to publish a trio or quartet of my essays on commission, but that it was unsensible in or of me ever to imagine that any essay I had written would hew closely enough to the format of any existing journal to stand any chance of being accepted for publication in it].) Not that this chronological correctness in itself justifies the composition of a twentieth-anniversary essay—no, that composition is justified, rather, by the fact that since the completion of the original essay I have been visited by at least an essayworth or essayweight of certain thoughts (thoughts that strike at least me as cogent and that I have at least not yet been given any reason to believe have already been both thought and published by some other person or persons) concerning not merely the adequacy of my account of the proprietary name in the original essay (for if that had been the case I might have published a semi-retraction of the essay in any gosh-damn year) but, rather, certain alterations in the objective fortunes of the proprietary name that have supervened since that completion; for twenty years is almost—if not entirely—universally thought to be a decorous interval at which to mark alterations in the objective fortunes of just about any entity or phenomenon that typically suffers such alterations at more than geological speed. (Of course, twenty-five years is almost—if not entirely—universally thought to be an even more decorous interval at which to mark such alterations, and if the passage of time eo ipso were no consideration, I would gladly wait another five years to pen the present essay, especially as it would afford me an excuse to style it not merely an anniversary special but a silver jubilee essay in reverential mimicry of my beloved Glenn Gould. But not unlike the philosopher in Novalis’s fable, I think it that in five years’ time, one of us, either the proprietary name or the so-called blogosphere or myself, will be dead [or in the case of the so-called blogosphere, dead again {see the passage on Substack below (but not right away!)}].) Indeed, we have already passed the twenty-year anniversary of another of my essays that has garnered at least a more-than-figurative handful of readers, “O My Friendster, There Is No Friend,” and for all my direly ardent desire to do so, I have not penned an anniversary essay on it, for try as I might (or tried as I mighted), I could not persuade myself that the objective fortunes of friendship had changed dramatically enough in the intervening fifth-century to justify such a screed. To be sure, there was a moment at which those fortunes at least appeared to have changed dramatically enough to justify such a screed, namely a mere five-to-seven years after “O My Friendster’”s completion, in ca. 2010, when Facebook was at the height of its popularity and enjoyed an effective monopoly of the social-medial market-cum-landscape, having long since elbowed out of existence such small social-medial fry as Friendster. At that moment I was indeed wondering if friendship had indeed become exactly what in “O My Friendster” I had stated I feared it shortly would become—namely, an institution on par with marriage in point of its ineluctable publicness, for by then I was routinely failing even to hear about certain social events involving my closest friends (or, to employ terminology less antagonistic to the spirit of “O My Friendster,” “the people, relatives aside, whom I had known longest and associated with most frequently”) because these events had only been announced on Facebook and I did not have a Facebook account. But shortly thereafter, Twitter, Instagram, et al. came along (I mean “came along” as in “came to mass awareness,” not “came into existence,” for I am well aware that Twitter at least has been around since 2006) and both re-fragmented the social-medial landscape and redefined the default social-medial interpersonal connection from one of friend-to-friend to one of “influencer”-to-“follower.” Consequently, friendship has more or less reassumed its old nebulous and unobtrusive ontological contours. This is by no means to say that friendship as a facet of social life is still in as resplendently fine fettle as it was in 2004 but merely that most such friendships as still subsist do so absent the benison or patronage of any social-media platform. For example, within the past year I have encountered some dreary statistic to the effect that some depressingly high percentage (say, 80) of men under some depressingly advanced age (say, 40) reported having not a single friend, and while I do not doubt the accuracy of the statistic to the extent that it is permitted by the just-mentioned nebulosity (which I reckon allows for the deduction of at most 20 points from the just-mentioned percentage to account for the designation as non-friends of people who conceivably merit re-designation as friends), I would be strongly inclined to doubt the accuracy of a statistic reporting that more than a depressingly minuscule percentage (say, 10) of those men did not have both a Twitter and an Instagram account. (I dare not even imagine a counterfactual statistic incorporating the percentage of them that also had a Facebook account, for I am confident that the age cited in the actual statistic was not quite as depressingly advanced as sixty.)
Before
proceeding to the official beginning of the present essay, I really ought to
address an objection that is not unlikely to have occurred to that pair or trio
(I am not so megalomaniacal as to dream of adding “or quartet”) of present
readers who have also read both “O My Friendster” and “Proprietary Names: The
Name,” viz. that regardless of the number of years that have elapsed since the
completion of “Proprietary Names: The Name,” it is inappropriate to judge its
follow-up-worthiness by the same criterion I applied to “O My Friendster,”
inasmuch as while “O My Friendster” does indeed center on the objective
fortunes of friendship, “Proprietary Names: The Name” centers on the subjective fortunes of the proprietary
name, on the changes in meaning and metaphysical resonance undergone by the
proprietary name as a category and certain specific proprietary names in the
present writer’s personal subjective landscape. To this objection I shall not
be so baldly bold (or boldly bald) as to rejoin à la Diane Keaton in the words
of the filmmaker who cannot be named: “Subjectivity is objective,” but I shall
be so receding-hairlinedly unabashed (or unabashedly receding-hairlined) as to
rejoin à la presumably a veritable murder of pointy-headed mid-to-late
twentieth-century academic scribblers (although I own I that at the moment I
can’t think of a single one who has uttered or written this verbatim):
“Subjectivity is ineluctably mediated by objectivity,” and “Proprietary Names:
The Name” is no elucting exception to the rule formulated in this rejoinder.
For that essay was an account, yes, of my subjective experience of the
proprietary name, but of that experience as mediated by my only partly
subjective experience of reading of Marcel Proust, an experience that had brought
to my attention certain objective historical occurrences that had brought
proprietary names to greater social prominence and thereby (once I had read
Proust) modified my subjective experience of such names. (Naturally, as I have
more or less already explained in “Proprietary Names: The Name,” Proust’s
account of names in general and of place names in particular is an objective
one mediated by his subjective experience of names, an experience that was in
turn mediated by certain objective historical occurrences that had brought certain
human bearers of names associated with certain places to decreased social
prominence.) And I did after all conclude “Proprietary Names” with an appeal to
the reader to consider a possibility centered on an objective state of affairs,
viz.,—“a proprietarily-named geographical heterogeneity too terrible to
contemplate,” viz., the massive hodgepodge of proprietarily named commercial
establishments that then dominated the roadsides and streetsides of America’s suburbs
and cities. But while I am addressing the objector on behalf of subjectivism,
let me assure him that in the present essay I intend eventually to provide an
update on the fortunes of the proprietary name in my subjective landscape, that
indeed I regard that landscape as being as integral to the prospective
constitution of the present essay as it was and is to the established constitution
of “Proprietary Names: The Name.”
But on, at last,
to the multiply abovementioned objective fortunes: the good news (good at least
from a certain subjective and indeed self-regarding point of view, that of the
continuing “relevance” of “Proprietary Names: The Name” [not that there is not
even something self-regarding about terming what I am about to report “news,”
as this implies that I am aware of it and that reader is not, and I freely
concede that the reader may very well have become aware of it already {in which
case I freely concede the superfluity to the reader of at least the present
portion of the present essay}]) is that the proprietary name is as objectively
alive and well in the America of 2024 as it was in the America of 2024 and that
it shows no signs of “going anywhere,” but I have placed that set phrase in
inverted commas not only because it is a set phrase and therefore merits a
foregrounded disavowal of any claims of proprietorship by the present “I” but
also because taken with literal precision, as it has every right to be taken
for all its inurement to being taken figuratively and vaguely, it not only
implies but postulates that the proprietary name has been geographically static
throughout the intervening period and gives every sign of being geographically
static “for the foreseeable future” (a set phrase that I have placed in
inverted commas merely because it is
a set phrase &c. [and the same goes for all subsequent quotation
marks-bracketed phrases unless stated otherwise]), and in point of fact the
proprietary name has done a great deal of moving about since 2004 and gives
every sign of doing a great deal more moving about even long before the ringing
in of 2044. What I mean in asserting that the proprietary name is “not going
anywhere” is merely that it is as conspicuously visible, as “in your face,” in
today’s America as in the America of twenty years ago and bids fair to remain
as “in your face” “for the foreseeable future,” for since then it has undergone
or undertaken quite a dramatic internal migration, or perhaps rather an
internal dispersal, by which I mean that it is more flagrantly visible in certain
places within the United States (and indeed “arguably” within the so-called
West insgesamt) than it was then and
that it is less flagrantly visible in certain other places therein. In 2004,
the roost of the proprietary name had essentially not shifted in location or
aspect since the advent of mass electronic media eighty years earlier. Few of
the proprietary names of 2004 had survived since 1924, but in 2004 as in 1924,
almost all proprietary names one encountered in the quotidian course of an
ordinary American existence were the names of the manufacturers and vendors of
consumer goods and services. Moreover, in 2004 as in 1924, the frequency with
which one saw a given proprietary name varied in direct proportion to the
centrality of the good or service subsumed by that name to the American system
of life and the market share in that good or service borne by the manufacturer
or vendor that owned that name, and proprietary names were consequently quite
finely graduated in visibility. One might typically see the name of one of the top
purveyors of a diurnally indispensable commodity like fast food—a McDonalds or a Subway—dozens of times a day, the name of a slightly less
commercially formidable purveyor of that commodity like Taco Bell or Burger King
a mere dozen times a day, and the name of a relatively obscure purveyor thereof
like Quiznos or Arby’s a mere dozen times a week, and yet one would still see Quizno’s or Arby’s much more frequently than one would see even the top
purveyor of some commodity typically purchased by Americans only at widely
spaced intervals—Hertz or Avis, the names of car-rental agencies,
or State Farm and Prudential, the names of insurance
agencies (not to be confused with car
insurance agencies like Geico and Progressive, whose names one did indeed
tend to see about as often as those of obscure fast-food vendors on account of
Americans’ much feted-and-cursed “love affair with the automobile”—i.e.,
automobile ownership, not rentership). Finally, in 2024 one tended to see
proprietary names most often in the same sorts of locales as one had seen them
in in 1924—in newspaper, radio, and (from ca. 1950 onwards) television
advertisements, in streetside and roadside signage, and within the walls of the
stores, eateries, etc., sited immediately (or, in the case of billboards
alongside limited-access highways, a mile or two) behind that signage. In 2024,
a very few proprietary names—perhaps no more than a half-dozen, and certainly
fewer than a dozen—outshine even the most illustrious of their inferiors to the
point of rendering them intermittently invisible, and while all of these names
are associated with corporate entities that produce or vend goods or services,
in all of them but at most three, this production or vendage is but a sideline
to some other genre of undertaking. Meanwhile, the locuses of our encounters
with proprietary names—not just the just-mentioned 6 to 12 but all the others
as well—have been siphoned from all the old haunts into the
successor-electronic media, the wholly digitized audiovisual media mediated by
so-called apps. To be sure, much proprietary-name peppered roadside and
streetside signage remains (at least for the immediate time being), but we
encounter proprietary names much more rarely via that roadside and streetside
signage and the stores, eateries, etc. behind that signage, partly because the
experience of driving or walking along roads and streets is much more marginal
to the American Alltag than it used
to be, partly and perhaps even mostly for the obvious reason that shopping is mostly
done online now, and partly for the less obvious reason that the strips and
clusters of retail establishments behind that signage are less richly stocked
and emblazoned with proprietary names than they were yesteryear (a development
that I shall address in detail at a more opportune time). As before, most
proprietary names (apart from the abovementioned majority of the abovementioned
6 to 11 names) are attached to entities of some
sort that produce or vend goods or services, and as we use the just-mentioned
so-called apps via which they manifest themselves prevailingly to watch and
listen to stretches of media more or less consubstantial in form with the old
television and radio programs, the proprietary names manifest themselves
thereby in commercials that are formally indistinguishable from the old
television and radio commercials (even if they appear one at a time and at
annoyingly unpredictable moments rather than clustered together at regularly
scheduled commercial break-times as in the old days; presumably they are so
placed to thwart the old carefully timed dash to the kitchen or bathroom). But
unlike in the old days, there is no graduation of levels of prominence in the
name: the named producers and vendors, along with their named products, seem to
be either obscure, of very recent origin, or of very limited commercial
longevity. Moreover, the advertisements are said to be “narrowcasted” to the
viewer by a so-called algorithm drawing on his viewing and listening
preferences; in my own experience, and the experience of others that has been
reported to me, this “narrowcasting” is quite inept, inasmuch as the
advertisements are rarely for products or services one would ever be inclined
to purchase, but I do not doubt that it has at least resulted in my seeing a
great many advertisements that even the people with whom I speak and correspond
with most often have not seen and vice-versa. The net (in two or more senses) result
of all these trends is that perhaps for the first time in the proprietary
name’s history since the very dawn of journalism we no longer have a common
stock of proprietary names to draw on in small talk and its textual analogues.
Indeed, apart from the abovementioned ones (none of which one can go a single
solar day without seeing or hearing mentioned), I can think of only one
non-“legacy”-proprietary name—that I have encountered being spoken or written
about in the old, offhand tone that takes for granted the speaker or reader’s
ability to catch the reference, namely Temu, and so far I have encountered it
therein only once. Of course en quasi-revanche
one nowadays encounters jeremiads bewailing the death of the so-called
monoculture, by which what is generally meant is a common stock of movies,
television shows, pop tunes, and other voluntarily sought-out cultural wares
with which everyone is or used to be familiar, but in truth there has never
been an American monoculture in that sense. “Not even back in the horrible old
days when there were only three television networks and only three television
channels via which to watch their programming?” Not even back then. For even
back then, one could watch only one network’s programming at any given moment, such
that once one had got into the habit of watching a certain program featured by
a certain network, one had a deucedly hard time picking up the habit of watching
either of its competitors on the other two—especially in the case of programs
with running plot lines like sitcoms and drama series. A scene from Barry
Levinson’s film Tin Men, released in
1987 but set in 1963, shews how fragmented the monoculture already was even at
its most primordially monolithic. Four of the film’s eponyms—i.e., middle-aged
aluminum siding salesmen—are sitting at a table at a restaurant (perhaps the
eponym of Levinson’s previous Baltimore-set hit, Diner), and one of them asks another, “You watch Bonanza, right?” whereupon the query-ee
answers in the affirmative and a bipartite chinwag on Bonanza commences; whereupon a member of the resultant silent duo
asks the other member, “You watch Ed Sullivan, right?” thereby precipitating a
bipartite chinwag on The Ed Sullivan Show
and turning the gathering into the sort of social unit on which Elliott
Carter must have modeled his notoriously hard-to-follow mid-to-late-twentieth-century
string quartets. (On consulting the network prime-time schedule for 1962-1963,
I find that it would not actually have been impossible to be a regular watcher
of both Bonanza and The Ed
Sullivan Show, as Bonanza started
on Sunday nights at nine-o’clock on NBC immediately after the conclusion of the
Ed Sullivan Show on CBS, but each
network’s marketer-assisted effort to keep viewers tuned into its offerings all
night [I’m sure there was some industry-specific bit of argot for the strategy]
doubtless resulted in much “siloed” viewing, at least on certain evenings.) But
the scene was doubtless included in the film partly as an illustration of the
comparative cultural homogeneity of the early 60s vis-à-vis the micro-epoch of
the film’s making, the micro-epoch of early cable television with its
Springsteen-derided 57 (?) channels, for I can attest that in 1987 I was
absolutely clueless about the plotline of Miami
Vice or (as my parents did not subscribe to cable television) the
choreography of the latest Michael Jackson video, while complementarily I was
powerless to bond with my peers over my own enthusiasm for A Prairie Home Companion and certain local AM talk-radio host. All
that said, back then, the then of the
entire quarter-century stretch between 1963 and 1987, the best-known television
commercials provided infallibly reliable points
de repère for Americans because they were almost more than figuratively
inescapable. Nobody had to gloss Walter Mondale’s utterance of the phrase
“Where’s the Beef?” in his debate with Ronald Reagan during the 1984
presidential campaign, and when, on the march from the first act of
Tchaikovsky’s Nutcracker’s being
introduced in my sixth-grade music class, one of my classmates began singing
“Smurfberry crunch is fun to eat” along to the piece’s tune, I did not mistake
those lyrics for a piece of organic schoolyard folk music because although I never
went out of my way to watch the The
Smurfs I did occasionally go out of my way to watch other
commercial-television programs that aired on Saturday morning. But now tout cela est foutu, and I suppose it
has been foutu since about 2010,
although having been an effective never-television viewer since the dawn of the
century, I find it difficult to be even vaguely sure of the date of the foutage. All I know is that when I
visited my parents for Christmas of that year, 2010, Dos-Equis’s commercial
centering on “the most interesting man in the world” aired frequently through
their (by then fully cable-ized) television set, and that on each of the
roughly half-dozen occasions I have referenced that advertisement in live
in-person settings (all of these settings having themselves naturally been set
in Mexican or Mexican-adjacent restaurants), the reference has been met with a
chuckle of recognition. Anyhow, presumably this recent disappearance of
old-school proprietary names from the stock of common discourse has preempted
the germination chez today’s youngsters of the elaborate metaphysical-cum-aesthetic
hierarchies of brand-named products I discussed towards the end of “Proprietary
Names: The Name”—of the association of certain chain pizzerias with luxury and
urbanity and certain others with austerity and rusticity, and the like. I say
“presumably” because I have not yet crossed paths with evidence of any kind
regarding the metaphysical-cum-aesthetic status of proprietary names among
today’s youth. I hope to quiz my nephews, who are both in their teens, on the
matter, but so far I am having a difficult time formulating a question about it
that is not likely to make me seem to be a complete loony, not only to the lads
themselves but also (and “arguably” more significantly) to their parents. And
of course I would have to pair that question with one that bids even fairer to
make me seem to be a CL, namely, one regarding what it has felt like to grow up
under the crushing metaphysical-cum-aesthetic weight of the abovementioned
6-to-11 omnipresent new-school proprietary names. But perhaps even in terming
this weight “crushing” I am “projecting” my own attitude to these names onto
these youngsters’ mental shoulders. For I do indeed find that weight crushing,
but then I was not born into a world in which they had already assumed their
present colossal proportions; indeed, I can remember when they were mere pups in
the proprietary dog pack—and pups of no colossal breed at that. Back in ’04 I
had already had an Amazon account for two years (as Amazon itself has been kind
enough to remind me unbidden via my present “profile”), but it did not even
occur to me to cite “Amazon” as a contemporarily current proprietary name in “Proprietary
Names/the Name,” for at the time Amazon was just one of several online vendors
from which or whom I might purchase a book or compact disc (and only ever a
book or compact disc) in the rare event that I could not find it at a
“brick-and-mortar” bookstore-cum-record store like Borders. The company’s
subsequent metamorphosis into my own and everybody else’s shopping destination
of first resort for everything but food occurred so speedily that it more
vividly evokes the supervention of the atomic bomb than that of any other
commercial phenomenon (or even of a more quiescently massive natural phenomenon
like the “footprint” of the river for which, qua
“not-only-longest-river-in-the-world-but also-river ten
times-as-long-as-the-second-longest-river-in-the-world” it was clairvoyantly
named by Mr. Bezos). “Netflix” had similarly humble, if slightly later (if
still slightly “Proprietary Names/the Name”-antedating) origins in my
lifeworld. My earliest recollection of that name is an aurally-sourced one: in
2003, in the course of a small gathering at which I was present, a friend of
mine who had subscribed to Netflix’s DVD mail-delivery service (then the only
service it or they offered) tendered nous
autres a quick description of its consumer-side workings (their dependence
on one’s maintenance of a “queue” and whatnot) and a highly qualified
recommendation of it: “It’s only worth signing up for if you watch an awful lot
of movies.” As I did not watch an awful lot of movies—unless two discs’ worth a
week counted as an awful lot, and as my neighborhood video-rental shop and the
central branch of Baltimore’s public library system kept me reliably supplied
with those discs, I gathered Netflix was not for me, but the company snagged me
eventually, in 2008 or 2009, when I developed a yen to watch the BBC’s complete
Shakespeare series from the 1970s and 1980s and somehow discovered that while
neither the library nor the video-rental shop carried it, Netflix did, and
thence commenced perhaps for the first time since my late adolescence a history
of interactions with a proprietarily named product that I would come to look
back on with nostalgia, and indeed specifically
nostalgia of the intense yet dubious kind I had ascribed to my
recollection of caramel Jello pudding pops and Subway steak-and-cheese subs in
“Proprietary Names/the Name” (whose dubiousness vis-à-vis both those products
has since incidentally only increased owing to the their respective pitchmen’s
precipitous descent into universal ignominy). In the kinetic stereograph of my
memory, my Alltag as a Netflix
DVD-delivery customer, centering as it does/did on my sealing a pair or trio of
“iconic” bright-red envelopes and dropping them into the ancient matte-blue USPS
mailbox on the sidewalk just outside the downtown-Baltimore office at which I
work/worked, is more evocative of nineteenth than of twenty-first-century
Occidental meta-postal life—a visual companion piece to the yellow tailcoats of
Biedermeier Germany’s postmen, the Trollope-invented red letterboxes of
Victorian Britain, and the petits blues
of Belle Epoque-Paris’s pneumatic tube letter-delivery system. The sense of
anticipation with which I awaited the arrival of my discs in my personal
mail-pigeonhole in the uptown-Baltimore apartment building at which I resided,
and the disappointment when I failed to find a hint of red therein, also now
strike me as very nineteenth-century, evoking as they do Schubert’s wanderer’s elated-cum-woebegone
exclamations of “Die Post bringt keine Brief für dich!” and “Mein Herz!”, even
as they recall the very late twentieth century in reminding me of the only
other period of my life wherein I have felt these emotions so keenly in
connection with the regular mail, the period comprising my undergraduate
studies in the early 1990s, when I corresponded with my friends by paper letter.
But of course this nostalgia has contrived to germinate and effloresce only
thanks to the gradual supersedence of Netflix qua rented-DVD distributor by Netflix
qua producer-cum-purveyor of so-called streamed content, specifically
principally—at least so I hear tell, for apart from certain specials and series
centered on Norm Macdonald and Jerry Seinfeld I have viewed nary a minute of
it—the sorts of tedious, turgid, profanity-and-nudity-saturated “drama” series
that the subscription cable channels had been producing since the late 1990s
(which in turn were essentially segmented extensions of the sorts of tedious
bombastic, “drama” films Hollywood had been producing since the late 1960s) and
that had prompted media critics (never the world’s cleverest or most cultivated
people) to proclaim with unanimous onanistic smugness starting in the late
20-oughties, “We’re living in a new golden age of television” or even “we’re
living in the first true golden age
of television.” And of course the just-mentioned supersedence coincided with
the supersedence of the cable channels’ output of such series by Netflix’s, a
supersedence that by the mid-20-teens had approached so close to being total
that people began saying “Netflix” in contexts wherein they had thitherto said
“television” or “TV”—not the respective commercial purveyors of television—“ABC,”
“CBS,” “HBO,” etc.—television itself and tout
court, as in questions such as “What’s on television/TV tonight?” and “What
have you been watching on TV/television lately?” Mutatis mutandis (i.e., setting aside technical differences like
the just-alluded-to one of the relative temporal portability of the offerings
[differences that would have resulted in the substitution of, say, “this
summer” for “tonight”]), the only difference between Netflix and television
seemed to be that Netflix was much “cooler” and upmarket, that there was no
embarrassment or shame associated with heavy Netflix viewership even among
people who fancied themselves super-cultivated; it seemed that Netflix had
inherited in perpetuity the entire mantle once bestowed somewhat selectively
only on the hippest productions of the supposed new golden age like Breaking Bad and The Wire. In the mid-teens one started to hear a god-awful phrase,
“Netflix and chill,” that conveyed the sense that a lifestyle of what would
have been disdainfully termed couch potato-ism
a generation earlier was now le plus chic on offer. To be sure, one did
(and still does) occasionally encounter polemics of the sort that bore (and
still bear) a superficial resemblance to the 1960s and 1970s paleosnobs’
jeremiads against “the vast wasteland” and “the boob tube,” but these paid fulsome
tribute to their Devil even as they denounced him. For example, in decrying the
present American populace’s seemingly ineluctable disinclination to productive
civic or economic activity, a pundit would (and will still) write, “After all
they’ve got Netflix on tap 24/7; what incentive do they have to get off their
keisters (not that anyone any longer employs so winsomely wholesome a euphemism
for the fundament as keister [as is
attested by the red-underscoring of keister
by my fifteen-year-old version of Word {“Speaking of Word, why have you not yet
mentioned Microsoft?” Because it was already an ancient proprietary-nominal
behemoth twenty years ago (although its commercial kinship with the newer
behemoths now in point will eventually occasion my echoing your mention of it)}])
and do something?”, thereby implying
that Netflix’s programming is more reliably moreish than stroopwafels steeped
in laudanum. I cannot tell you—whoever you are—how demoralizing this
implication is for me, inasmuch as I cannot think of anything that might more
reliably push me over the edge into terminally suicidal despair than a diurnal
ocular-cum-aural diet of Netflix programming. “But how do you know this if
you’ve never even viewed a non-Macdonaldian or Seinfeldian minute of that
programming?” Because owing to my near-continuous propinquity to Netflix
subscribers, I have not managed to avoid hearing
millions of minutes of it, and from those millions of minutes I believe I am
entitled to infer that it is consubstantial in point of trashiness with the “second
Golden Age”-epoch television programming of which I did go out of my way to
watch at least a hundred minutes when I didn’t know any better. Anyway, for all
my demoralization by what Netflix has become, that demoralization palls by
comparison with that wrought in my soul, such as it is or may be, by the third
proprietary name of the top trio out of the abovementioned rough half-dozen, Google. Not that I can summon up even a
wisp of nostalgia for the Google of yore but that I can at least fondly recall
a time when Google seemed harmless and about as meritorious as a so-called tech
company is capable of seeming to a paleosnob such as the present writer. The
name Google entered my consciousness
of the webiverse as that of a search engine in an already very crowded field of
them, and to this day I am unclear on how that engine managed to elbow into
effective nonexistence its more anciently established rivals like Yahoo, Alta
Vista, and Ask Jeeves. Certainly if I had had my metaphysical-cum-aesthetic
druthers it never would have won out, for I found the name far less appealing
than any of those three. YAHOO!’s bumptious
self-presentation in those exclamation-mark punctuated zanily off-kilter italicized
capitals certainly did not endear, but I never could have found it in my heart
to hate a brand whose name I had first encountered in the prose masterpiece of
one of my favorite writers, Jonathan Swift (or, more likel-ly in the 1968 Doctor Who serial The Mind Robber, a serial featuring a self-quoting Gulliver in its
dramatis personae, which I first saw in 1985, long before first reading
anything of Gulliver’s Travels beyond some child-friendly version of the Voyage
to Lilliput). Complementarily, I never could have been very sorry to see Ask Jeeves go, weary as I had been of
the cult of P.G. Woodhouse almost since first learning of its existence in ca.
1992, on spying The World of Jeeves on
my college roommate’s bookshelf. (I suppose this weariness had simply sprung
from my having spent a surfeit a surfeit of time with 1960s TV butlers like Family Affair’s Mr. French and Batman’s Alfred in childhood [for
butlers had been omnipresent in the prime-time offerings of the 1960s, reruns of
which had constituted the bulk of my childhood televisual diet {and yes, I know
Jeeves was and is technically not a butler but a valet, but who really shivs a
git about the difference?}]). Alta Vista is probably the combatant that I wish
had won the search-engine wars, for while its name certainly has never had any
aura of romance about it for me, it at least evokes nothing offensive in my
mind’s sensorium, and indeed nothing at all apart perhaps from some
unremarkable Floridian housing complex like Del Boca Vista, the one Jerry’s
parents retired to in Seinfeld, or
Lago Vista, where my paternal aunt and her husband lived back in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, and Alta Vista does
after all mean—high view or perhaps
more idiomatically bird’s eye view or
overview, which is after all what a
self-respecting search engine ought to provide to the user, at least according
to my quaintly Luddite lights. But Google
strongly repelled me right from the get-go, conjuring up as it inevitably did
my first encounter with the preposterously long number for which it was
presumably named (I write presumably
because I have yet to encounter an “origins story” about Google [and in this I
am presumably among the last living persons in the Occident {although it is
true that Sergei Whatshisname has always been much less interested in
publicizing the history of his shop than Messrs. Zuckerberg, Bezos, et al. that
of theirs}), namely in an episode of the astronomer-cum-“exobiologist” Carl
Sagan’s mutatis-mutandis-al clone of
Kenneth Clark’s Civilization, Cosmos, into which the number had
presumably been introduced solely for the sake of Sagan’s narration of its own
insufferably twee “origins story,” for a googolth of a second’s thought
suffices to remind one that no entity peculiar to pure mathematics can afford
any insight whatsoever into “the wonders of the cosmos.” Anyhow, I was and am
so violently repelled by the evocation of Cosmos
because my rabid fandom of that program at the age of about ten was and is
a synecdoche for the bad very old days of my childhood membership of the cult
of scientism, from which I apostatized at the age of fourteen and a
well-nigh-fanatical would-be-scourge of which I have remained ever since (even
while finding most strains of anti-scientism too “problematic” in their own
right to warrant even my equivocal adherence), all the while knowing that I
have been swimming against the tide of the Weltgeist,
and certainly the very early years of the present century witnessed a
tsunamification of that tide, what with their veritable canonization of the
abovementioned Dr. Sagan (d. 1996) as the arch-saint of a New-Atheist movement at
least as demographically formidable as any of its contemporaries among the
quasi-traditional pop music-centered youth subcultures, and the elevation to
unprecedented prestige of so-called geeks, as instanced not only or even mainly
by the complete mainstreamification of the internet but also the permeation of fandom
of the god-awful sci-fi and “fantasy” “universes”—Lord of the Rings, Star Wars,
Harry Potter, etc. into the society
of nominal adults; such that one cannot help wondering if Google’s victory in
the search-engine wars was not preponderantly owing to its possession of the
“geekiest” name of all of them. For it must be or at least ought to be
remembered that Google’s supposed insuperable superiority as a search engine
was slow to be acknowledged; indeed, I believe I can recall someone of at least
more extensive interwebbial experience than my own saying in ca. 2001 something
to the effect of “you might as well use Google” apropos of some other search
engine in much the same tone as one would say “you might as well walk” apropos
of some particularly hitch-ridden system of rapid-transit. I own that
eventually I started to hear from such people talk of how Google stood head and
shoulders above the rest of the pack of search engines in terms of the abundance
and quality of results it returned, but in hindsight I wonder if all those
people were ultimately just dupes of Google’s (or Alphabet’s [incidentally, I
think I learned that Google was but a subsidiary of Alphabet only in ca. 2018,
a fact that I find mildly disquieting, inasmuch as I have not since heard of an
Alphabet project that was not also a Google project [such that one cannot but
conclude that Alphabet is but a so-called shell corporation founded for some
nefarious purpose] and probably because Alphabet
in its ever-alternating evocation of kindergarten and Godard’s Alphaville is an altogether more
sinister-sounding name than Google)
marketing department, because they never seemed to get around to explaining
exactly what it was in technical terms that supposedly made Google such a
superior web-crawler to, well, Web-Crawler [R.I.P.]. Of course now those
selfsame people would doubtless say that it was the superiority of Google’s algorithms that did the trick. But what
the heck is an algorithm? And if those algorithms of Google’s are so
gosh-darned superior, why do they now notoriously yield to the average query
nothing but endless repetition after the top dozen or so hits? Howbeit, I have
to confess that my Cosmos-catalyzed
aversion to Google ultimately failed
to “take,” failed to eventuate in an eschewal of the search engine bearing that
name, and that over the half-dozen years following its victory in the
search-engine wars—in other words between ca. 2002 and ca. 2008—Google won a
place in my affections that was more prominent than that of most other
proprietary names in my lifeworld and also I daresay much more prominent than
the place it then occupied in the affections of that micro-epoch’s Joe Laptop.
I can neither forget nor disavow the nearly audible coos of admiration with
which I greeted the particolored cascade of postage stamp-sized snapshots of
Thomas Bernhard that resulted from my first Google Images query—coos elicited
by the reflection that the engine had somehow
instantly assembled a postage stamp album-sized collection of images of the
writer from every corner of the world at the sole solicitation of the inputting
of his forename and surname. Nor can I
forget or disavow the first action I took on first taking in Google News’
presentation of a cascade of journalistic reports updated “within the last two
hours,” “within the last 46 minutes,” and so on—namely, to dash off to a pair
of friends an email in which I placed a link to the site and exultantly
remarked that it showed that we were at last living in the age of “the Hourly
Telepress,” that being the name of a presumably electronic newspaper of the
year 2000 as imagined in the abovementioned Mind
Robber (for despite my abjuration of my boyhood geekdom, I retained a soft
spot for Doctor Who qua treasure
trove of traditional British values and stereotypes [for this was, after all, a
year or two before the 2004 debut of the so-called reboot of the program(me), a
reboot whose deliberate desecration of those values and stereotypes eventually
indurated that soft spot into the toughest of calluses]). And last but not
least in point of exposure of the intensity of my former Google-olatry, I
cannot forget or disavow the glow of gratitude that suffused my soul or heart
or what have you (and that doubtless simultaneously suffused my face) on my
receipt—presumably via my Microsoft Hotmail account, then my only personal
email account—of an invitation from a friend (one of the pair of friends
referenced immediately above) to establish a Gmail address—or the glow of
smugness that suffused that selfsame entity (and that doubtless etc.) on my subsequently
hearing another friend, one whom I had just invited to establish a Gmail
account in turn, remark with admiration that might just have been not entirely
jocular (albeit undoubtedly not light enough in jocularity to be described as
“wry”) (for the friend was a seasoned software developer and hence in a
position and of a disposition to cock a skeptical eye at all ostensible
innovations the so-called tech field), “Ah, you have a Gmail account!” For (vis-à-vis
the likely anomalousness to the reader of needing an invitation to start using
Gmail) for whatever reason—a reason that will doubtless have long been since
shewn to be both astonishingly ingenious and astonishingly diabolical by more
dedicated and searching Google-bashers than me—Google chose to “roll out” Gmail
slowly, unobtrusively, and selectively, via the distribution of invitations
nested in groups of four or five invitees per acceptor, and I was the first
person I had ever heard of who had received one of these invitations. Moreover
(vis-à-vis the delight I had felt at receiving the invitation), it must be
remembered that Gmail featured (and still features) a certain very useful
feature then completely new in the realm of electronic correspondence—viz., the
searchability of individual emails by subject and recipient regardless of their
location in relation to one’s inbox. You (whoever you are) see, up until then,
the only way one could keep emails from a certain person or on a certain
subject at one’s fingertips had been to set up a subfolder bearing the name of
the person or subject and move them into that subfolder one at a time.
“Googling” one’s own inbox had not thitherto been an option. Now in hindsight
one cannot help wondering if it might not have been advisable to keep the old
folder-centered system in place—partly because it encouraged good
organizational habits; partly because the old IT adage “garbage in, garbage
out” applied just as water-tightly to the “Google”-able inbox as to any earlier
data-processing apparatus, such that in the absence of accurate
subject-headings to work with, it could not reliably return a concatenation of
emails centered on a specific subject, and since learning that their inboxes
are “Google”-able (and hence theoretically capable of yielding all emails on a given subject based on
their lexical contents, albeit only according to some hopelessly naïve
philosophy of language to which presumably nobody actually subscribes [i.e., one
according to which each and every message topically centering on, say, triskaidekaphobia,
will include more occurrences of the word “triskaidekaphobia” than of any other
word] but to which everyone is happy to pretend to subscribe in a
meta-epistolary setting because the pretense saves him the trouble of keeping his
letters well-labeled), scarcely anyone has been back-bottomed to use subject
headings at all, let alone thoughtfully (to be sure, the present writer does
his best to use subject-headings frequently and thoughtfully, but as in any
system in which scarcely anyone follows the rules, the odd rule-follower is at
a disadvantage not only because he spends a quantum of effort on rule-following
that his fellow system-inhabitants can devote to other pursuits but also because
he loses out on the windfalls of the disorder occasioned by the near-universal
disobedience [and so, vis-à-vis the system now in point, the present writer has
compelled himself to content himself with ostensibly corresponding with many a
correspondent about a subject that originated years ago {and whose original
pertinence to his transactions with the correspondent he can now but dimly
recall} because to break the “thread” by starting up a new subject would
substantially reduce his chances of receiving a reply because the correspondent
is apparently in the habit of maintaining one email thread per correspondent of
his own and so will never manage to find {or perhaps even bother to try to
find} the fresh-subject-headed email]); and partly (and not most minusculely)
because the inbox-searching apparatus seems latish-ly to have developed
“reliability issues” not dissimilar those which have contemporaneously begun to
afflict its web-searching apparatus (and on which I shall descant presently).
But back in ca. 2004 that searchable inbox was like a brand-new toy, as they
say (or used to say), such that one could not help regarding Google [and Google
itself rather than Sergei Whatshisname, for back then one had not even heard of
Sergei Whatshisname, at least not often enough even to remember that his first
name was Sergei] as a kind of Santa Claus, the figure who had preempted Christ
himself as the personification of virtuous benevolence in the heart and mind of
an American such as the present writer who had had an entirely secular
upbringing and hence had always regarded Christmas as essentially and centrally
Santa’s holiday and Christ’s only secondarily and accidentally; whence the
feeling of well-nigh religious gratitude with which I reflected on Google’s
official slogan “Don’t be evil” shortly after acquiring my Gmail account. Of
course I would not even be the millionth interwebbial wag, let alone the first,
to remark with a wryness so lacking in jocularity as to be downright rueful
that it is supremely ironic that in the span of scarcely more than a decade
Google went from adjuring itself not to be evil to being “arguably” the most
evil entity in sublunary existence, and so I shan’t remark that remark but
merely second it (or million-and-first it), but I think it is just barely
conceivable that I am the first interwebbial wag to remark what I am about to
remark in connection with “Don’t be evil” (and with massive lashings of sheer
a-humorous bemusement in place of any trace of wryness), namely, that in
hindsight as a miniature polemic (for that is what it actually was) it seems
quite oversized—a veritable mosquito-slaying bazooka—in the light of the
characteristics of the evil that it was targeting—viz., the routine
self-marketing practices of the Microsoft corporation towards its own customers,
and certain unintended knock-on effects of those practices. It was targeting
those pop-up pleas to upgrade to the latest version of Word or Excel or Outlook
or what have you that would come embedded like dormant jack-in-the-boxes in the
CD ROMs via which one installed those programs on one’s PC’s hard drive, and on
the formidable technical glitches (e.g., system crashes and freezes and
preternaturally slow performance) that would often ensue if one were gullible
enough to hearken to those pleas. These practices and their effects were
certainly vexing, but there was nothing remotely “Orwellian” (or, rather, to
gratify the Tolkienolatrous mindset of the present micro-epoch, “Sauronian”)
about them. At their most malevolent-cum-maleficent they might have been
not-unaptly described as Barnumian. But by the same token, the slogan’s
anathematizing stance was very much in keeping with the Zeitchengeist, for in those days Bill Gates was the most loathed
man on earth apart from (perhaps) George W. Bush. One…oh, I guess, not-unwryly notes—one not unwryly notes
that all the evil that Mr. Gates then wrought or was even capable of working
[(sic) for wrought is indeed the
original past tense of work and most
certainly not a past tense of wreak]
was firmly anchored in user-end offline media, such that not-unlike Elizabeth
the First vis-à-vis lesbianism-versus-male homosexuality, one cannot help very
wryly wondering exactly what sort of evil an all-online service-provider Google
then fancied it might do if it wanted to, such that one further finds oneself
unable not to wonder paranoiacally (1. paranoiacally, that is not vis-à-vis
oneself but vis-à-vis the collectivity of reckoner-users [altho’ I’m sure many
a ninth or tenth-generation Freud-knockoff would say this is a distinction with
a difference {or vice-versa}] 2. i.e., super-wryly yet not at all jocularly and
hence not at all ruefully) whether “Don’t be evil” was but the bastard
thought-child of Google’s wishes for online evil yet to be wrought and already
in the works back, or perhaps down [for it was and is in Silicon Valley, no?] at Google HQ. Howbeit, it
was by not many—perhaps as few as three and certainly no more than six—years after
the roll-out of Gmail, that Google began working such evil in the form of those
advertisements that used to appear towards the top of the window in Gmail,
advertisements that were said (and, I believe, acknowledged by Google itself)
to be customized on the basis of data culled from the texts of one’s own emails
and the emails one had received; in other words from a more or less exact
electronic analogue [or perhaps, rather, “digitalogue”] of a desk drawer in
one’s closet or boudoir, the innermost sanctum of one’s private life, a site
whose violation by snoopers had been known to touch off more than figurative
riots (e.g., the one touched off by the searching of John Wilkes’s study by
agents of the Crown in Georgian Britain). And this simultaneous violation of
millions of Google users’ privacies did indeed catalyze something that might
not inaptly be termed a riot at least in terms of its widespreadness and obstreperousness
(for as far as I know it was not attending by Google HQ’s being more-than-figuratively
beset by a more-than-figurative mob wielding non-electric torches). And at
least so far as the outward manifestation of their snooping went, Google evidently
placated the rioters, for I cannot recall the last time I saw an advertisement
of the abovementioned sort (or any other sort) in a Gmail window. Whether the
disappearance of these ads bespeaks even the slightest or even the most
theoretical or technical renunciation of access to users’ correspondence (i.e.,
a renunciation analogous in its practicality and non-technicality to that
exhibited by the United States and Russia when in the brief post-Cold War
honeymoon they ceased targeting each other’s cities with nuclear warheads [for
the selfsame news reports in which the de-targeting was revealed also reported
that each of the superpowers could retarget every single one of those cities at
five minutes’ notice]) is unknown to me and presumably to every other workaday
user, and in any case, the pointfulness of seeking an answer to this question
appears to have been effectively nullified by the revelation two or three years
ago that the U.S. government’s National Security Agency could access any
American citizens’ full archive of electronic communications at will; a
revelation that nicely more or less exactly coincided (at least chez moi) with the revelation that
Google had been intimately involved in the U.S. Defense Department’s (i.e., the
department under which the NSA is umbrella’d) satellite mapping, mapping which
presumably (i.e., inasmuch as one had learned way back in the 1980s that the
U.S. Defense Department’s satellites’ cameras were already capable of reading
the license plate numbers of cars) allows for the micrometer-by-micrometer
tracking of the “meat-world”-ial whereabouts of every U.S. citizen (and perhaps
even many a U.S.-based non-citizen!). In short, Big Brother is most certainly already
watching us, and whether he is watching us under the alias of Uncle Sam or that
of Uncle Sergei is undeterminable and seemingly irrelevant. And in any case, since
dropping the abovementioned ads, Google has not confined itself to modes of
user-micromanagement that are invisible to the user himself. At some point in
the late oughties, Google acquired Blogger, the electronic self-publishing
platform that I had already been using for several years, and thereupon
assimilated every Gmail-using Blogger user’s (including the present writer’s)
Blogger account to his Gmail account (and presumably compelled every
non-Gmail-using Blogger user to set up a Gmail account). This acquisition
obviously meant that every Blogger-using blogger was thereupon subjectable to
as much scrutiny from Google as every Gmail user had thitherto been. As near as
I can recollect, I then paid the acquisition next to no mind, although I do
recall being mildly annoyed by Google’s acquisition of YouTube a year or two
later—this notwithstanding the fact that I had posted no videos to the Tube and
had no plans to post any thereto. I suppose my irritation was occasioned by the
intrinsic tackiness of the mixture of media—of the textual and the
audiovisual—that had not been entailed by the consolidation of Blogger with
Gmail, although in hindsight it seems not unlikely that had it not been for the
consolidation of YouTube with the other two platforms, the entire so-called
blogosphere (i.e., the totality of blogs including not only those hosted by Blogger
but also those hosted by non-Google-owned platforms such as WordPress) would
have remained unbadgered by censorship to this day. After all, hardly anybody
reads blogs (or much of anything else for that matter), whereas practically
everybody watches videos, such that the “algorithmic” juxtaposition of Gmail-account
holders’ YouTube videos with their respective blog posts must perforce have
drawn innumerable blogs to the prying attention of people who otherwise never
would have been aware of them at all, and thereupon got those selfsame pryers
into the habit of seeking out blogs more generally, including the blogs of
people who had yet to post a single YouTube video. “Including, presumably, the
blog of ‘the present writer?’” Indeed [how it irks me to have involuntarily
just typed a homonym of yet another Google-owned property!], although I somehow
managed to escape the prying of anyone bent on making life difficult for me for
quite a long time, and indeed [ditto!] I don’t recall being at all worried
about attracting the attention of such a person until about 2018, by which
point even total obscurities were beginning to be “canceled” for “edgy”
comments they had made online. I believe, for example, that it was about then
that that employee of a twopenny-haypenny NGO was fired for having jokingly
Tweeted that she needn’t fear catching AIDS during a trip to Africa “because
I’m white.” But even then, and per the just-cited example, I did not yet
envisage Google’s or Twitter’s (for by then I did have a Twitter account) being
directly involved in my “cancelation”; I supposed simply that someone would
notice something I had posted that was objectionable on grounds of some sort
and then draw it to the attention of my employer, who would then effect the
cancelation on her (for my boss at the time was a woman) own. But when, in
2019, the explosion of super-woke content (e.g., documentaries seriously
entertaining the question of insects’ rights, “science”-magazine-sited pitches
for blokes’ participation in women’s sports brutally rubbing shoulders with
comedy panel shows devised solely for the purpose of showcasing women and
excluding men, and a fully aphasiac “stand-up” comic delivering pre-recorded
robot-voiced jokes one eye-twitch at a time) on my news-and-current-affairs
source of first (and nearly sole) resort, BBC Radio 4, drove me unprecedentedly
to seek news-and-current affairs coverage from YouTube, and what with that
content’s hailing by default from a certain range of the political spectrum, I
quickly learned of the permanent suspension of many a YouTube user for many an audiovisual
sally that did not exceed many a blog post of mine in point of “edginess” or
“spiciness.” And so I strongly suspected that the powers that were or be’d at
Google would as readily send me as the dude with the Nazi-saluting dog to the
Coventry of the blogosphere if they ever took cognizance of my diatribe against
fat people in “Gluttony
and Panpsychism” or my entertainment of the notion of more-than-figuratively
cannibalizing uppity commodity-consumers in “To
Russia with Lunch.” Then came the watershed year of 2020, after which a
’Tuber could be flagged or suspended for saying anything that deviated from the
consensus of the moment about the presidential election of that year or the
COVID 19 virus or any of the “vaccines” for that virus or “climate change” or
abortion or transsexuals—“the list went and still goes on and on”—and when
those ever-so-helpful links to Wikipedia articles on the pertinent item on the
list began appearing like Surgeon General’s anti-smoking warnings just below
the viewing-window of first-time deviators. (Wikipedia is of course yet another
member of our epoch’s kuchka of new-but-omnipresent
proprietary names, and the unprecedented sinisterness of its reflexive
participation in Google’s fact-crushing mission [for even a counterfactual
precedent of which in preceding microepochs one has to reach for some feeble
pseudo-approximation like the notion of Ford cars suddenly becoming equipped
with Chrysler-branded airbags] is matched in intensity only by the comic
richness of its continuing indispensability as a reference work of soup-to-nuts
resort on most topics despite that participation.) The fact that these links seemed to appear
instantaneously, that they were always already present when I went to view
offending videos (videos that had generally premiered only hours earlier) led
me to assume that the flagging of “inappropriate content” was robotically actuated,
which led me in turn if not to assume then at least to suspect that my
obscurity would no longer protect me at Blogger (if it ever had done) and to begin
proceeding with extreme caution as a lowercase blogger. I had then just
completed a very long essay that I had begun in 2019 as a sort of sequel to
(albeit by no means a fifth-anniversary special on) “Every
Man His Own W.G. Sebald”—in other words an essay on the changes (all of
them for the worse) that had supervened in my quotidian street-level life as a
Baltimorean in the exact handful of years that had elapsed since the date
reported on in that post; but as the so-called pandemic had supervened in the
course of the essay’s composition, it had perforce metamorphosed into an essay incorporating
an account of my relocation from Baltimore to the Tampa Bay area (as opposed to
ending abruptly with my egress from Baltimore, for it was in large measure the
nadir of inhospitableness reached by Baltimore in March of 2020 that had
precluded my even attempting to ride out the so-called pandemic there, and the
riots of the subsequent summer had been instigated by BLM, the same
organization that had instigated the 2015 riots in Baltimore that had
dramatically accelerated the city’s decline in hospitableness) and hence
perforce dealt with COVID and other scabrous topics in a manner guaranteed to
make even the drowsiest robot eye see fire-engine red. And so like a dissident
Soviet writer, I resolved to make it an essay “for the drawer.” I did manage to
screw up the courage (or rashness) to post my next essay (a polemic against
Walter Benjamin’s sanctification of storytelling) despite its inclusion of some
“spicy takes” on sensitive topics, but I was almost relieved thereafter to find
that it required substantial revision for other reasons, such that I had a
decent non-cowardly excuse for pulling it and thereby placing it beyond the
reach (at least for the time being, at least as far as I knew!) of the
robo-censor. Even so, I was either courageous, rash, complacent, or lazy enough
not to pull any of my posts that antedated the Baltimore and Tampa Bay-centered
one, and so all but an incalculably minuscule proportion of my bloggic output
remained visible to all internet connection-equipped eyes human and robotic. Whether
upon leaving that proportion in place I prevailingly thought regarding a
possible flagging by the censors, “It could never happen to me, because if it
could, it would have by now,” (i.e., I was prevailingly acting out of the
rashness of complacency [perhaps in complicity with the laziness of laziness])
or “It probably will happen to me, and I just don’t care” (i.e., I was acting
out of the kind of rashness that is at least construable as courage [and again,
perhaps in complicity with the ell of ell]) is impossible for me now to say;
all I know [the “all I know,” by the way, is a tip of the hat to the verbatim
evocation of that unit of W.G. Sebald’s style in “Every Man His Own W.G. Sebald”]
is that when I received my first censor-flagging, my emotional-cum-somatic reaction
to it was one of intense irritation mingled with mild surprise and free of the
slightest suspicion of shock. The flagging took the form of an email from
Google notifying me that one of my posts, “Notes
on William Lovell by Ludwig Tieck,”
had been identified as containing “sensitive content,” that it would
thenceforth be blocked off from web-users by default and released to their view
only on their agreeing to see it despite its possession of such content, and
that it would be entirely excluded from the corpus of online content to which
user-initiated web searches were directed—in other words, that even its existence
would be invisible to everyone in the world except users already in the visual
presence of my blog and the link to the post in its side-panel index (an index,
incidentally, consisting by default of nothing but a column of the blog’s years
of activity in descending chronological order, the individual posts for each
year being rendered visible only by toggling one of those Javascript menus
activated by tiny cuneiformesque triangles). A day or so later, I received in
ultra-quick succession verbatim mutato mutando
emails regarding three other posts—“An
Uncharacteristically Topical Essay on The
Favourite” and two of the four installments of my essay “To Russia with
Lunch.” In all candor and frankness, I must own that “sensitive content” is not
a substance that has been moderated by Google only since the mid-to-late
20-teens advent of the micro-epoch of “cancellation” and that it has never been
moderated exclusively from on high; indeed, I must admit that an option to flag
a given post as containing such content has been presented to users in a
slender horizontal fillet that has appeared at the top of every Blogger window at
least since I started using the platform back in 2004—in other words, since well
before Blogger’s acquisition by Google. On first sighting that option way back
then, I immediately thought, “Ah, ‘sensitive content’ is obviously just a
euphemism for pornographic images,” and as I had absolutely no intention of
posting any pornographic images (or indeed, way back then, any images of any
kind), my withers were unwrung, and the “sensitive content” fillet soon became
effectively invisible to me. It simply did not cross my mind that anyone would
flag as “sensitive content” mere strings of words amounting to statements and
sentiments insufficiently mindful of the emotional well-being of so-called
protected groups—or even such statements and sentiments as were couched in
language calculated to offend such groups (e.g., statements containing
so-called slurs). Now, as mentioned before, by the time I received the
abovementioned emails from Google I had been worrying for several years about
being “canceled” for mere words I had written, but I had only been worrying
that I would be “canceled” either via a Google-actuated robot or via some living human acting
independently of Google, for because I had completely forgotten about the
“sensitive content” fillet it had not occurred to me that I might be canceled
via the collaboration of Google with some non-Google affiliated human being, that
some person offended by—or affecting to be offended by—something I had posted
at my blog could get me into hot water of any sort by reporting on that
something to Google rather than to my employer. But it is most likely—or at
least apparently most likely (for
like any other reckoner-user not in the employ of a so-called Big Tech
organization [and doubtless even many a user in such an employ] I am not privy
to the subcutaneous workings of the interweb, although this lack of privity
will not stop me from delivering a conjecture about certain of those workings
at a slightly later point in this essay])—such a person acting in such a way
that got me flagged for “sensitive content.” Indeed, owing to the timing of the
first flagging and the content of the first-flagged post, I am even pretty sure that after a certain fashion I know who
the human complainant was—which is to say, while I don’t know his name, I know
certain facts about him that uniquely distinguish him from all other human
individuals vis-à-vis their respective relations to and interactions with me.
You see, about a week before my receipt of the first email from Google, I
pulled from my blog my translation of Ludwig Tieck’s novel William Lovell (a translation that I had posted there in installments
back in 2010 and 2011 and that had consequently been continuously exposed to
universal public view for more than a decade) in preparation for submitting it
to publishers, who understandably tend to be cool to the notion of bringing out
an edition of a book that everyone can already read for free. And within three
days of the pulling of the translation, I received a so-called tweet (or
perhaps, rather, a so-called post [for I cannot remember whether Twitter had
already been renamed X by then {and if it had, the “so-called” in front of
“post” ought by all rights to be boldfaced (for in such a case the post would actually
have been called a post and yet no worthier of being called a post than a so-called
tweet of being called a tweet [for the X-post is patterned on the blog-post and
therefore doubly ersatz or twice as far removed from a post worthy of being
denoted as such without qualification])}]) from someone (I believe the name
attached to the tweeter’s account suggested that he at least “identified” as
male) representing himself as a student at one of the more prominent Midwestern
liberal arts colleges (which he named but which I will not) who had been
consulting my translation in connection with his coursework in German and
wished to know if now that my translation was no longer available at my blog it
was available somewhere else. While I was by no means offended by the request
(for the tweet did of course essentially boil down to a request to be sent a
copy of the translation), by the same token, within seconds of reading it I was
more or less firmly resolved to disregard it entirely. After all, it would have
been if not technically then at least rhetorically impossible to open a reply
to the tweet without some bluff apology for-cum-explanation of my removal of
the translation from the blog, and my reasons for doing that were none of this
apparent younker’s gosh-damned business, let alone the business of the
Twitterverse at large (even if “ironically” they are very much the business of
anyone [including the aforesaid younker {albeit exclusively in the capacity now
being described}!] who happens to alight on this essay wherever it eventually
finds its public home); and while I didn’t really mind his using my translation
as a “pony” for his assigned translation exercises, or even plagiarizing it
outright (for “consult” or whichever synonym thereof he employed was obviously
the flimsiest of fig leaves for some degree of dereliction of scholastic duty),
I did have enough regard and affection for Tieck’s novel not to go out of my
way to abet the deliberate circumvention of an acquaintance with it unmediated
by my translational intervention. Admittedly, within hours of sending me that
tweet (i.e., without hours of my resolution not to reply to it) the apparent
younker “followed” me and thereby relieved me of the burden of exposing my
prospective transaction with him to the eyes of the Twitterverse at large, but
I found that this relief would not adequately indemnify me for an unhappy
epiphenomenon of an ineluctable precondition of my privately replying to
him—viz., (vis-à-vis the precondition) my “following” him “back” and thereby
(and here comes the naming of the epiphenomenon) becoming “mutuals” with him;
for, pace my above assertion of
Twitter-followership’s supersedence of Friendster-style pseudo-friendship, the
much rarer phenomenon of Twitter mutualdom (i.e. two-way followership)
establishes a kind of connection that in virtue of its traditional (to the
extent that any phenomenon less than twenty years old can participate in a
tradition) if contingent dependence on selectivity is much closer to classic
real-worldial friendship than Friendster-style pseudo-friendship ever has been,
and I certainly did not wish to become even semi-classic friends with the
younker. In short, while I harbored no ill will towards the presumptive fellow,
I reckoned that I didn’t owe him anything or even that I would be committing
any breach of decorum in ignoring him altogether. After all, the worst that
could happen to him in consequence of my ignoration would be his having to read
William Lovell “with all his eyes” as
the French would say (only in French), and the worst that could happen to me
was…well, nothing, inasmuch as I had never “doxed” myself in a blog post—but,
alas, wie gesagt, I had completely
forgotten about the “sensitive content” fillet, which placed instant revenge
against me at the younker’s fingertips, and so (so I conjectured upon receiving
the first email from Google), when I failed to reply to him within twenty-four
hours, the younker, doubtless being a brat of the sordid sort that seems to typify
the students of liberal arts colleges these days, a brat who believes he is
entitled to instant obedience from “adults” (for these days nobody—and least of
all the younkers and younkeresses themselves—seems any longer to make a
pretense of regarding college students as adults in their own right), (had) simply
reached out and smashed the button in the fillet above the still-available post
in my blog closest in content to the Tieck translation itself; and when (so I
conjectured upon receiving the other three emails) that first email (had) failed
to make me instantaneously relent, he (had) simply smashed the fillet-buttons
above a trio of posts that numbered among the most readily locatable because
among the most recent I had posted (although I was bemused and remain bemused
as to why he overleaped the two very
most recent—the
essay on the Metropolitan Opera’s 2020 production of Alban Berg’s Lulu and the
bagatelle on the Scopes Monkey Trial, especially given that both contained
material guaranteed to raise the hackles of a typical liberal-arts student de nos jours—the essay a well-aimed kick
at a gratuitously “woke” element of the production, the bagatelle a well-aimed
snook at Darwinism [altho’ truth be told, one wonders how much today’s younkers
and younkeresses even hear about Darwinian evolution, let alone care about it
{for one needn’t know anything about Darwin to loathe Biblical Christianity}]).
“So:” (so I said to meself after receiving the first email and recovering from
the abovementioned surprise but while still positively reveling in the
abovementioned irritation) “I have been flagged for having posted ‘sensitive
content.’ How am I now to respond to the flagging?” For while I certainly had
no intention of making any substantial changes to my writing just to gratify
some twopenny-haypenny functionary (for I cannot but regard whoever or whatever
was and is in charge of mediating complaints about “sensitive content” at any
organization as such a picayune bureaucraceme) “I ain’t gonna lie to you” and
say that if restoring my posts to full visibility had manifestly and
unequivocally required one or two un-time-consuming revisions that would not
have adulterated their substance (I suppose I am thinking of something along
the more than figurative lines of the verse or two about non-Jews that
Shostakovich and Yevtushenko were compelled to insert into the lyrics of DDS’s
oratorical symphony on the massacre at Babi Yar), I would not have entertained
the possibility of making those changes. But to my intense irritation, middling
surprise, and—yes—even slight shock, the email was couched in entirely general
terms, namely those of Google’s baleful “terms of service” that I had heard so
much about from formerly suspended YouTubers (and that I had doubtless myself assented
to at my insu by rashly clicking some
“I-agree-to” checkbox donkeys’ half-decades earlier). It basically said,
“Somebody has complained that you have violated Google’s terms of service,
which are as follows: ‘Don’t do A, B, C, D, E aut cetera.’ [with the cetera
extending at least far as J and composed mostly of “woke” taboos like spreading
disinformation and using transphobic language.] Please revise your post to make
sure that it violates none of our terms of service, and perhaps we will then
deign to remove the ‘sensitive content’ flag from it and make it web-searchable
again.” “Kafkaesque” is of course one of the most heavily abused adjectives in
today’s English, routinely employed as it is to describe any disagreeable
bureaucratic or quasi-bureaucratic phenomenon, and indeed I have myself
satirized this overuse of it by jocularly defining it as “involving a document
that requires more than one signature.” But if The Trial may be regarded as an adequate synecdoche for Kafka’s
oeuvre as a whole, I know of no real-worldial phenomenon past or present that
is worthier of being dubbed “Kafkaesque” than Google’s jurisprudential
treatment of blog posts. After all, in what other real-wordlial setting has
anyone ever incurred penalties for unknown infractions at the instigation of
anonymous accusers, such that he is peremptorily and preemptively excluded from
knowing how to go about exonerating himself and how to avoid incurring penalties
of a like kind in the future? Anyway, perhaps not quite needless to say, I
wasn’t about to remove from the offending posts every single
potentially-terms-over-service-violating character-string therein on the offest
of off-chances that Google would find at least one of those posts sufficiently
terms-of-service friendly to warrant unflagging. And so, to this day (August 9,
2024), probably well over a year after their flagging (I say probably because I am not about to go
searching for the flagging-notifying emails via the use of Gmail’s wretchedly
useless internal search engine [q.v. above] on the offest off-chances that such
a quest turns up those four e-needles from my 22-year-old haystack of Gmail
correspondence), all four posts remain flagged. I can to the credit of my
fortune at least report that I have so far (touch “would”) received no further
emails from Google informing me of the flagging of additional posts. And from
this absence of further e-pistolary molestation it seems reasonable to infer
that the younker in the Midwest has spent his resentment and will not again be
troubling Google to trouble me. Perhaps he has even graduated by now. Perhaps
en route to graduation he even took the trouble to read Tieck’s novel in the
original German and consequently aced his German class and sub-consequently
actually come to feel grateful to me for not having acceded to his request.
Perhaps—an outcome far less propitiative of my vanity but not a jot less
propitiative of my sense of security—he has for whatever reason completely
forgotten the entire episode, my snubbage of him included. But perhaps the
temporal propinquity of the tendering of his request for translated Tieck to
the flagging of the Tieck-related post was entirely coincidental. Perhaps some other
person or persons flagged that post and the three other posts for some reason
or reasons as yet even unconjecturable by me. Or perhaps the ostensibly
offending posts were flagged (and here comes the above-promised conjecture
regarding the subcutaneous workings of big tech) by some sort of so-called bot
tasked by Google (or one of its rivals?) with hunting down “sensitive content,”
flagging it, and notifying its purveyors in an instantaneously elapsing
three-step process—this by way of expediting the expunging of such content from
the platform (or for encouraging users to defect to another platform?). In any
of these cases, I am by no means confident that I have had my last brush with
Google-actuated censorship, and even if I could be thus confident, I would continue
not easily to brook continuing to be readily knowable to the world as a
supposed purveyor of “sensitive content.” And so I have set about—to the extent
that any activity so desultory and dilatory may be justly described as “setting
about”—seeking a different online resting-cum-displaying spot for my content”
(“content” that now includes two further very long essays that I felt compelled
to write “for the drawer”). In connection with this personal virtual Exodus or
Hegira (I do not think the meta-religious metaphor is over-the-top by so much
as a micrometer, for the move in question is “arguably” the biggest of my life
apart perhaps from my move from the Tampa Bay area to Baltimore in 1994 and
from Baltimore back to Tampa Bay in 2020-21) I have not even lightheartedly
entertained migrating to Blogger’s traditional competitor, WordPress, as
although I know nothing even at second hand of WordPress’s censorship policies-cum-practices,
I cannot but half-assume (basically because I somehow tend to think of the
WordPress blogo-semi-hemisphere as being more thickly populated with bienpensant types than the Blogger one [probably
because WordPress, being not absolutely free, has always been slightly more
upmarket than Blogger]) that they are at least as stringent and bienpensant-ophilic as Google’s. The
most sensible course of action is doubtless to purchase (or somehow otherwise
acquire) a web-location of my own that is independent of any preexisting
platform, but I haven’t yet acquired the patience to research this
properly—i.e., to work out which dedicated-domain dispensers are the genuine
article and which are merely Blogger-like entities that grudgingly allow one to
do business under the http-beginning
string of one’s choice, which of the genuine ones are least likely to be hacked
or taken down or what have you, etc. And so I have more or less resigned myself
to the seemingly only effective remaining option—that of climbing (albeit
ever-so-slowly, feebly, and peevishly) onto the Substack bandwagon.
But intensely
irked though I am by this irruption into my lifeworld of Substack as an
event-in-itself, I am at the same time grateful for it inasmuch as it affords
me the opportunity to revive or revisit the spirit of ’04 by doing a bit of
much-needed backfilling, so to speak, in or on (or perchance even to?), “Proprietary Names: The
Name/Proprietary Names: The Place,” for it has just occurred to me that
throughout the golden age of proprietary names, irkedness of the kind that I
have been feeling in connection with Substack
is, has been, or was the default reaction of every person to the irruption of a
new proprietary name into his lifeworld upon his attainment of the age of
discretion; for the (or a) truth would seem to be not only that it is only
before we have (or had) attained that age that we are (or were) generally
capable of the sort of head-over-heels enamorment with proprietary names that the
very young Proust experienced in connection with place names and that once we
have attained that age we tend (or tended) to greet newly encountered proprietary
names in particular not only without love but even with an instinctive aversion
(and hence to be incapable from the outset of the kind or degree of
disillusionment that we often and perhaps even virtually always experience [or
used to experience] in connection with proprietary names we encountered [or had
encountered] before that age), for by then we have after all become (or used to
have become) wise to their prevailingly prostitutional habitus-cum-telos, with
the fact that proprietary names are (or were) generally deployed with the aim of
getting us (or our parents) to fork out more or less large sums of cash to
their proprietors. As starry-eyed tiny tots we regard McDonaldland as an Edenic
near-utopia and Ronald McDonald, Mayor McCheese, and Grimace as our friends who
yearn only to provide us with what is best for us in the form of delicious
hamburgers, French fries, and milkshakes and would be able to do so ad
infinitum but for the machinations of that polity’s Satan, the pesky Hamburgler;
as asteroidy-eyed mid-sized tots we realize that the war between Ronald
&co. and the Hamburgler was all along an instance of what in the oversized
Punch-vs.-Punch show that is professional wrestling is inscrutably known as kayfabe, a completely contrived conflict; that our supposed friends have
all along been in league with the Hamburgler, whose burger-thieving has all
along been but a tactical feint in an altogether maleficent strategy, that he
has been stealing the burgers only to make them more gustatorily alluring and
thereby make us more importunate in our imploration of our parents to procure
us those slivers of grade-barely edible beef (along with the milkless
milkshakes and fries cobbled together from potato dust) in lieu of more
toothsome-cum-wholesome fare; and thereafter we prove impervious to the blandishments
of that late addition to the citizenry of McDondaldland, Birdy the Early Bird
(and consequently tragically miss out on McDonalds’s excellent breakfast menu).
(Sic, incidentally, on the absence of
interpolated past-tense verbs from the immediately preceding sentence inasmuch
as barring its fleeting reference to professional wrestling [which is in the
“natural” present tense because professional wrestling clings to some sort of
sub-subculturally orientated existence despite the implosion a decade or so ago
of the corporation with which it was practically coextensive {I really know much more about professional
wrestling than I should in the light of my near-lifelong aversion to it}], it
must perforce be read as being in the historical present tense inasmuch as
McDonald’s purged McDonaldland from its televisual advertising campaigns a
quarter-century ago.) It is really quite extraordinary how early on in a
youngster’s life this de facto sales resistance takes hold and how fierce it
instantly becomes. Lest the reader suppose I am disingenuously extrapolating a
licentious generalization out of my own experience, I tender the following
counterexample. In 1983 or 1984, the Tampa Bay area acquired its second
classical-music formatted radio station. Unlike the first one, the
local-university affiliated WUSF, the new station, WXCR, was a privately owned
entity that funded its operations (and at least attempted to line the pockets
of its operators) with over-the-air advertising. Most of this advertising took
the form of recorded commercials inserted between blocks of programming, but it
also included brief live pitches delivered by the announcers within those
blocks. Naturally such a format precluded the complete uninterrupted airing of
compositions of greater length than, say, one of the shorter Beethoven
symphonies. At the time of WXCR’s arrival in the area, both I and my only
friend who was also a classical-music buff, Lang Adams (whom the reader may
recall I mentioned in “Proprietary Names: The Name” and whom I am naturally
delighted to have found an opportunity to mention in its China-jubilee essay) were
eleven or twelve years old. While we lads were naturally pleased to have our wireless
listening pleasure nominally doubled, being accustomed as we were to the
uninterrupted audition of entire operas and Beethoven’s Ninth-length orchestral
works thanks to WUSF’s commercial-free format, we could not but be intensely
annoyed by a listening schedule dominated by ten-minute Romantic tone poems and
individual movements of symphonies and concertos interspersed with the same sort
of eardrum-splitting aural product-pimping that seamlessly insinuated itself
into the output of our metro-area’s unregenerately loud-as-heck rock stations
(even if, given that ’XCR’s target demographic consisting of retired senior
citizens, the products themselves tended to be slightly more upmarket and the
pimping slightly more understated). And so, using Lang’s personal
stereo-equipment, we recorded a sort of radio play satirizing a typical block
of WXCR programming, a dramatization wherein not even the briefest of
music-units was allowed to play through to its conclusion without the
interposition of a commercial, and no interrupted piece was allowed to resume
before the announcer had delivered a live product-pitch. Sadly, the audio cassette to which we
committed this performance has not survived (unless, perhaps, with the
recording of some later performance of ours in the WXCR-spoof’s stead [for
being obliged as we were to purchase blank audio cassettes with a budget funded
entirely by our picayune $5-maximum-allowances, our archival space was even
more painfully limited than that of the BBC of the 1960s, and we sometimes
found ourselves reluctantly wiping an older recording to make room for a newer
one]), but happily, at least for my present purposes, I remember verbatim one
tiny fragment of it—specifically, a pastiche of one of the abovementioned live
pitches, delivered by Lang in a tone of unsurpassably unctuous rote servility:
“This piece is brought to you by Payne-Webber [Payne-Webber being then one of
the at-least-locally better-known investment banking firms]. Thank you, Payne-Webber.” And although
being then not only virtually impecunious but also legally nonexistent from the
point of view of the banking industry, Lang and I could not make a point of
taking our portfolios to some other firm, perhaps the well-heeled oldsters at
whom the original of this pitch-let was aimed proved to be as resentfully
sales-resistant to it as we had, for a scant fortyear later, Payne-Webber was
absorbed into the maw of an ungodly behemoth of a Swiss-based bank that still
exists and that I will not name if
only in tribute to the commercial-phobic spirit of our little spoof. (I should make it sub-parenthetically clear
here, lest I be taken to have been born almost more than figuratively yesterday
[i.e., taken to be utterly oblivious of the long and distinguished track record
of the advertising industry], that I do not believe that after one has attained
the age of discretion it is impossible to fall in love with a new proprietary
name, or even to fall back in love with a proprietary that one has fallen out
of love with (and indeed, at later point in this essay, I shall, Lord willing,
narrate the history of just such a case of re-enamorment {hint, hint: it was
not in total disregard of this planned narration that I introduced Mayor
McCheese & co. at a slightly earlier point}); that I merely believe that as
an older tot and as an adult one does not fall in love with new proprietary
names by default and that indeed sales-resistant grumpiness is probably most
older tots’ and adults’ default affective reaction to such names.)
But to resume
the thread on Substack qua new proprietary name (even while frowardly
continuing the thread nominally broken off at the end of the immediately
preceding subparenthesis): chez moi
at the moment, Substack instantiates what must surely be the most pestiferous
of all sub-genres of new proprietary names—viz., the kind attached to a
commodity or service that is ubiquitously cried up like the quasi-proverbial
brand-new toy even though it is as prosaically old and familiar as the
undeservedly unproverbial hills of Humdrumville. For Substack is not—and to the
credit of its proprietor (or proprietors?) does not even pretend to be—anything
but a new blogging platform, to be anything other than a newly christened
vehicle of the oldest interwebbial genre of all barring the
un-sub-differientiated personal website or perhaps that genre’s short-lived
contemporary, the webzine. And yet a day seldom elapses without my hearing some
YouTuber gushing about how Substack has “revolutionized” not only his own modus
operandi as a provider of inline “content” but the entire
interwebbial-universe’s provision thereof; or eulogizing it as both a genre
more aesthetically innovative than the epic and a technology more
world-transformative than the printing press. Yes, I understand and appreciate (and
have already mentioned) Substack’s present near-indispensability as a virtually
uncensored platform for long-form writing. But it is self-evidently not on
account of its virtual freedom from censorship that these Chewbers are
principally delighted by Substack, for if it were, their praise of Substack
would be interspersed with bursts of nostalgia for the days of uncensored
old-school blogging. Even Substack’s most vaunted feature, its treatment of
readers as “subscribers,” is no sense genuinely innovative. In the old days (as
now), if one wanted to keep up-t0-date with a given blog, one needed only paste
its root URL into the “blog roll” of one’s own blog, where a link to its latest
post would thenceforth appear; or, if one did not have a blog oneself, one
could follow it through an RSS-feed reader. The main reason people are so jouissant about Substack, I submit, is
simply that it streamlines “content”-providers’ up-hoovering of money from
their audiences’ bank accounts. Ever
since the very earliest days of Googlean Blogger, users have enjoyed the option
of “monetizing” their blogs via the admission of static algorithmically
generated advertisements into the margins of their posts, but the present
Blogger user’s minuscule quantum of temptation to overcome his scruples about
obtruding upon his readers’ eyes such splashings of meretricious muck was
instantly quashed in those days by his discovery that the median revenue
generated thereby totaled something no higher than ten dollars per annum; and
while the figure generated by their YouTubial equivalent seems to be more than
negligibly higher, I have yet to hear of a Tuber with fewer than a
quarter-million subscribers who pays more than one of the smaller proverbial
bills with YT ad income alone, or even with such income augmented via the
recently introduced “Subscribe” button—this in each case because the moneys
received by the user have been filtered through the coffers of the platform-proprietor, who presumably
always appropriates the lion’s share of them and passes onto the user only the
mouse’s crumbs left over therefrom. If one even cherishes the hope of making a
full-time boulot alimentaire of one’s
Google-mediated content (or indeed one’s content mediated by any other
pre-Substack “content”-provision platform), one must sign up with some
money-hoovering mediator like Patreon, sedulously paste a link to one’s
personal money-hoovering virtual nozzle into the footnotes of every video one
posts ([sic] on bare “video”, as old-school bloggic content perforce precludes
the fulfillment of the last desideratum in the present list), and round out
each of these videos with an oral plea to the viewer to click on the aforesaid
link. Substack apparently cuts out the middle-man (or middle-robot) more or
less completely (I say “apparently,” because I am not entirely sure that the platform does not automatically receive at
least a minority cut of user-raised-revenues and “more or less” because I am
sure-ish that it does require the payment of an-at-least nominal fee from
monetizing users up front) and simplifies the dunning of one’s
audience-stroke-readership by making every reader by default a non-paying
subscriber, as to a newspaper, who receives every one of one’s blog-posts as an
email athwart the midst of which—if one has opted to monetize one’s blog—is
appended a boilerplate imploration to become a paying subscriber on pain of not
reading the remainder of the post and on pleasure of reading that remainder
plus the entirety of future posts (at least until the subscription expires). “What’s
not to love?” Well, not all that much, I admit, but what wasn’t—and isn’t—to
love, from an aesthetic point of view, about old-school blogs? Certainly I have
not found my experience as a blog-reader a jot improved by Substack, for it has
obliged me to have my email inbox deluged diurnally with showers of de-facto
spam merely for the sake of having access to the output of essayists with whom
I would on average be interested in “catching up” only every month or so, and
with whom I am now effectively incapable of fully catching up anyhow on account
of my insuperable constitutional Jack Benny-dwarfing n*****dliness (a n*****dliness,
incidentally, that is especially implacable vis-à-vis anything even remotely
smacking of a newspaper subscription because despite being one of Thomas
Bernhard’s “most dedicated advocates and ardent propagandists,” ich bin kein Zeitungsfresser, and indeed
I have never subscribed to either the print or the online edition of a single
actual newspaper). “Now don’t get me wrong,” “I need dough like anyone,” and
indeed my ethical compass on meta-monetary matters is by no means so narrow
that I wouldn’t put it past myself to employ Substack’s dough-manufacturing machinery
for my own use, especially if all other dough-manufacturing machinery continues
to be effectively off-limits to me (not that the odds of my actually making any
dough with Substack are not minuscule, but they can scarcely be lower than
those of my securing a dough-making engine by shoving my needle of an
application for a job into the midst of a fifty thousand strand-strong haystack
of applications from people fortunate enough to have heard of the position ten
minutes before I did), but I cannot bear to see or hear a dough-factory cried
up as a Geist-refinery. The argoteme grifter has come in for a powerful
ordeal of abuse since its revival in the inlineosphere some half-dozen years
ago, and indeed, so often has it lately been employed as a term of
disparagement by those flagrantly actuated by no more noble a motive than envy
that it might now be humorously redefined along the lines of Gore Vidal’s
redefinition of narcissist: “A grifter
is an inline ‘content’ provider who makes more money from his ‘content’ than
you do from yours.” (Incidentally, so far has narcissist been concurrently stretched beyond the limits of its
meta-erotic scope that even Vidal’s definition of it as “a person who is
better-looking than you” merits recasting as “a person who is more popular than
your favorite object of hero-worship.”) But inasmuch as a grifter as classically
defined is perhaps first and foremost a dishonest person and perhaps only
secondarily a person who makes money, I maintain that any Substacker who
maintains that Substack has effected a genuine aesthetic revolution in inline
“content” comes as close to being a grifter in the classical sense as any
present-day inline person can do. And any Substacker who while acknowledging the
absence of any intrinsic aesthetic innovations from Substack would maintain that
Substack-using at least has a strong tendency to improve the “content” provided
by bloggers by encouraging them to “tailor their ‘content’ to the needs and
desires of their subscribers” is an even more flagitious grifter than the first
type inasmuch as the entire autojustification
of the inline “alternative-media” universe, the entire raison d’être of that
universe in its own eyes, consists in the notion that it provides “content” of
a level of quality no longer available from even top-tier so-called legacy
outlets like the New York Times and
inasmuch as notoriously nothing has contributed more weightily to the decline
of such outlets than their transition from being funded principally by
third-party advertisers to being funded mainly by their subscribers. From the
topick of this decline and its conjectural parallels in the established corpus
of Substack blogs it is the easiest of transitions to the topic of the
inconvenience and unsalutariness of Substack’s subscriber-centered format to
the present writer qua blogger, for while, as mentioned above, I have never yet
made use of Blogger’s advertising “capabilities,” I have from the very outest
of outsets to the presentest of the present aimed my Blogger-destined posts at
a readership at least as broad as any that might have greeted the New York Times in its most heavily
advertising-funding all-print days—say, in 1988, when it could be purchased for
fifty cents from a vending machine on any urban American street corner (as I
know full well, for I purchased an issue of the NYT from such a machine for such a price from a street corner in
downtown Tampa in that year). This is not to say that I have ever expected any
of my Blogger-“published” essays to be readily understood by Joe or Jill Wine
Cooler-Four Pack (i.e., the 1980s’ upper-middle-middle-class analogue to Joe
Sixpack, and hence the typical NYT
reader of that decade) or some later incarnation of him or her, but it is to
say that because I know that my blog is most likely to be first encountered as
the result of a general web-search directed at finding “content” on a certain
topic rather than at finding the blog itself, I have always been prepared for
any of my Blogger-“published” essays to be stumbled
upon (incidentally, Stumbled Upon
was the name of one of the obscurer engines that lost out to Google in the
abovementioned search-engine wars) by such a person. I accordingly do not
conceive of my reader by default as my friend; indeed, I tend to assume that he
is inclined to be hostile to whatever I assert, however sensible or irenic my
assertions may be; consequently, I am always doing my best to anticipate and
answer his objections, and this anticipatory-cum-replicative effort has left a
by-now-indelible mark on the basic formal constitution of my essays—most
notably in the ever-recurring supervention of the quasi-dramaturgical figure of
the DGR or Dear Gentle Reader, whose name naturally belies his implacable
brutishness and brutality. The Substack blogger, by contrast, in virtue of being
obliged to treat every single reader as a “subscriber” is further obliged to
treat his readership as an aggregation of friends-cum-patrons. While I am
preaching to an invisible congregation, he is preaching to an all-too-visible
choir that can change the hymnal whenever it likes. While he is fly-fishing in
an artificial pond pre-sized to his specifications and stocked with fish that
he has hand-picked, I am “casting a broad net” in the open sea, to import and
dilate a metaphor employed by the narrator of Michel Houellebecq’s Extension du domain de la lutte in his
apostrophe to a prospectively female reader vis-à-vis her well-nigh-inevitable
revulsion from his proto-“incel”-ish account of his history of amorous failure
with women. Becoming a Substack-ready blogger would (or will) accordingly
require a massive overhaul of my entire modus
bloggendi (or bloggandi); it would
(or will) require my shifting from manhandling the reader with the brutality of
the Jerky Boys’ used car dealer who will not take no for answer (to recycle a
metaphor I have already used in describing this modus bloggendi [or bloggandi]
in “Against
Intralingual Diversity”) on virtually every electro-page to ritualistically
soft-soaping or apple-polishing for him (or, rather, them, in the old-school plural-designating sense, for I will [or
would] by default expect every essay to be read by a collectivity, however
small) “like a guilty schoolboy,” to commencing every post with the sort of
half-thousand word exordium of shilly-shallying and hemming-and-hawing with
which virtually every extant Substack “article” seems to commence, an exordium
rife with formulas like, “I know this is supposed to be a blog about nothing
but blancmange thickened with rice flour, but just this teeny-tiny oncelet I’m
going to go off-script by writing about a kind of blancmange thickened with
corn starch,” and “I’m ever so sorry to you kind folks for alluding however
briefly and covertly to the possibility of using gelatin as a
blancmange-thickener when there is obviously nothing in the universe less
conceivable, let alone possible, than employing such an execrable substance in
that capacity,” or “I know this blog has hitherto been called Just Blancmange, but you kind folks have
let me know in no uncertain terms that you would rather read about lutefisk,
about which I know absolutely nothing except that the very word makes me retch,
but you kind folks are after all the boss, as it’s only thanks to you that I
can keep the lights on in this wretched little subfusc subcorner of the
interweb, so I am herewith changing its name to Just Lutefisk and writing about nothing but lutefisk, and I warmly invite
each and every one of you lutefisk-connoisseurs to make fish-paste of me in
your comments.” I mean, like gag me with a spoon, as they used to say in the
early Usenet days (not that I was a Usenet user back then, but I was a sentient
human back then, and I know people then used to say, I mean, “Like, gag me with
a spoon” “IRL,” or at least in certain simulacra of “RL” served up on
television and radio). I suppose as a Substacker I technically could simply keep composing my essays in
my established manner, but then I would ineluctably think of myself as casting
my fishing-net not quasi-rationally out into the open sea but utterly insanely
up into the open air, for as near or far as I can tell (which is admittedly not
very near or far at all owing to my near-total lack of patience to undertake
research on such prospectively ephemeral meta-tech-industrial piffle), a
Substack blog’s visibility to the ocuverse of search engines (an ocuverse which
is of course still dominated by Google) is directly proportional to its level
of “subscriber engagement,” such that if I neglect to secure subscribers
entirely I shall be entirely invisible to happenstance, upon-stumbling readers.
And so I suppose for even minimum visibility’s sake I shall have to go cap in
hand via “a pretty-pretty-please subscribe to my bloggy-woggy” message to every
single person whose email address I have on file, nine-tenths of whom are
probably not even aware of my Blogger blog, and nine-tenths of the
probable-remaining-one-tenth of whom I have probably not even recommended a
single post to, and nine-tenths of the probable-further-remaining-one-hundredth
of whom I have yet recommended only a single post, what with that post’s being
the only one the correspondent in question could conceivably both take a
smidgen of interest in and not take oodles of umbrage at. “It’s all so
tiresome,” as the Chinaman in the so-called meme says. In short, don’t even get
me started on Substack. And if, DGR (if I am even still permitted to address
you as “DGR” [for as of this date {August 29, 2024} I have not resolved not to post the present essay at
Substack]), you are by any chance about to chortle derisively, “It’s a bit late
to refrain from getting you started
in either sense in point isn’t it?”, please allow me to throttle that chortle
before it finishes its journey out of your windpipe, for whilst is true that I
have started on Substack in one of
the two senses—i.e., the sense of having set up a Substack account—in the other
sense I have not yet even begun, for what I have written so far in
disparagement of Substack is so minuscule a portion of what I might write
therein if I “had world enough and time” that it at most merits being termed a
prelude to the beginning thereof. I could if not cheerfully then at least very
willingly rail against Substack till all umpteen-million Michigander cows came
home to Kalamazoo from Katmandu, supposing all umpteen-million of them had gone
to graze in the latter city. But as I haven’t got WEaT, inasmuch as I haven’t
even finished classifying the abovementioned 6-to-11 dominant proprietary names
of the present microepoch, I shall move on to the conclusion of that
classificatory task thus: the last category of these proprietary names, a
category that in comprising Amazon, Twitter, and Facebook overlaps with the
first (or second?), is the category of the proprietary name that is
metaphysically associated at least as closely with the human figure of the
proprietor as with the product or “service” (the inverted commas here hint at
the alternative possibility of denoting the entity referenced by service as a plague or affliction, a
possibility that at least in the case of Facebook I can entertain in all
seriousness, being a non-holder of a Facebook account) provided by the
proprietary organization. After a certain fashion this category “has always
been with us,” or with us at least since the dawn of the assembly line-centered
phase of the industrial era, for of course Henry Ford was at least as famous as
the Model T car his company turned out in the millions, and of course since the
early 1970s every bucket of Kentucky Fried Chicken has come with the portrait
of KFC’s founder and original proprietor printed on it; and after a certain
other fashion it has only really been with us for about a half-dozen years,
inasmuch as Messrs. Bezos, Musk, and Zuckerberg are now far more mediatically
and meta-politically prominent than Messrs. Ford and Sanders ever were and a
half-dozen years ago they were not even household names—at least not in the
household of the present writer, as is partly attested by my theatrically
exaggerated flubbing of the names of the proprietors of Amazon and Twitter (then
still owned by Jack Dorsey) in To Russia
with Lunch. The displacement or “colonization” of the names of these
corporate entities by those of their founders or proprietors naturally has the
effect of personalizing or anthropomorphizing the entities in our eyes, but
because our apprehension of persons is ineluctably mediated by our apprehension
of their names, it more basally transposes our private metaphysics of these
entities into the more primeval realm of Proust’s metaphysics of personal
names, such that our attitude towards the corporations is preemptively shaped
by the connotations those names (or names phonetically or graphically
resembling them) have acquired in our history of acquaintance with them. Thus I
can personally attest that when at some point in 2020 I finally ceased to be
able to avoid remembering that the founder and then-still-controlling
shareholder of Twitter was named Jack Dorsey, I initially had difficulty
crediting the rumors of Twitter’s nefarious collusion with the Democratic party
owing to my thitherto exclusive association of the surname “Dorsey” with the
clean-cut, smooth-faced, well-bred big-band leader and his equally clean-cut,
smooth-faced, and well-bred trombonist brother (and perhaps secondarily to the
timeless parity of the diminutive “Jack” with “Jimmy” and “Tommy” in point of
wholesomeness); but that once I discovered that Jack Dorsey was in fact a
slatternly, would be Rasputin-bearded dirty hippie, I had no trouble whatsoever
imagining Twitter to be up to its avian eyeballs in any sort of malefaction or
chicanery. But no sooner had the image of this dirty hippie begun to displace
that of a white dinner-jacketed-and black tied composite of Jimmy and Tommy
than Twitter was taken over by Elon Musk, a man whose surname I found
immediately evocative not of prior bearers of it (for I at least had and have
never heard of any earlier Musks apart from Elon’s father and of him only in
connection with Elon) but of the various non-human entities denoted or
described by the world musk—musk
itself qua animal glandular secretion, musk itself qua cologne, musk rats, and
the general “musky” odor that is not to be confused with the “musty” one and
yet is somehow not completely distinct from it. These connotations are neither
very flattering nor very sinister or ominous, and not being sufficiently
meta-politically ill-disposed to Mr. Musk to decry him or his behavior as
rat-like in good faith, I can only say that they have only been reinforced
rather vaguely by the dry baritone timbre of his speaking voice and fairly
precisely by his notorious predilection for the hallucinogen colloquially known
as “skunkweed.” Mark Zuckerberg’s surname is less diffusively evocative of
real-world non-human entities chez moi
qua part-time reader of German—Zucker
of course recalling sugar and Berg a
mountain, and the compound-word sugar
mountain being so close to Sugarloaf
Mountain, the name of a peak in my former home state of Maryland, and a
sugarloaf being an object that resembles a Caucasian head at least in outline
(at least to me qua reader of Swift’s Tale
of a Tub, in which the resemblance is made much of), I cannot help thinking
of Mr. Zuckerberg as bearing a head made entirely of sugar, and indeed his
soft, pasty complexion and the inconspicuousness of his recessed eyes do much
to reinforce this preconception (with his shockette of ginger-adjacent hair
perhaps suggesting a summit-crowning dusting of cinnamon qua artistic-confectioner’s
effort at evoking the abovementioned mountain in autumn). As for Jeff Bezos—well, the Jeff part of it is even less evocative
than Mark, which is at least biblical
in origin although of course far less
Bible-evocative than Elon, what with
the Bible-evocativeness of biblical forenames [with the exception of Jesus, which of course sounds
intrinsically blasphemous to Anglo-Saxon ears] varying more or less in inverse
proportion to the prominence in Scripture of persons bearing them), but Bezos is “arguably” the most evocative
of all three of the surnames now in point despite its utter bereftness of
association in my mind with any specific class of common-named entities in the
real world, owing to its –os
termination, which, although presumably denoting a Grecian provenance in this
case, is for me an ineffaceable bespeaker of the name-bearer’s membership of
some race of creatures of non-terrestrial origin (and I am not thinking of
angels or demons here), most likely simply because a science-fiction television
program I watched religiously in the 1980s, Doctor
Who, featured a host of alien beings and alien worlds bearing names
terminating in that termination (although, what with Doctor Who’s being a doggedly shameless off-ripper of other
science-fiction properties, I doubtless would have associated –os as closely with such beings and
worlds even if as a youngster I had read and watched much more promiscuously in
the science-fiction “universe”). And in all candor and frankness—i.e., all
embarrassment at being in thrall to such a hackneyed and pedestrian trope of
pejoration—I must acknowledge that simply in possessing s cue ball-bald head
Mr. Bezos does strike me as someone who might very well hail from an alien
planet (this doubtless because on account of its notoriously tiny budget Doctor Who would often distinguish an
alien personage from his human and quasi-human scene-sharers with the
prosthetic-cum-cosmetic aid of little more than a latex bald cap). And in all
candor and frankness—albeit with not a jot of embarrassment (even if the
attitude I am about to disclose is at least as common and uncontroversial as
the disparagement of an individual person by likening him to a space alien)—I
must acknowledge that this reflexive interpellation of Mr. Bezos as a space
alien harmonizes perfectly with my attitude to Amazon, for I really do regard
and experience Amazon as a soul-destroying and dehumanizing force in my own
lifeworld and indeed in the collective lifeworld of the present-day Occident.
But my resentment of Amazon itself is exceeded in intensity by my vexation at
being unable to specify exactly why I
am so resentful of it. The at-least-traditionally most obvious explanation of a
customer’s resentment of a business entity to which he supplies his custom will
not serve my turn, for I cannot in good faith describe myself as a dissatisfied
or disgruntled Amazon customer. To be sure, I am incessantly infuriated by the
innumerable “nudgy” stratagems that beset virtually every minute of my
existence as a user of Amazon’s gadgetry and platformage—the ad for some new
bestselling piece of “chick lit” or “young-adult fiction” that greets me every
time I flip open either of my two “Fire” tablets, the minefield of icons for
mindless arcade-type games that I am obliged to hopscotch just to reach one of
the butcher’s half-dozen so-called apps that I have actually deliberately
downloaded, the “For You” tab under which my personal library of so-called
e-books has been subsumed far, far below an Alexandrian heap of shortcuts to “chick-lit”
and “young-adult fiction” novels, etc. But in my near quarter-century as an
Amazon customer, Amazon has never fallen seriously short in its provision to me
of its core services: it has generally had in stock affordable versions of the
products I have wished to find; it has generally delivered these products to me
in one piece (or as many pieces they have respectively supposed to have had before
their consumer-actuated assembly) and within reasonable temporal distance of
the pre-promised arrival date; and when occasionally it has failed in any of
these three respects (or at least the second and third of the three, for I am
not really enough of a consumer self-advocate to ring up a company’s complaint
line just to whinge about their not yet
carrying a version of my pet product [pet
product here denoting either favorite
commodity or commodity for the use of pets [for after all, domestic animal
fetishists are exactly the sorts of
people who tend to ring up complaint lines to whinge about this sort of thing,
are they not?]), I have not had to try very hard or wait very long for some
conventionally adequate indemnification for their dereliction of commercial
duty—usually a full refund or a free second delivery of the ordered product.
Such all being the case, I cannot but infer that I am simply resentful towards
Amazon on account its demonstrably lionesque share in the causal nexus that
precipitated the far-abovementioned near-disappearance of mid-tier old-school proprietary
names from Occidental quotidian life. But I cannot but be not a little
chagrined if not dismayed (or a little dismayed if not chagrined, depending on
which it is more unpleasant to be) by this inference, for however dimly this
may have been perceptible to the reader (however bright he may have been), I
intended “Proprietary Names: The Name” as inter
alia (if not primum inter alia) a
lament at or of the intertwinement of many of the most formative experiences of
my formative years with proprietarily named entities, and intended it as such a
lament because I at least fancied that I lamented that intertwinement. And why
did I fancy that I lamented it? Well, I suppose because, however childishly
petulant this may make my adult self of twenty years ago sound, I thought that
I had been cheated by the super-prominence of proprietary names, that the
super-prominence of proprietary names in the Umwelt of my childhood had caused me to develop a less truthful
understanding of the world than I would have developed in a childhood Umwelt in which proprietary names had
been less prominent—that it had caused me to overemphasize differences and
disjunctions between certain entities (e.g., pizzas of the same culinary style produced
and vended by pizzerie operating under different names) and to overemphasize
continuities and similarities between certain others (e.g., pizzerie operating
under a single name yet hailing from different architectural styles and
periods). I also intended “Proprietary Names: The Name” as inter alia (if not secundum
inter alia) as a lament at or of my continuing and prospectively unending
habitation back then, in 2004, of an Umwelt
in which all my fellow-humans, no matter how old, intelligent, knowledgeable,
or experienced appeared to remain at least as enthusiastically, starry-eyedly
in thrall to the blandishments of the proprietary name as I had been in my
single digits—an Umwelt dominated if
not exhausted by (not to put too fine a red point on it or keep the red cat in
the bag an instant longer than necessary) the inherently meretricious racket
known as consumer capitalism, a racket
in which the proprietary name was the chief tool (!) of the trade of every bawd
or huckster (or, if you prefer a more coolly “dehumanizing” metaphor, in which
the proprietary name was itself bawd or charlatan-in-chief). And what was
worse, I could not even begin to conceive of the circumstances that might bring
this regime of the proprietary name qua tool or bawd or huckster of consumer
capitalism to an end, such that, although I knew full well that certain super-prominent
entities or phenomena that I had previously taken as unbudgeable givens
(notably the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet satellite polities) had come to an end within my lifetime, I all but despaired of outliving
the regime, and to be fair to my then-present self, no occurrence or
manifestation in my Umwelt seemed
construable as a foreboding of the slightest attenuation of the regime, let
alone its outright collapse; my neighbors continued raving interminably about
the latest proprietarily named flummery and gadgetry, and virtually every day I
heard to my inestimable fury some talking head (or, to be more precise, talking
voice [for I then derived almost all
my so-called news coverage from radio]) intoning, “Consumer spending is the
largest sector of the U.S. economy.” To be sure, I did not fancy that twenty or
fifty years thence people would still be raving about the I-Pad or the I-Pod or
whatever the latest I-prefixed gewgaw was called, but I did fancy that they
would be raving as enthusiastically about some other proprietarily named gewgaw
of no greater intrinsic interest. But
now tout cela—ce regime là—est foutu.
Oh, I assume there are still mega-scads of people not only raving about some
proprietarily-named successor of the I-prefixed gewgaws but even about some
actual I-prefixed gewgaw—for my abovementioned forced smorgasbord of YouTube
commercials occasionally features a spot for the I-Phone Umpteen—but I doubt
they are anywhere near(ly) as numerous as they were twenty years ago or that
they are raving anywhere near(ly) as enthusiastically as they were wont to do
then, because if they were that numerous or that enthusiastic, I would be
incessantly hearing people raving
about such entities, and I seldom if ever do now. Presumably, like me, almost all
my fellow Americans now do the preponderance of their shopping through Amazon;
and presumably, like me, they search for a product not by the proprietary name
of its manufacturer but by the common name of the product itself; and
presumably, like me, on typing in that name they will be presented with a
welter of product-specification pages on almost all of which the proprietary
name—almost invariably a thitherto completely unfamiliar one—is among the least
conspicuous visual elements; and presumably, like me, they will generally choose
from among the welter of products on the basis of the quality of the
specifications factored by the constraints of their budget and utterly
regardless of the name of the proprietor; although perhaps like me, they will
occasionally opt for a product because despite not winning gold in the
quality-factored-by-affordability Olympics it is associated with a proprietary
name to which they are partial for some reason or other, as I opted to buy a
pair of Sperry boat shoes a few days ago owing to Sperry’s proprietary
association with top siders, the gold
standard of casual men’s footwear in my junior-high and high-school days. And I
suppose, if I am to be brutally honest—the brutality in question arising from
the attendant acknowledgment of a measurable quantum of unfairness in my former
appraisal of consumer capitalism—my partiality to these familiar old
proprietary names like Sperry does
not always arise entirely out of an impulse as indifferent to the qualities of
the proprietarily named product’s intrinsic qualities as a
sentimental-cum-superstitious desire to propitiate the manes of my boyhood self, I suppose, indeed, that there are a few proprietary
names that have subsumed products of such consistently sterling quality,
products that amid all the circumambient degeneration of my Umwelt have to their own original noble
selves proved so steadfastly true, that like Larkin’s “toad Work” they, both
the names and the products, are now affording me a rotating shift of consoling
arms as I head “down Cemetery Road.” The Sperry top-siders I bought two years
ago have done me yeoman’s and boatswain’s service in the course of the hundreds
if not thousands of miles I have since walked along the beaches of Pinellas
County and the sidewalks and shoulders of Hillsborough; and now that almost all
the people with whom I elected to socialize during the interval between
Thanksgiving and Christmas twenty years ago have vanished from my lifeworld, I
find nothing more powerfully evocative of the holiday seasons of the early-to-mid
20-oughties than a bottle of Sierra Nevada Celebration Ale (although I am now
far more often obliged to make do with a can thereof), not only because such a
bottle still bears the image of a snowbound log cottage with a wreath on its
front door but also because its contents at least seem to taste as good, and as
good in the same way, as the contents of such a bottle did back then. But this
lingering attachment to a handful of surviving proprietary names from my
personal old days cannot account for my nostalgia for the proprietary ancien regime en bloc, unless we suppose
that the attachment is complemented by a
sort of phantom attachment to the proprietary names that “didn’t make it” into
the present, and such a supposition seems rather implausible, as I do not seem
to find myself spending much time positively pining for the absence of certain
proprietary names of yore from my lifeworld, although I have been led to
understand that such pining is not uncommon chez
les autres and thereby to realize
that it is not absolutely unprecedented
chez moi-même—led thereto, for example, by Michel Houellebecq’s outburst of
anguished Sehnsucht for a certain
discontinued make of windcheater or parka and a certain superannuated model of
early portable computer in his 2010 novel La
carte et le territoire, an outburst that when I encountered it in 2011 catalyzed
in me the realization that I had been yearning for Starbucks’ recently
discontinued (and never since reinstated) chonga
bagel. Moreover, it must be remembered that I continue to be not
infrequently resentful of the obtrusion of certain new proprietary names upon
my lifeworld, as I would not continue to be if I were a dedicated yearner for
the resuscitation of the proprietary ancien
regime. Such being the case, it seems to me that my resentment of Amazon
qua proprietary-named displacer can only have been occasioned by an
epiphenomenon of its displacement of proprietary names rather than by the
displacement itself, and the only plausible generator of such an epiphenomenon
that now springs to mind is the abovementioned fact that “the strips and
clusters of retail establishments behind [streetside] signage are less richly
stocked and emblazoned with proprietary names than they were yesteryear” (such
that the long-ago opportune moment for addressing this fact in more detail has
at long last arrived). And the dwindling of the stock of proprietary names in
those clusters of establishments has indeed been potentiated and followed by a
development by which I am no means pleased—namely, the replacement of those
establishments by certain genres of non-proprietarily
named establishment that I find mildly unwholesome at best. Chief among these
sorts of establishment in frequency of occurrence is the so-called smoke shop,
an instance of which, rarely designated by anything more elaborate—either on
the streetside sign or the shop-front sign behind it—than the word “smoke shop”
itself in sans-serif capitals, is to be found in, I would say, three out every
five so-called strip malls I pass or stop by nowadays. I have never yet, thank God, been inside one
of these smoke shops or even close enough to the front door of one of them to
see (or, perhaps more to the point, smell)
what typically goes on within them—to know, for example, whether any smoking typically
goes on therein or they are typically simply sites for the buying and selling
of smoking-related products, but I am at least “streetwise” enough to know that
the “smoke” associated with them is not the wholesome invigorating sort
produced by burning tobacco but the feculent torpifying sort produced by
burning marijuana. To say that I am not “the world’s biggest fan” of
marijuana-smoking would be something of an understatement and indeed so big a
something thereof that I am not even sure that to say that I am “the world’s
biggest foe” of marijuana-smoking would be anything whatsoever of an
overstatement. Certainly I cannot recall a time when I both knew of marijuana’s
existence as a drug and was not repelled to the point of nausea by the idea of
partaking of its pharmacological effects in any medium—not merely the idea of my partaking thereof, mind you, but the
idea of anyone’s partaking thereof. I
have already mentioned my abhorrence of the stench produced by its combustion,
and this abhorrence is equaled if not exceeded in intensity by my abhorrence of
the characteristic “high” induced by it—a solipsistic risibility that stands at
equally distant and inferior antipodes to the alacritous alertness engendered
by tobacco and the gregarious good cheer of alcohol-intoxication; of the
stubbornly surly stupidity exhibited by its habitual users throughout whatever
increasingly slender portion of the day they are obliged to set aside the
“roach” or the “bong” to attend, however minimally, to the exigencies of
personal world-maintenance; of these users’ hyperslatternly sartorial habitus—the
historically unvarying complet of
hole-ridden T-shirt, tatterdemalion “cut-off” or “cargo” shorts, and sandals or
flip-flops; of the entire goshforsaken 1960s-originating hippie sub-cum-counter
“culture” with which the drug has been inalienably associated for the past
three-fifths (!) of a century, the subculture of Haight-Ashbury and Woodstock.
(I have more than once been heard to remark that if I could change places with
any person from the historical past, that person is or would be Richard Nixon
so that I could superintend the dropping of a multi-megaton nuclear bomb on Woodstock
in the summer of 1969.) In my boyhood and youth there was but one marijuana
paraphernalia-vending establishment (in those days known not as a smoke shop
but as a head shop) in all of
Hillsborough County: a place known as The Wooden Nickel that was housed in a
particularly mesquin and minable strip mall sited on a seedy
block of East Fletcher avenue only a nickel-nickel’s throw from Tampa’s
officially shittiest neighborhood, Suitcase City (a strip mall that
not-unfittingly concurrently housed the Loft Theater, a fifty-seat venue where
I once saw a performance of a sort of Rocky Horror-show knock-off called Vampire Lesbians of Sodom [and a venue
that was eventually annexed to Hillsborough County’s main theatrical venue, the
Tampa Bay Performing Arts Center, as a sort of Tampan answer to the Vienna’s Akademietheater; thus furnishing yet
another example of the pan-Occidental “colonization” of “high-cultural”
institutions by trashily degenerate subcultures in the present mini-epoch]);
now, in 2024, there must be dozens of such shops in my little corner of the
county (the Keystone-Lutz-Citrus Park area, which I would dub “my new Tri-ZIP
code area” did it not regrettably contain portions of more than three ZIP-codes
and not contain any single ZIP-code in its entirety), a corner whose
neighborhoods have for the most part hitherto been as unseedy as any
neighborhood in 20th-and-21st- century Florida has been
capable of being. Of course the proliferation of these smoke shops qua smoke
shops is first and foremost a byproduct not of Amazon’s suction of retail
traffic from the strip malls but of the gradual de facto nationwide
legalization of marijuana over the past decade-and-a-half. But in the realm of
personal metaphysics blaming the co-messenger for bad news (Amazon’s co-co-messenger
being of course the newly proprietary name-poor roadside signage itself) is not
only permissible but ineluctable, and in any case by dint of sheer discursive
drift I am no longer discussing my resentment of Amazon but rather the boulversant catastrophe in my personal
metaphysics on which that resentment is superstructed, a catastrophe whose
chief lineaments I shall limn after slathering a dollop of another artistically
exigent sub-hue of shit-colored gouache onto my palette (every other sinister
or disagreeable post-2004 development already discussed in this essay, up to
and including the proliferation of smoke shops, being another such sub-hue),
namely, the non-proprietary-named bit of signage I sight most frequently
beside(s) the bit allocated to “Smoke Shop,” viz. signage sporting nothing but
the word or name “Botanica,” printed à la “SMOKE SHOP” in sans-serif capitals (although in my
memory’s eye, while “SMOKE SHOP” invariably appears in green (just like
weed or grass, get it mohn-stroke-dude?) or black, “BOTANICA” sometimes shews itself in red [just
like…well you will presently see just like what]). While I have fortunately yet
to see (or at least to remember having seen) a “BOTANICA” sign in the pseudo-tri ZIP-code area,
each time I am forced to venture into the city of Tampa I spot a “BOTANICA” sign on virtually every block, although
the foregoing “fortunately” unfortunately falsifies by default the history of
the name-word or word-name “botanica” in my personal metaphysics, for the truth
is that before I discovered the purpose to which the shops behind Tampa’s “BOTANICA” signs were and are appropriated, I did
not associate “botanica” with anything sinister or disagreeable and indeed
viewed it in a slightly positive light. You see, Botanica was and is the name
of a bar in Manhattan’s SoHo neighborhood that I visited at least twice during
one or more of my three or four late-1990s trips to New York. I suppose one
might even term it my Manhattan local inasmuch as I paid the last or latter of
my visits to it on my own and of my own initiative. I took something of a shine
to this Botanica because of the dozen or so bars I visited in the course of
those few sojourns, it was the only one that even roughly approximated the Vorstellung of a hip New York bar that I
had formed as a child and teenager of the 1980s, for although we were then only
a year or two into Giuliani’s notorious “Disneyfication” of the Big Apple en bloc, New York’s punk and punk-adjacent
subcultures seemed to be already completely “Disneyfied,” at least to the
extent that they were embodied in its so-called nightlife, for in the
supposedly grittiest neighborhood in downtown Manhattan, the part of the
Lower-East side then still known as Alphabet City, I overheard a nose-pierced
barman marveling at the “edginess” of Marilyn Manson to a female one, and
witnessed a micro-epochally retardataire
upright acoustic bass-anchored “swing” combo entertain an audience dressed like
extras from Whit Stillman’s Metropolitan
(but seated in a bar-stroke-nightclub whose name boasted of its being owned by
“Handsome” Dick Manitoba, frontman of one of scariest [or at least
scariest-named] first-generation punk bands, the Dictators). “Not that there
was anything wrong with this” intrinsically [and indeed in these days of
universal athleisure the image of a bar filled with people dressed like Metropolitan extras makes me fairly weep
with nostalgia], but it was not what I was then looking for in New York. Botanica,
on the other hand, although it still fell short of my New Yorkian ideal and
indeed even further short thereof than my favorite Baltimorean watering holes
of that micro-epoch, the Club Charles and the Rendezvous Lounge, came
serviceably enough close to it, being roughcast-walled, dimly lit, and
frequented by people attired and coiffed rather like Nick Cave and whichever
female 1980s post-punk “icon” favored shoulder-length black hair and black
cocktail dresses (the Cramps’ Poison Ivy, perchance? If so, then perhaps I
should replace Nick Cave with Lux Interior). The establishment justified its
self-styling as a haunt of plants rather than people via the economical and
unobtrusive yet eloquent placement of a few oversized potted ferns directly
beneath the peripherally situated sources of the just-mentioned dim
illumination. Consequently, when I started seeing “BOTANICA”-bearing signs in
Tampa, as I found the notion of an entire chain of Tampa-sited SoHo-esque bars
too preposterous a notion for my imagination to compass (especially as my first
sightings of the signs took place on West Waters Avenue and hence several miles
north of Tampa’s own SoHo neighborhood [so called not only on account of its
aspiration to be as “arty” as Manhattan’s SoHo but also on account of its
situation along South Howard Street, a stretch of road commencing only two or
three miles north of the central business district]), I could not help
picturing the establishments attached to these signs as downscale, fully
enclosed urban versions of the spacious open-air suburban stores from which
gardeners and nursery-owners replenish their stock of greenery. But as that
notion in turn proved slightly too preposterous to countenance (for the few-dozen
square feet of clear glass apportioned to the fronts of each of these shops
scarcely seemed capable of affording life-sustaining photosynthetic sunlight to
more than a handful of shrublets at a time), I soon found myself asking my
mother if she had ever heard of these “botanicas” and knew anything of their
purpose or function. She replied that she had not, but as her own curiosity had
been piqued by the question, she immediately betook herself to the online
reference work of first resort for an answer to it, and the answer that she
found could scarcely have been more devastating to someone of my
metaphysical-cum-aesthetic constitution. It turned out that these botanicas had nothing whatsoever to do with plants, at least
nothing to do with living ones, and that they were in fact wholly appropriated
to the vending of objects—candles, incense, and the like—essential to the
ritual observance of a voodoo-like cult or folk-religion practiced in certain
(or perhaps all) Latin-American countries, a cult or folk-religion the
beginning of whose name was coextensive with the Spanish word Santa meaning holy, sacred, or saint. I had in fact first heard of this
Santa from my mother—or perhaps from
my father—for it figured (and figures) not unprominently in the lore of our
family, in our portion of that genre of family lore common to all North
American families with still-visible roots in non-North American or non-northern-European
countries, the genre treating of all the outlandish events and practices
experienced and engaged in by the branches-cum-generations still bound fast to
those roots. On my mother’s side of the
family, the half-Italian side, the chief piece of such lore centers on our
answer to Seinfeld’s George
Costanza’s Aunt Baby, a brother of my grandfather’s who failed to live to
adulthood thanks to third-degree burns sustained in a fire inadvertently
started by my Sicilian-born great-grandmother as she was distilling some
moonshine in the kitchen of their shotgun house in Tampa’s Ybor City
neighborhood during the micro-epoch of Prohibition. On my father’s side of the
family, the half-Hispanic side, the corresponding personage is my Cuban-born great-grandmother
herself qua part-time celebrant of that Santa-nic
pseudo-religion. It is said that she would avail herself of certain purportedly
curative charms or talismans of that religion whenever one of her children was
ill. I believe it is even said that she passed the secrets of these charms or
talismans on to her daughter, my paternal grandmother, and that the latter
would occasionally employ them on my father’s maladies when he was a tot. The
reader may well be wondering why in the light of this Santa-nic pseudo-religion’s prominence in my family lore I was not
delighted rather than horrified at or by the discovery that all those newly
sprouted botanicas were intimately
associated with it; the reader may well indeed be wondering why in the
aforesaid light I did not instantly undertake a pilgrimage to the nearest of
these botanicas upon making the
aforesaid discovery. But in point of fact, despite being a quarter Cuban in
ethnic constitution, I harbor an antipathy to almost all things Latin American
that exceeds in ferocity and antiquity even my antipathy to the
bongwater-logged sixties subculture-cum-counterculture, such that it is not
entirely impossible—what with marijuana’s
being a word of “American Spanish” origin, according to my trusty 1990 Concise Oxford Dictionary—that my
sixties-subculture-cum-counterculture-phobia must ultimately be regarded as an
outgrowth of my Latinameriphobia. Moreover, the ferocity of my aversion to a
given piece of Latin-Americana generally varies in direct proportion to that
piece’s American-ness and remoteness from organic Latin-Europeana or Iberiana,
from things of immediately Spanish or Portuguese provenance (not that I have
ever been much of a fan of organic Iberiana: bullfights, acoustic guitar music,
paella, and Portuguese men of war [whether ships or jellyfish-impersonators]
all elicit from me Lucy van Pelt’s signature exclamation of Blech! [TBS, I do harbor a powerful
passion for port wine, but port is “arguably” more of a staple of British than of
Portuguese life]). “Woke” cavilers will doubtless denounce this antipathy as a
manifestation of “internalized white supremacy,” and for aught I know their
denunciation is well-founded (and indeed, mutatis
mutandis, I have jestingly entertained this very possibility vis-à-vis my
selective restaurant tipping policy and my Italian ethnic heritage in one
of the segments of “Every Man His Own George D. Painter”), but even if it
is, that is of precious little moment to my personal metaphysics, for my
Latinameriphobia is an organic and inextirpable portion of that metaphysics; it
as much “a part of who I am” as the fact that I am over five feet tall—nay,
“arguably” even more a part thereof, as I was already a Latinameriphobe when I
was less or fewer than three feet tall and shall remain a Latinameriphobe even
if the cobelligerent efforts of gravity and osteoarthritis eventually reduce me
to a near-dwarf of four foot eleven. And the present moment, a moment
immediately after my “self-outing” as a person possibly in thrall to
“internalized white supremacy,” is probably a better moment than most others to
mention something that really must be
mentioned before “close of play” in or on this essay—namely, that the
metaphysical resonance now in point differs strongly in degree if not
necessarily in kind (as well as contingently if not necessarily essentially)
from that of the proprietary names discussed in “Proprietary Names: The Name”
in that the aura or entity- cluster attached to the name in my mind is also
attached to a referent or cluster of referents in the world of the here and
now. So, for instance, while as I mentioned in “PN: tN,” the name Little Caesar’s conjured up an aura of
late republican-cum-imperial-Roman majesty in the mind of my boyhood self, I
never stood any chance of meeting an actual Roman dictator or emperor or any
other sort of late-republican or imperial Roman in the Tampa Bay area of the 1980s,
I stand a very good chance indeed of meeting a so-called stoner or pot-head in
the Tampa Bay area of the 2020s, and that the proliferation of signage for
so-called Smoke Shops in this area cannot but betoken (!) an increase in the
likelihood of such an encounter, inasmuch as (however insistently the purveyors
of the asinine argument that the frequency-cum-widespreadness of occurrence of
an activity varies in inverse proportion to the degree to which it is legally
permitted, that the relaxation of legal proscriptions of an activity actually
decreases the number of people engaging in it and the frequency of their
engagement therein) this proliferation presumably betokens (!) a proliferation
of cannabis use in the area. And of course the proliferation of the signage for
so-called botanicas in the area likewise would seem to betoken an increase in
the likelihood of my encountering a practitioner of the god-awful Santa-nic pseudo-religion hereabouts,
and this betokening likewise seems to be founded on a proliferation of observance-cum-celebration
of the Santa-nic pseudo-religion in
the area, especially if certain recent news reports are to be believed, news
reports reporting that a sizeable proportion of the millions of recent
immigrants to the United States hail from Central and South America and
Hispaniola. At this point the “wokester” is bound to interject that what I have
been terming a “personal metaphysics” has just revealed itself to be in fact a personal paranoiacs, a paranoiacs
ignobly superstructed on the abovementioned internalized white supremacy. But
to the “wokester” I would counterdemur that in all candor and frankness and
good faith I believe my aversion to the Santa-nists
to be fundamentally metaphysical in character, inasmuch as while I undoubtedly
am worried (albeit far from paranoid)
about the demographic increase in Santa-nists
qua potential harmers of my person (and of the persons of my pets!), my
aversion to these people and their pseudo-religion is fully detachable (or, if
you prefer, alienable) from my fear
of them, inasmuch as even the idea of spectating on their rites from a
completely safe distance—the distance afforded, say, by a video viewable
completely “off the grid,” i.e., beyond the reach of any powers human or
robotic that might somehow contrive to notify the Santa-nists of my aversion to them—fills me with loathing and
horror, loathing and horror of something I cannot help regarding as evil. In
any case, the “horrification” of my personal metaphysics of names by the local
roadside signage cannot be entirely reduced to phenomena even “adjacent” to
politically scabrousness, inasmuch as it has been partly owing to changes
having nothing to do with any ethnos or subculture, and indeed nothing really
to do with people as such at all.
Take the recent arrival in Hillsborough County of outlets of the supermarket
chain known as Aldi. At first blush,
this arrival would seem to mark a resurgence of the old proprietary roadside-signic
heterogeneity, inasmuch as Aldi is
after all an old-school proprietary name attached to a company offering
tangible products. But in point of fact, with one invisible or dead or robotic
hand the proprietors of Aldi take away a thousandfold with the other, for Aldi
is specifically a supermarket chain whose signature gimmick is offering no proprietarily named products—or, what
comes to the same thing, proprietarily-nominally-metaphysically speaking,
offering products exclusively under names of its (Aldi’s) own invention or
proprietorship. The chagrin I felt on learning that Aldi had arrived in the
area sharpened into outright dismay on my discovering just a few days ago (as
of this writing, September 23, 2024) that the supermarket closest to my
dwelling, a Winn Dixie, is slated for conversion into an Aldi and that the conversion
will be complete within a matter of weeks. And in this dismay I am compelled to
see yet another proof that I am and always have been much more attached to the
old-school proprietary retail name than I ever formerly supposed, or at least
formerly was willing to admit to myself; for the truth is that I have always regarded
supermarket store-brand products (a.k.a. own-brand
products) as downmarket and louche and regarded people who do not blush (or at
least affect not to blush [if
affecting to be incapable of an involuntary reaction be not a logical or
physiological impossibility]) to buy them as churls and losers. What is more,
on once again reflecting on the proprietarily named products I have loved over
the years and comparing them with either actual store-brand quasi-equivalents
that I have to my shame been unable to avoid occasionally consuming in their
stead or conjectural store-brand quasi-equivalents that I may be forced to
consume in their stead in the future, I cannot but conclude that my contempt
for store-brand products arises from instincts about them that are
fundamentally sound, i.e., that store-brand products generally are inferior to the name-brand products
for which they presume to substitute. I own that I cheerfully buy jugs and
bottles of Publix-branded water at Publix, my supermarket-chain of first resort
because, well, you know, it’s water,
which no matter where it comes from tastes
like nothing (although of course here the professional valetudinarians
among my readers who will assure me that however uniformly null the taste of
bottled water may be, there is more than figuratively nothing I should be more
concerned with), and I even own that a handful of Publix-branded products (notably
their frozen lasagna rolls) have grown so refulgently on me over the years that
I should only reluctantly switch to brand-name pseudo-equivalents of them; nay,
I even own that I may come to find Aldi’s Trixkit woven wheat crackers
preferable to the Triscuits of which they will be a transparent knockoff (for
such is the way of Aldi’s treatment of its own-brands: rather than coming up
with their own completely different name for one of their alternatives, they
substitute a name that is just barely within legally safe orthographical distance
of that of the best-known original as if to rub the consumer’s nose in his
betrayal of his favorite brand à la C.S. Lewis’s satanic-cum-technocratic
totalitarians forcing new members of their society to step on a crucifix), but
will it be unreasonable in me to shrink from purchasing B. F. Chung’s Chicken
Lo Mein in preference to P. F. Chang’s? Is it not possible that the celebrated
restaurateurs whose portmanteau name appears on every box of that CLM have each
had a hand in the selection of ingredients for their version of the dish and
that those hands were slightly more gustatorily discerning than the hands of
the entire Mannschaft of German food
engineers doubtless responsible for the recipe of the B.F. Chung version? And
what of Sierra Wyoming beer? Will I be able to assume that like Sierra Nevada
it has been “family-owned and argued over since 1980” by a clan anciently and
intimately acquainted with the American-microbrew tradition of heavily hopped
beers? Will I be blamable for assuming instead that Sierra Wyoming is in fact a
product of one of the more massig German
brewers and that however heavily hopped it may purport to be per its
bottle-label, it will always end up tasting like a slightly yeastier version of
Miller Lite just like a typical German lager or pilsner? And even as regards
German beers, am I not perchance right to ascribe a certain level of infungible
quality (quality, that is, both in the sense of peculiarity, Eigentümlichkeit, and in the sense of
superiority, Qualität) to the classic
familiar brand names and to suspect that that quality will not be found in
Aldi’s knockoffs thereof? Am I not perchance right to suspect that Köstritzer’s
Schwarzbier, with its famous bottle-swathing
alteration of Tischbein’s portrait of Goethe, the one wherein the poet is shown
with a glass of the beer itself in his right hand, is “in a certain very real
sense” the same beer he consumed in copious quantities two hundred years ago,
such that if one were through the magic of time travel to pour him a draught of
today’s Köstritzer he would be unable to tell the difference; and that a Schwarzbier that tried to work the same
magic on me via the placement of itself (an Aldi concoction perchance dubbed Kostenritzer—i.e., cost-cutter) beneath the formidable schnozz of Schiller as depicted
by Ludovike Simanowiz would or will turn out to be chemically indistinguishable
from watered-down Bitburger with brown food coloring in it? Perchance,
perchance. And am I completely alone in my profound misgivings about these Aldi
knockoff-brand products and my ferocious preference for “traditional”
supermarkets like Publix that are chock-full of a cornucopiacally diverse array
of proprietarily named products (including Chock Full o’ Nuts coffee, my
preferred brand thereof)? Perchance, perchance: for I am told that Aldis are
wildly popular in every corner of the USA; that today’s Americans welcome the
arrival of the first Aldi in their town or neighborhood with all the
celebratory fanfare that their ancestors bestowed on the arrival of passenger
train service or electric street lights (or even the first McDonald’s) therein.
When I first learned of this wild Aldi-popularity, I could not help wondering
with a mixture of egoistic glumness and eschatological hopefulness if it did
not indicate that the American population en bloc had developed a more
wholesome (i.e., because less metaphysically laden) rapport with proprietary
names than my own. For after all, these supermarkets shelved with nothing with
store-brand products recall nothing so strongly as the supermarket depicted in
the 1984 “cult-classic” film Repo Man,
wherein every single item was encased in a label displaying nothing but a word
or phrase—“Milk,” “Baked Beans,” autc.—denoting the product contained within it
(and wherein the filmmakers were incidentally but taking their cues from the
so-called generic sections at real-world supermarkets of their time, sections
whose minuscule allotment of floor space and swift disappearance admittedly
betrayed their marginality to the contemporary American Handelsgeist), unless it be the commodity-scape of The Simpsons touched on in “Proprietary
Names: The Name,” a commodity-scape wherein every product bears an entirely
fictitious proprietary name understood to be a stand-in for a notorious factual
counterpart—and in either case a would-be subversive expression of resentment
of the proprietary name’s chokehold on the popular imagination, and of dogged
determination not to be drawn into the maelstrom of “product-placement” that
had already blighted the Weltdarstellungen
of many a crowd-pleasing Hollywood blockbuster (e.g., 1982’s ET, with its foregrounding of Reese’s Pieces
qua the eponymous extraterrestrial’s favorite candy). But I soon discarded this
line of wonderage on reflecting that the most ardent cooers over Aldi-arrivals
I had heard tell of were elderly women—in other words, members of the demographic
tranche of present-day America presumably most prone to being ardently smitten
with old-school proprietary names, what with its having come of age during
those names’ heyday, a heyday when it had consisting of young women and hence the most brand-name obsessed American demographic
tranche of that micro-epoch. Presumably these ladies were smitten with the Aldi
brand name as they would have been smitten with the name of a perfume
manufacturer or fashion designer thirty to fifty years ago, and presumably instead
of regarding Aldi’s store-brand products as corruptions of the products of
nobler merchants in the grocery trade as I did, they regarded them as they
would have done the latest lines of clothing or perfume issued by those
standard-bearers of haute couture or parfumerie. For after all, Aldi was (and
is) of European provenance, and although German brand names have something of a
checkered meta-aesthetic history chez die
Frauenzimmer of America (what with these names primarily being associated
with cars and precision tools, products typically regarded as objects masculine
obsession), Aldi had (and has) long had a sizable commercial footprint in the
United Kingdom, and American women are legendarily abject Anglophones, the most
supine suckers for all things British—or at any rate, all things traditional-cum-non-working-class
British (e.g., tea and crumpets, the royal family, and the Henley Regatta) qua
totems or synecdoches of poshness; and today’s elderly American ladies,
doubtless not knowing anything about Aldi beneath or behind its bare name, have
never had any reason to think of it as in any way tradition-flouting or sub-U.
But “I would bet a silk pajama” that none of these ladies, and precious few of
their non-young and non-female compatriots, would ever have become smitten with
Aldi had they first heard of it in the same setting as I first did—viz., the
BBC Radio 4 obituary of the company’s founder, an obituary that could not
forbear from mentioning another highly successful supermarket chain founded by
that Herr, Save-a-Lot, and especially
if they had heard that obituary after having visited a Save-a-Lot as I have
once done (and only once, and unwillingly, dragged thereto as I was by a friend
far less choosy about his groceries than I have ever been! [the visit,
incidentally, is obliquely commemorated in the
final episode of “Every Man His own George D. Painter”]), what with
Save-a-Lot’s being a super-discount supermarket specializing in cast-offs from more
upmarket retailers–chiefly expired canned goods and very-soon-to-expire
refrigerated meat; a supermarket wherein most of the products are not even
shelved properly but rather heaped up willy-nilly in horizontally orientated wire
racks. (Naturally I am aware that my disclosure of the “origin story” of my
acquaintance with the Aldi name obliges me to acknowledge that my aversion to
Aldi may have been “overdetermined” rather than solely the effect of my
discovery of the chain’s bereftness of name-brand goods; even so, I suspect
that my aversion to store-brand goods has always been strong enough that I
would not have welcomed the Aldification of the American supermarketscape even had
I never heard of Aldi’s proprietary connection to Save-a-Lot.) But talking—or
resuming to talk—of Aldi’s Germano-British provenance: it now occurs to me that
in virtue of this provenance, the proliferation of Aldis ([sic], incidentally,
on the absence of the apostrophe, for “Aldi” here denotes “a single outlet of
the Aldi supermarket chain” and hence requires the plural number, not the
singular possessive) on these shores, or more specifically within the bounds of
this polity, the U.S.A., signalizes yet another sinister and demoralizing turn
in the fortunes of the proprietary name’s interaction with American roadside
signage, for to the best of my limited but not necessarily slight knowledge,
aside from Aldi, there is no foreign-originating supermarket chain that has
made any commercial headway in the States, and that complementarily Safeway is
the only American supermarket chain that has ever made any commercial headway
overseas (specifically only in other Anglospheric countries—and that that
headway would appear to have been fairly negligible in the light of the
minuscule number of references to Safeway by comparison with those to
Sainsbury’s, Waitrose, Selfridges, and Aldi that I have encountered in
UK-originating media over the past quarter-century). The ponderation of the
question why supermarkets of all proprietarily named entities (and as notably opposed
to soft drinks, cars, and fast-food restaurants) have had such a tough time
breaking various international commercial barriers would doubtless yield some
answers or at least conjectures with regard to the general history of
proprietary names and the metaphysics thereof, but anyway, now that those
barriers have been broken by Aldi, it behoves me to remark that in the light of
the outsize geographical footprint of supermarkets by comparison with fast-food
restaurants and the like, and also in the light of the fact that both strip
malls and High Streets tend to be anchored by or to center on supermarkets, an
America liberally sprinkled with Aldis is bound to resemble the UK at the
streetside-cum-roadside level much more closely than it did before. And as if this were not bad enough (and there
is no denying that the change in question is bad, for we are after all not
talking here about a Stateside proliferation of the nice elements of Britain’s human geography; of village greens and
quaint little pubs and tearooms in half-timbered houses and the like, but
rather of a coldly inorganic element thereof and indeed, given that the
supermarket is an American invention, we are effectively talking about a
re-importation of Americana whose perversity could perhaps only be matched by a
Stateside boom in those UK-originating hamburger joints known as Wimpy Bars),
and if reports I am hearing from numerous on-the-spot sources are to be credited,
this leveling of the distinction between British and American
streetside-cum-roadside geography is being paralleled at the non-proprietary
end by a newly originating ubiquity of smoke
shops in town centers throughout the British isles. And while I have yet to
hear of any UK-sited botanicas, there
as here the rise of the smoke shop has coincided with that of a sinister
commercial institution likewise associated with an exogenous ethnic
cohort—viz., the Turkish barber shop.
So far no one has been able to account for these shops’ proliferation in the
High Streets; there has apparently been no dramatic uptick in demand among
British men for shaves or haircuts alla
Turca, which in any case apparently differ from their British equivalents
only in being administered by fellows whose facial features lead one to presume
that they do not bear surnames like Smith,
Jones, and Perkins. It would scarcely be accurate to say that they are popular, because that would imply that
they have organically developed a large clientele, that (for example) on
stepping into one of them for his shave-and-haircut a gent or chap is obliged
not infrequently to wait for the or a barber’s chair to be vacated by the or a
customer ahead of him in the queue, as I am not infrequently obliged to do at
my local (and non-Turkish) barbershop even when I have an appointment; whereas
it would seem that on stepping into one of them one typically finds the sole
tonsorial artist contemplating his (presumably self-manicured) fingernails
nails behind a single empty chair. Such a classic token of commercial
otioseness has naturally prompted speculation that these establishments are
mere fronts for so-called money-laundering operations, but nobody has yet been
able to begin sussing out an answer to the question, “Money-laundering
operations for the laundering of what
sort of other sort of operation?” The usual answer, “drug-dealing,” has become effectively chimerical now that the law
enforcement bodies of the UK, like their counterparts in every other occidental
polity, have become supinely tolerant of the public use and trade of virtually
every sort of nominally controlled substance. A fragment of hearsay about a
single shop in a tiny Welsh town suggests an alternative answer: on being asked
how he had acquired the funds to purchase the shop, the proprietor-cum-owner
(who may have hailed from some country other than Turkey) reportedly replied
that he had been given a grant by the local council, a grant available only to
non-UK citizens hailing from his country of origin (and hence pointedly not available to would-be entrepreneurs
among the town’s citizenry). (Naturally this scenario invites comparisons to
certain governmental-cum-quangal programs and practices in the US, programs and
practices that it would probably be imprudent to specify at least at the moment
of this writing [October 1, 2024] when they still constitute an excoriatingly
scabrous hot potato of a political football.) In the face of all this
recent-to-present horrifyingly degenerative
homogenization-cum-deprorprietarization of the Anglospheric streetscape, where
in the tangible external human-built world of the present is the British or
American survivor of the old proprietary-nominal dispensation to find a modicum
of metaphysical consolation, a smattering of a sense of numinous continuity with
the world of his own past to the extent that it offered a sense of the
numinously good in its own right (for, as I believe I have already made plain
in my account of the metaphysical blight wrought by smoke shops and the like,
the world of the present does not want for bridges or “portals” to portions of
that older world that already offered nothing but a sense of the immanently
evil)? Why, presumably, in that smattering of three-dimensional human built
places in which business continues to be transacted under the auspices of
proprietary names already in existence in the old days. And to such places I
have indeed repaired in search of such consolation, but the results of that
search have been mixed to say the least. To be sure, there are a few—a very few—still-extant proprietary names
whose metaphysical profiles have actually improved
chez moi in recent years. Without a doubt the most conspicuous of these is Winn
Dixie. In my boyhood, Winn Dixie was simply known as a place where nice people
never shopped for groceries. While never quite descending to Save-a-Lot-esque
levels of abominableness in the public imagination, its stores were regarded as
dirty and poorly stocked with name-brand products, and its own-brand products were
assumed to be of barely-edible quality at their freshest and stale on arrival
on the shelf anyhow. And from what I gathered from the roughly half-dozen times
I had been unable to avoid entering one of these stores, that downmarket
reputation was well merited. But since moving back to Florida more than four
years ago, I have been obliged to become fairly well acquainted with a specific
Winn Dixie, the abovementioned one nearest my house, and I have found it to be
a supermarket eminently worthy of the custom of the nicest of nice people (who
are by no means to be confused with the sort of people who think Whole Foods a
trifle parvenu—people whom I suppose one would have to call neo-yuppies [i.e.,
because the word “yuppie” itself has lost all currency owing to the absorption
of the entirety of the “young urban professional” quasi-class into the
subculture of “hipsterism” and the political lifestyle of “progressivism”]). To
be sure, its décor is rather depressingly Sovietesque in its virtually
monochrome near nonexistence (white walls offset only occasionally by splashes
of red and black in the signage and the staff’s uniforms); and to be sure, one
cannot get sandwiches made to order at its deli as one can at any Publix’s.
Still, the Dietz and Watson-brand cold cuts on offer therefrom are eminently
edible (if not quite as edible as the Boar’s Head-brand ones on offer at any
Publix deli), and as regards the shelf-and-refrigerator stock, I am able to
find an exact name-brand match for roughly eighty percent of the products I
would normally purchase at Publix, and for ninety percent of the remaining
twenty percent I can find a serviceable enough substitute (which substitute is
occasionally even a store-brand product). Essentially Winn Dixie seems to have
“moved on up” into the second-place spot in the regional supermarket hierarchy
formerly occupied by the now-defunct Kash ’n’ Karry (the chain at one of whose
outlets I worked as a bagboy, as mentioned in “Proprietary Names/the Name”), as
makes perfect sense given that my neighborhood Winn Dixie was formerly an
outlet of Sweet Bay, i.e., Kash ’n’ Karry under the name as which it futilely
rebranded itself in the late nineties or early oughties. But all my newfound
metaphysical solace in Winn Dixie has of course been foutu ever since my abovementioned discovery of WD’s acquisition by
Aldi. Happily the first-place occupier of the spot in the just-mentioned
hierarchy, Publix, remains as close to its former self as any retail business
obliged to keep up with trends in the character of its retailed merchandise
(e.g., in the specific case of the retail-grocery business, the introduction of
“organic,” “gluten-free,” etc. product lines) can ever be. Unhappily, the
Publix at which geographical propinquity obliges me to shop most often, the
Citrus Park Publix, is but feebly evocative of the Publixes (Publices?) of my
boyhood, for the shopping center in which it is housed was constructed years
after my emigration from Florida, in the late nineties at the earliest, and it
remains cast in the mold of a “big-box” store of the millennium-straddling
microepoch, being quite expansive not only horizontally (a quality to which I
have no intrinsic objection) but also vertically, with visible air-conditioning
ductwork snaking along its cavernously or cathedral-esquely high dark-metal
ceiling. But I have only to step into a Publix of even slightly earlier construction
(as I am privileged to do all too rarely) to be transported into the retail
atmosphere of thirty to fifty years ago. In many cases even the signage
designating the various sections and departments (Produce, Bakery, Deli etc.)
appears not to have changed a jot since the day of the store’s opening—by which
I mean not that it seems simply to have been left to its own fortunes since
then, for in that case it would be visibly chipped and cracked and covered in layers
of dust, but that it looks as new as it must have looked then, which presumably
means that the management of the store or the company has gone out of its way
to maintain it . (One might almost suspect this to be a manifestation of some cannily
twee marketing stratagem, of an effort of the chain to present certain of its
stores as miniature retail theme parks, as “postmodern” pastiches of
traditional supermarkets, did one not know how foreign any sort of chasing
after hip “meta-ness” is to Publix’s Gesellschaftsgeist.)
But Publix, although it has recently expanded at least as far northward as
North Carolina, remains a Florida based-and-centered retail chain, and I ceased
to put an ounce of trust in even the mightiest of Florida based-and-centered
retail chains when about ten years ago every single one of the hundreds of
ineffably winsome Eckerd’s drug stores—Eckerd’s being a St. Petersburg-headquartered company that had enjoyed a near-monopoly of
the local retail pharmaceutical market—was transformed into a soulless CVS overnight
(CVS being a national chain that I had previously witnessed displacing and
engulfing [if not quite destroying] another gemütlich
regional drugstore chain, Rite Aid, up in Maryland). This has left me no option
but to seek out current instantiations of the national chains of yore that are
still extant. I can report on success with only one of these, Domino’s. In the
1980s and 1990s, Domino’s was the pizza-delivery option of penultimate resort,
the last resort therefor being Hungry Howie’s, whose redneckish aura I
animadverted on in Proprietary Names: The Name. While presumed to be of higher
quality than HH’s, Domino’s pizza had a reputation for irredeemable insipidity
and homogeneity. Certainly one would never dream of ordering from Domino’s if
one could afford to spring for a pie from the ruler of the national pizzeriec
roost, the substantially more expensive Pizza Hut. But over the past
dozen-and-a-half years, Domino’s has undergone a revolutionary improvement in
quality and variety that overtops even the one that I have witnessed chez Winn
Dixie. Now Domino’s is unquestionably the best of the national pizza-delivery
chains, and I would never dream of ordering from a Pizza Hut if I lived within
the delivery radius of a Domino’s. But “order from” is very much the so-called
operative word here, signifying as it does that Domino’s is a delivery-only
restaurant and therefore incapable of providing one with a sense of emplaced proprietary continuity. And so
even theoretically practically speaking, I can seek my proprietary-nominal
metaphysical solace only at an outlet of one of the stalwart near-exact-handful
of ancient national sit-down fast-food chains, and practically speaking, in the
light of the Alltag imposed on me by
my carlessness, I am left with only the Citrus Park-Keystone McDonald’s
cater-cornered across Gunn Highway to the abovementioned Citrus Park Publix
(although I do not despair of revisiting the Wendy’s on North Dale Mabry
Highway at which I lunched with Lang Adams and his father after taking in a
screening of Amadeus or Better Off Dead at the nearby Mission Bell Square cinema in
1984 or 1985, for I believe I recently spotted Wendy’s signature red locks
while riding by the spot where I recalled that eatery’s being sited). This McDonald’s
was built at right about the same time as the Northdale Court McDonald’s, the
hot pink-heavy “Miami Vice”-themed one mentioned in “Proprietary Names: The
Name,” in the very late 1980s or the very early 1990s, although unlike the
Northdale one it has featured a traditional earth tone-heavy McDonald’s color
scheme from its opening onwards. I have transacted with this McDonald’s only
twice since my 2020 move-back. The first time, was back in 2020 itself, when
even Hillsborough County, Florida was still in semi-lockdown, such that the
transaction perforce took place through the restaurant’s drive-through window
and so afforded me no experience of its interior. I mention this first visit
only because I did not dine during the second one, such that the first one
affords me my most recent memory of the gustation of McDonald’s’ food. I
believe I accompanied my French fries with both a Quarter-Pounder and a Big Mac
just so that I could acquaint myself with the latest incarnations (and
“inpanations”) of both of McDonald’s’ signature sandwiches, so that no one
could accuse me afterwards of not really being up to date on the Wirthausgeist of McDonald’s. And I was
pleased to register that minus the inevitable slight diminution in piquancy
occasioned by in-transit cooling, all three menu items tasted exactly like
their most recent counterparts in my memory’s palate—viz., the Big Macs,
Quarter-Pounders, and fries I had not infrequently purchased and consumed at
the main two-story McDonald’s in downtown Baltimore (which may have shut its
doors as anciently as 2010) during dozens of mid-oughties lunch breaks. I was
not vouchsafed an opportunity to inspect the Citrus Park-Keystone McDonald’s’
interior until two years later (i.e., two years ago, i.e., at some point
towards the end of 2022), when my mother took my two nephews thither for lunch,
and I accompanied them. I found to my disappointment that while the restaurant
retained a broadly earth-toned color scheme, not a single square foot of it
could have been exchanged with a McDonald’s of the very late twentieth century.
The McDonald’ses of that quasi-epoch flaunted the syntheticness and
prefabricatedness of their facture
with dazzlingly shiny plastic booth banquettes and single-hued vinyl formica-topped
tables (even if many of them touchingly sought to offset these qualities with
fragments of organic warmth like potted ferns and imitation stained-glass booth
partitions). The Citrus Park-Keystone McDonald’s of 2022—the first I had
entered in donkey’s half-decades—was instead entirely accoutered in a
bargain-basement version of a sort of Japanese-cum-Scandinavian interior-design
style that I had first encountered at certain mid-to-upmarket Baltimore
nightclubs and restaurants during the micro-epoch in which I had been wont to
lunch at the downtown McDonald’s—a style consisting of rusticated surfaces of
granite or wood that invariably met at the sharpest of right angles. The
evocation was not a particularly pleasant one, and not merely because the
granite and wood in this case were manifestly artificial (hence the attributive
“bargain-basement”), for although I had spent a fair number of pleasant
evenings in or at the nightclubs and restaurants evoked (and here it is only
fair that I should name a few names: the Café Asia at the Inner Harbor, Sonar
in its original Canton location, and the Red Maple in Mount Vernon), I had
never found the Wirthausgeist or esprit de boîte of any of them
particularly wholesome or edifying. To be sure, they had all been
irreproachably hip—as hip as any eatery or danceria south of the Big Apple legitimately
could claim to be, but that did not undividedly redound to their credit, for
the hipness of the oughties had a decidedly louche and parvenu quality about it
that had been absent from (or at least significantly less prominent in) the
hipness of the nineties (i.e., the hipness of my Club Charles and
Rendezvous-frequenting days). Nineties hipness had been centered on the
relatively bookish and stylish Burroughs-and-Kerouac worshiping indie rocker;
oughties hipness was centered on the utterly unlettered and fashionless club
kid addicted to nothing but the latest so-called designer drugs and the latest
trends in inanely repetitive dance music (“drum and bass,” “jungle,” “Bhangra,”
etc.). Nineties hipness had been a refined and diversified continuation of
seventies and eighties punk; oughties hipness was a coarsened and homogenized
reincarnation of seventies punk’s innately and irredeemably naff contemporary,
disco (sorry, Whit!). The Nachtlebensgeist
of oughties hipness had made going out a drearily demoralizing experience for
anyone seeking to cling however tentatively to the always fragile and
semi-fictional connection between contemporary hipness and nineteenth-century bohemianism,
and the discovery that the McDonald’s of the 2020s had been infected by the
décor of oughties hip nightlife could not but have been a demoralizing
experience for anyone who had thitherto regarded fast-food dining as an
intrinsically wholesome (if
naffer-than-disco) family-oriented or kid-friendly activity. In togging its
inner self out in the matte, subfusc sub-finery of oughties nightlife, the
McDonald’s of the 2020s seemed to be at once touting for the custom of
so-called Millennials already nostalgic for their early majority and urging the
so-called Zoomers and Alpha-ers to put away wholesomely childish things in
favor of the wafer-thin trappings of a morally and intellectually barren early
adulthood. (In all fairness to Mickey D’s, though, I must acknowledge that it
is possible that the redecoration scheme now in point was at least in part a
so-called knock-on effect of the late-1980s or early 1990s-originating
consumer-advocacy campaign that impelled the corporation to scale back its
marketing to children via the above-discussed dramatis personae of McDonaldland to the point that Ronald McDonald
himself rarely any longer made appearances in television advertisements and
Conan O’Brien’s late-night team produced a sketch in which that clown was
obliged to seek employment at Burger King; a campaign that absurdly claimed
that “fast food was the new smoking” and that hence those characters’ influence
was as detrimental to children’s long-term health as the influence supposedly
exerted on their buying choices by the notorious and doomed cartoon cigarette
mascot Joe Camel.) But even more demoralizing “blasts from the past” lay in
store for me at that McDonald’s. First, on stepping into the men’s restroom
(for restaurants in the state of Florida had mercifully not yet [and still have
not yet] succumbed to the eyechart lobby’s demand for universal
urinary-cum-defecatory sexual desegregation), I found that it both looked and
smelled of not having been given a thorough cleaning in recent historical
memory and that the urinal did not properly flush (i.e., that when one actuated
its flushing mechanism it simply gurgled a bit without sending a ripple through
its contents, let alone replacing them with undefiled water). To be sure, not
having been born twenty-four or fewer hours earlier, I had been obliged to make
use of numerous unclean and dysfunctional public restrooms over the years, but
those years had not begun until my relocation to Baltimore. My earliest memory
of an encounter with such a restroom dates back to the spring of 1995, my first
spring of residence in that city, to an extremely greasy spoon in Fell’s Point,
the city’s flagship nightlife district, where my visiting brother and I were
obliged to make use of the lady’s room because the men’s room was out of order;
my second to some unspecifiable moment less than a year later, and to another
establishment in Fell’s Point, a “legendary” or “classic” Baltimore bar called
The Admiral’s Cup—and aptly so, I ruefully reflected upon gingerly-ly availing
myself of its athletic support-shaped (and barely more than AS-sized) urinal
ensphered by a cloud of gnats and houseflies. Of course the unsanitary bathroom
at my formerly friendly neighborhood Florida McDonald’s was first and foremost
disturbing in immediately sensuous terms. But that unsanitariness’ evocation of
Baltimore nightlife was only slightly less disturbing, for like the evocation
thereof produced by the change in décor it seemed calculated to attenuate the
McDonald’s “brand’”s classic aura of kid-friendliness. And as I stepped out of
the men’s room and back into the main dining area, my eyes alighted on a sign
on the opposite wall that as far as I was (and am) concerned might as well have
read “Abandon all hope, ye who exit thence” inasmuch as it actually read, “No
loitering. 30 minute time limit on consumption of food.” I had first beheld
such a sign more than a quarter-century earlier, and in fact during the
selfsame spring-of-95 Baltimore visit of my brother that had witnessed our
encounter with the unclean Fell’s Point ladies’ room, in the dining area of the
McDonald’s at 29th and Greenmount Avenue. I suppose we had repaired
thither simply because neither of us had much money to spend and because
McDonald’s was the closest fast-food outlet to my apartment at 31st
and St. Paul Streets. By then I had already learned that Baltimore was a town
with far more wrong sides than right sides and that Greenmount Avenue marked
the boundary between my particular right side and the nearest wrong one, but I
suppose I had reckoned the McDonald’s name (like the Kentucky Fried Chicken
name of the KFC outlet on the other side of Greenmount) was a guarantor of
civic normalcy within the restaurant’s immediate precincts. But those precincts
had turned out to exude a combination of squalor, unfriendliness, and danger
that impelled my brother to dub them (a bit hyperbolically, I admit [and would
have admitted even then]) “Gangland USA.” And so perhaps the appearance of the
sign within the restaurant should not have been shocking. And yet it had been. And
to this day I am of the firm conviction (and not merely convinced [See
“Customizing the Corpse for the Coffin” if you are mystified as to why I am one
and not the other]) that it was altogether normal and decent of me to be shocked
by that first sighting of that sign. Why? Well, I suppose first and foremost
because I had thitherto been accustomed to seeing “No Loitering” signs posted
exclusively on the exteriors of
places of business, chiefly alongside the front entrances of so-called
convenience stores, and because it is to such exteriors that “No Loitering”
signs properly and exclusively belong. For a business—any business of any
sort—is of course well within the bounds of civility to warn against loiterers
on its doorstep, inasmuch as the sole purpose of a commercial establishment’s
entrance or exit is to facilitate the movement
of customers into or out of its premises, such that anyone who insists on
lingering thereat is perversely thwarting that purpose and therefore worthy of
being interpellated by default as a suspicious character. But for any customer-oriented
business to post a no-loitering sign within
its premises is an unpardonable affront to its customers, who have in any case
purchased or agreed to purchase the right to linger on the premises via the
proffering of a sum of money corresponding to the pre-stipulated price of their
goods or services offered on the premises. And for a sit-down restaurant, be it
ever so inexpensive, to post such a sign is especially gallingly insolent—for
the customers of such a business are after all officially and hence more than
merely fictionally its guests: not for nothing are restaurants and lodging
places collectively known as the hospitality
industry. And of course the addition of any time-limit on food-consumption to
such a sign in such a setting is perforce trebly galling, and galling in a
quasi-literal sense, for the consumption of food is an activity that manifestly
requires a certain amount of time whose length cannot be imposed because it
ineluctably varies in direct proportion to the quantity and type of food to be
consumed and the masticative-cum-digestive strength of the prospective
consumer’s organism. Thirty minutes may be more than enough time for a
perfectly healthy 20-year-old of average build to consume a single Egg
McMuffin, but it is not nearly enough time for that selfsame 20-year-old to
consume five Big Macs and an extra-large milkshake or for a diminutive
nonagenarian with an ulcer to consume a single small cup of coffee and a small
order of fries. Of course it was (and still is) rational and even
understandable for a McDonald’s in “Gangland USA” to post such a sign inasmuch
as a sizeable proportion of its guests were (and still are) likely to consist
of ne’er-do-well hobbledehoys accustomed to convening at sit-down fast-food restaurants
chiefly for the purpose of potentiating their e’er-do-ill-dom. But that posting
certainly did not redound to the good fame of the polity in which the
McDonald’s was situated, a polity that did after all style itself a city as
unabashedly as McDonaldland itself did, such that its elected officials were
duty-bound to punish ne’er-do-wells as zealously as Mayor McCheese was (or had
been) wont to punish the Hamburgler. And so the presence of that sign
ineluctably signaled that as a Baltimore resident I was living under the
tattered auspices of a so-called (or so eventually-to-be called [for I don’t
recall hearing the expression until the late 20-teens at the earliest]) failed
state (or statelet [although in truth since about 1950 Baltimore has been more
materially governed from Annapolis and Washington, DC than from its own city
hall, such that “state” is perhaps the mot
juste whether one takes its referent to be the State of Maryland or the US
federal government]). “I see. And so you were appalled to see such a sign at
the Citrus Park McDonald’s because it signaled to you that as a resident of
unincorporated Hillsborough County you were living under the tattered auspices
of yet another so-failed state (whether you took “state”’s referent to be the State of Florida or the US federal
government).” By no means. To be sure, I was appalled by the sight of the sign,
but not because it signaled to me that I was living under the auspices of a
failed state. For the Citrus Park McDonald’s was emphatically not sited in a
neighborhood that could be styled “Gangland USA” by any stretch of the most
dystopia-ridden imagination. To be sure, the strip mall that it fronted had
never been the most upmarket of retail locales; indeed, it had been seemingly
condemned to lifelong lower-mid-marketdom at its very-late-1980s opening by
being anchored by an outlet of the supermarket chain Food Lion, a sort of poor
man’s Winn Dixie (but by no means any sort of man’s Save-a-Lot) that went
belly-up only a very few years into the present century, and although the Food
Lion has been succeeded by an outlet of Ace, America’s largest and most reputable
chain of hardware stores, that mallette has always had a hard time holding onto
respectable tenants (such that its newest one is a liquor store and its second
or third-newest one an accursed smoke shop) and even to stay free of vacancies
(and indeed, it has sadly quite recently lost the occupier of its
second-largest spot, an outlet of one of my favorite chain bar-restaurants,
Beef O’Brady’s [although en revanche,
the Domino’s via whose deliveries I have come to experience so much of that
chain’s abovementioned metaphysical elevation continues to thrive beside the
ex-Beef’s space]). But it is cater-cornered to a solidly upper-mid-market
counterpart, the Shoppes of Citrus Park, the site of my abovementioned Publix
of first resort. And Citrus Park was by no means an even ever-so-slightly dodgy
quasi-town or suburb; it had been an eminently respectable place in which to
live and go about the everyday business and pleasure of life ever since my
childhood days as a pupil at its eponymous elementary school, when that
respectability was still inflected but by no means tainted or sullied by a
slightly rural aura emanating from its lingering material associations with the
orange-growing industry to which it owed its name, and more lately, beginning
in the late 1990s, when the entire Tampa Bay area’s most-upmarket non-strip
mall opened there, it had become downright borderline posh. For fudge’s sake (I
may have then exclaimed to myself), that McDonald’s was sited a
less-than-figurative stone’s throw from another strip mall, the Village Shoppes
of Keystone Odessa, that housed both a pho-ery and a craft brewery! How much
more infuriatingly upmarket in the most tweely up-to-date way could one get? So
the sign appalled me in virtue of its grotesque incongruity and otioseness. But
although it appalled me, it did not really surprise me inasmuch as although I
had not yet seen it take the form of such a sign, I had encountered grotesque
incongruity and otioseness of its specific unsavory flavor numerous times
before, starting in the aestivus
horribilis of 2020, when dozens of cities scattered all over the United
States, including Tampa, were visited by the sort of synthetic so-called race
riot that I had previously witnessed only in Baltimore in 2015 and that had in
fact been confined to Baltimore and a sub-handful of other cities in the world (notably St. Louis and
London [yes, the one in England, in which in 2011 a police shooting of a
non-white person had likewise served as a pretext for a looting spree
{Obviously my contention that such riots had thitherto been confined to a
sub-handful of cities is bound to elicit cries of What about the riots of the 60s? What about the 1992 Rodney King riots?
in correction of which I can only point the criers back to the adjective “synthetic,”
which act of ostension is bound to elicit cries from a different set of criers
that the 60s and 92 riots were synthetic in their own right, in response to
which I can only say that it seems to me that if the earlier ones were not
wholly organic they were at least appreciably less synthetic than those of the
past decade-and-a-half}]). At some point during that summer I had
found myself privately referring to this phenomenon as the format-painting of the worst of Baltimore into the rest of America,
and I suppose I had latched onto that word-processing term format-painting because it felicitously denoted both the apparently
mechanical quality of the method employed and the apparently aesthetic (or
meta-aesthetic) motivations of its employers and its beneficiaries. Apparently,
I then gathered, certain people had found the extreme civil-cum-civic disorder
of the Baltimore of recent years beautiful and had wanted to impose it on the
rest of the country. Of course (it now occurs to me) I had already witnessed
exercises in this sort of format-painting from within Baltimore itself, whose
2015 riots may themselves have been (as it now occurs to me) partly
precipitated by those earlier exercises. The principal and Ur-format of the earlier exercises had been furnished by the
Baltimore-set oughties HBO drama series The
Wire, which had brought to Baltimore a degree of absolutely unprecedented aesthetically inflected fame and “sex
appeal,” inasmuch as no Baltimore-originating aesthetic artifact—neither the
short stories of Gertrude Stein (the short stories of Stein’s more famous
predecessor, Poe, never having quite been regarded as fully Baltimorean), nor
the essays of H.L. Mencken, nor the films of Barry Levinson, nor even the films
of John Waters—had enjoyed as much prestige in their own or subsequent epochs
as The Wire enjoyed in the oughties.
At least throughout the Anglosphere, The
Wire was undoubtedly the most
prestigious aesthetic artifact of that decade. People who thought even the most
prestigious literary figures thereof—say, Paul Auster or David Foster
Wallace—beneath their notice blanched at the thought of missing a single
installment of The Wire. And so when
people came to Baltimore, whether as tourists or as new residents, they
expected to see re-creations of the squalid tableaux
mourants of The Wire as a matter
of course wherever they went within the city. And the city government
(doubtless with the full endorsement of the abovementioned Annapolitan and
Washingtonian real powers that be’d) was only too happy to oblige these
connoisseurs of terminal degeneracy by relaxing law enforcement even in those
parts of the city such as the Inner Harbor that had previously been treated as
oases of safety and family-friendliness. But of course (I now reflect) the
format-painting within Baltimore had not stopped in 2015, and it had not confined
its inspiration-sources to the Wire
either. One now supposes in hindsight that the squalor and the horror of both
that program and the actual riots eventually proved too prosaic or low-key for
the local connoisseurs, as if the urban disorder portrayed and actualized,
respectively, by the two phenomena had not been spectacular or catastrophe-ridden
enough, for as I mentioned in an earlier essay (an essay in which I also treat
of the Wire-ification of Baltimore,
albeit without explicit recourse to the concept of format-painting), the interior
of the more-than-century-old cinema palace the Parkway when it reopened in 2017
was patently evocative of the 1982 dystopian horror film Escape from New York. Instead of restoring to the interior its
inaugural Belle-Époque glory the reopeners had left it in the appalling state
of dilapidation into which it had fallen when it had closed its doors in the
early 1970s after many ignominious years of service as a pornography theater,
such that when one went to see a film there, one felt as if one were among the
criminal squatters who are seen confabbing with and stabbing each other in
comparably ancient-cum- formerly splendid architectural surroundings in
Carpenter’s film. And of course (it now occurs to me), the redecoration of the
Citrus Park McDonald’s was itself an instance of format-painting and moreover
an instance-thereof doubtless initiated by the same Millennial cohort that had
initiated or was to initiate (for regarding the date of the redecoration I can
of course only specify a terminus ante
quem of late 2022) the summer-of-2020 nationwide format-painting campaign.
After all, oughties Millennial hipsters loved snorting cocaine in the bathrooms
of dance clubs as much as they enjoyed watching lowlifes shooting up heroin on
the streets outside those clubs–so why should they not have sought to impose
both the interior and exterior tableaux of their collective nostalgia-scape on
America simultaneously? And of course (and here my present reflections merge
with those of two years ago) all these non-verbal exhibitions of
format-painting have been directed not only and perhaps not even principally at
people who shared the aesthetic habitus
of the painters; to the contrary, they have been partly or perhaps even mainly
directed at people whose aesthetic habitus
is diametrically opposed thereto—nice, normal, wholesome people who like to be
in clean, well-lighted surroundings occupied by other people engaged in nice,
normal, wholesome activities. They have inculcated on these nice, normal,
wholesome people an art-appreciation lesson that may be verbalized as follows:
“You may not live in the big city, but that is entirely to your discredit and
shame, and so you must have the big city in all its gritty, shitty, bloody anarchic
malodorousness shoved directly into your face. You may even live in the big
city but think that city life need not be grittily, shittily, bloodily,
anarchically malodorous, but in this belief you are woefully mistaken and so
must be apprised of the erroneousness of your belief.” And the deterritorialized
McDonald’s “no loitering” sign has extended that lesson into explicitly verbal
territory without being reducible to the message that it explicitly verbalizes,
for in being formally situated in the context of the ensemble of
format-painting exhibitions, it perforce must be regarded as a kind of museum title
plaque-cum-museum-program book for that ensemble-exhibition, a program book
whose text may be summarized as follows: “You may think that in virtue of your
preference for clean, well-lighted surroundings occupied by other people
engaged in nice, normal, wholesome activities you are a better sort of person
than an obstreperous, belligerent, gun-and-knife-happy hobbledehoy and that in
virtue of your superiority thereto you are entitled to take as long as you
please to consume your meal, but in fact your preference for clean,
well-lighted surroundings occupied by other people engaged in nice, normal,
wholesome activities bespeaks your abysmal inferiority to obstreperous,
belligerent, gun-and-knife-happy hobbledehoys, and so you ought to be grateful
that we have vouchsafed you the full thirty minutes instead of a mere
quarter-hour. But as we already know that you will not be grateful therefor, we
hope you choke to death in your effort to adjust to this new gustatory
constraint (for we also already know that despite your ingratitude, in being a
nice, normal wholesome person you will do your best to respect the rules of our
establishment even if it kills you). To repurpose our 1970s jingle for these more
enlightened times: You deserve a break
today: not a mere temporary break from cleanliness and wholesomeness but a
permanent break from life.” As I mentioned before, I have not been inside
the Citrus Park McDonald’s since that late-2022 visit, but I have since passed
by it hundreds of times, in the course of my weekly trips to and from the
Publix at the Shoppes of Citrus Park. During one of the more recent of these
trips I was particularly struck by the condition of the restaurant’s two
roadside signs, the only identifiers of the restaurant to passersby on Gunn
Highway. These signs are about three feet tall apiece and in design consist
simply of the signature “golden arches” above a rectangle displaying the name
“McDonalds” in white against a field of solid red. Even when brand-new they
could not have been especially eye-catching, and now they are both in a
positively eye-repellently unprepossessing state. The northernmore of the two
is both faded and completely covered in mildew that one might mistake for
hoarfrost if one didn’t know better about the local climate. On the other one
the “golden arches” have been sun-baked and smoked into a sinisterly dark shade
of orange. The sign’s rectangle remains defiantly red, but here and there the
underlying white half shines through in a manner reminiscent of nothing more
strongly than the surface of a dinner plate half-visible under the more aqueous
portions of a dollop of the least dispensable fast-food condiment, ketchup. My
recollection of the world of twenty five-to-fifty years ago is too limited and
hazy to furnish any support for the conjecture that I am about to hazard, and I
can think of no fool-proof means of fact-checking it that would not entail
ransacking thousands of people’s personal photo albums (i.e., in search of,
say, vacation snapshots with McDonald’s signage fortuitously present within their
frame, inasmuch as one could hardly trust any picture “curated” by the company
itself or its detractors to be representative), but here goes: surely the
McDonald’s corporation of the late twentieth century or even of the first
decade of the twenty-first never would have allowed any of the roadside signs
of any of its franchises to cease to pass for brand-spanking new, let alone to
fall into such a state of flagrant disrepair as the one now shared by those
Citrus Park-located ones. Of course I am strongly tempted to assimilate the
wretched appearance of those signs to the anarcho-tyrannical Gestalt of the restaurant’s interior, to
infer that the malevolent-cum-maleficent powers that now be have knowingly
forborne to renovate or replace the signs, that they have allowed them to
become as hideous as they are lest any customer should escape his obligatory Two
Minutes Demoralization by confining his custom to the drive-through. But even
if the deterioration of the signs has resulted from nothing more or other than
the passage of the reins of the McDonald’s corporation into more negligent
hands, this passage in itself is balefully significant in the light of McDonald’s’s historic prominence—and
perhaps even pride of place (for the most obvious alternative contender for
that position, Coca-Cola, has by now
acquired a quaintly quasi-antiquarian aura; for however often one may see or
consume a can or bottle of Coca-Cola, one now thinks of a Coca-Cola
advertisement by default as something appearing on an enameled tin sign posted
at a roadhouse of the 1930s, not on a CRT television screen of the 1980s, let
alone an LCD phone screen of the 2020s)–in the firmament of Occidental proprietary
names. For the McDonald’s corporation of the late twentieth century would not
have suffered itself to fall into negligent hands and indeed never would have
felt in peril of falling thereinto, as it could then count on the most talented
and conscientious business minds in the world’s vying ruthlessly with each
other to become its CEO. And it could count on such ruthless competition for
its CEO spot not only because nearly everybody in the world appreciated a Big
Mac and fries but also because nearly everybody into the world was smitten with
the mystique of the proprietary name qua reliable bespeaker of purchasable
fungible infungibility—of the entity that is both completely indistinguishable
from all others of its kind and completely unmistakable as an entity of any
other kind. And so it seems entirely fair to regard the dilapidation of the
signs in front of the Citrus Park McDonald’s as a certificatory seal on the
suspicion I have already voiced in this essay—viz., that the retail proprietary
name is being rapidly sidelined and that this sidelining is wittingly or
unwittingly serving as the helpmeet of the supersession of the terrible
proprietary heterogeneity I decried at the end of “Proprietary Names: The Name”
by a de-proprietized homogeneity far more terrible. For call me old fashioned
(“or something far worse than old fashioned,” as I am wont to append), but I
happen to think that wolfing down a burger and fries and then picking up some
clothes or toys for the kids or a new living-room couch or any of the other
umpteen-quadrillion commodities on offer at the American strip mall in its
heyday is a more wholesome way of spending a Saturday afternoon than smoking
kilograms of marijuana or burning incense to a demon or having one’s hair
ineptly trimmed by a surly money-launderette attendant. And even if the worrying
demographic trends that the street-level advent of businesses facilitating
these activities seems to register fizzle out completely, we shall still have
to cope with the terrible problem of what to do with all that empty retail
space. Per Philip Larkin, we Occidentals have been separated from each other by
“acres of housing” for more than half a century. How are we going to be able to
congregate in even potentially productive and agreeable ways, be it ever so
rarely, once those acres of housing are further separated from each other by
acres of vacant shopping malls and high streets? I am not thinking here of such
supposedly “meaningful” and “community-building” but actually oppressively vacuous
phenomena as the mid-twentieth-century bowling meets extolled by Robert Putnam
(and thoroughly disparaged by the present writer in his
2009 essay on David Riesman’s Lonely
Crowd); I am thinking, rather, of such classically mundane experiences
as occasionally running into a friend or acquaintance by chance, a universally
familiar experience even in the late-twentieth century heyday of the non-strip
suburban shopping mall, then regarded as the absolute apotheosis (or nadir) of
soulless massification, a mere holding pen of the parenthetically
just-mentioned lonely crowd. At some point in the nineties, a
very-late-twentieth century establishment cultural critic, a proper “shoeshine
boy of the ruling elite” (no, not Tom Friedman, but someone of more or less the
same unctuous bent) extolled the non-strip shopping mall as the reincarnation
of the pre-industrial English village green. At the time this paeanette
elicited many a groan of contemptuous incredulity from many a snooty “elitist”
including the present writer, but now it seems as spot-on as an English
village’s market cross, even if (per one of my essays on Johnson and Boswell)
in pre-non-strip-shopping mall days the specific type of interaction I am
extolling was as likely to occur in the biggest of big cities as in the tiniest
dorflet. Certainly it would be preferable for people to run into their acquaintances
in settings at least partially purposed for something other than spending and getting
([sic] on the inversion of Wordsworthian word-order), but if the alternative is
for them not to run into them at all, I am happy to settle for a dedicated wallet
and handbag-hoovering site as a sufficiently serviceable pis aller. For the time being, most Americans are still obliged to
interact with each other in person fairly regularly owing to their continuing
frequentation of supermarkets, but this frequentation continues only because
most Americans find the home delivery of perishable groceries (for of the
delivery of the imperishable ones Amazon has already got the market half sewn
up) too expensive to justify its convenience, but will they continue to find it
so when the alternative involves driving through permanent more-than-figurative
no-man’s lands? And once they cease to find it so, how will the suburban
supermarket find its survival any less precarious than that of its “inner-city”
counterpart has long since proved to be?
Adorno’s apercu to the effect of “The ghost town bespeaks the rise of
the nearest boom town” has probably already given up the ghost of general
applicability, for while new suburban developments continue to sprout up on the
fringes of our metropolitan areas, the ratio of commercial retail space to
residential space in these new developments has presumably dwindled to near
nullity. And nobody seriously believes that we can reclaim even a tiny fraction
of the umpteen-zillion square miles occupied by empty strip malls for everyday
human use by turning the former shops into youth clubs or old people’s housing or
bulldozing them and replacing them with dog parks and nature trails. Not that
we seem yet to be in any danger of having such doomed reclamation attempts
forced on us en masse, for precious
few people even seem to notice the increasing desuetude and abandonment of our
retail geography, let alone the threat that it poses to our social cohesion.
Indeed, bizarrely and disturbingly, the polemic against increasing proprietary name-mediated
geographical homogenization that I decried at the end of “Proprietary Names:
The Name,” a polemic whose minimum tenability is predicated on a burgeoning
retail geography, continues in full vigor. Twenty years ago this polemic was completely
wrongheaded in meta-metaphysical terms because it was predicated on a
categorical error—viz., that of classifying units of commercial suburban real
estate in terms of the genre of business occupied by them; thus it would view
two suburban strip malls at opposite ends of America as metaphysically
interchangeable with each other qua embodiments of homogenization because each
of them consisted of two fast food restaurants, a video rental store, and a
supermarket; thereby failing to appreciate that because the one consisted of a
Mc Donald’s, a Subway, a Blockbuster, and a Piggly Wiggly whereas the other
consisted of a Taco Bell, an Arby’s, a Hollywood Video, and a Giant,
metaphysically speaking they might as well have been situated on separate
planets as in separate sub-national regions. Twenty years ago this polemic was,
I say, meta-metaphysically wrongheaded, but at least its meta-metaphysical
error was predicated on an actual state of affairs inasmuch as proprietarily
named retail establishments were still proliferating across the USA as speedily
as they had been doing since the middle of the twentieth century. Now that American
proprietarily named retail establishments are going out of business like
nobody’s business (least of all their own), this polemic must by all rights be
styled a “zombie polemic,” although the style is somewhat misleading inasmuch
as it suggests that the polemic’s exponents of today are metaphysically identical
to its exponents of two decades ago. It suggests, in other words, that the set
of these exponents consists of a combination of old and middle-aged lefties who
were young or middle-aged lefties back then and young lefties of today who have
inherited or adopted the mindset-cum-agenda of the older ones. But in point of
fact the left has lost all interest in attacking proprietary homogenization
just as it has lost interest in almost all other causes not immediately
associated with the safeguarding or fostering of sensual libertinage, and all
of today’s proprietary homogenization-bashers—at least all of them I have ever
heard of—hail from well to the right of center. This means that they are all
vociferously opposed to many of the phenomena that have at least coincided with
the sidelining of proprietarily named retail establishments—chief among them,
mass immigration. Indeed, the most vehement and prolific proprietary
homogenization-basher known to me is my informant regarding the penetration of
Turkish barbershops into the Welsh hinterland, a man deemed too
“controversial”—i.e. too far to the right of the so-called Overton window—to
appear as a pundit on the allegedly far-right television station GB News. Like
all his left-wing forebears he has chosen old McDonald’s as his whipping
boy-in-chief. He pities the poor citizens of Cairo for having to behold the
golden arches alongside the kebab shops and hookah lounges of their naughty
nursery-rhymed streets. It seems to me that even if McDonald’ses were still
proliferating in Cairo and had already proliferated to a point at which they
outnumbered kebab shops and hookah lounges, the Cairo-ians would have bigger
problems to cope with—chief among them the proliferation of their fellow
Cairo-ians at a rate that has seen the population of the greater Cairo
megapustule double over the past thirty years. Another of these fellows, a
friend of the first who is known as the so-called dissident right’s leading
“opinion leader,” has said that nothing makes his heart sink faster than his
first sighting of a McDonald’s after touching down in Tokyo. As if anything
could be more authentically Japanese than a Tokyo McDonald’s (apart, perhaps,
from a Tokyo garage-punk band)! And as if any sort of entity in the present
world stood more sorely in need of the services of a global version of the
Village Green Preservation Society! These dudes’ party may affect to be a wake,
but they are affecting to mourn the wrong decedent; they are partying as though
it were still 1999 and the ghost of Emmett Kelly rather than of Ronald McDonald
were being laid to rest. That they are doing so is perhaps understandable if
not entirely excusable, for as unabashed right-wingers they are essentially
duty-bound to defend what they love via an undialectical appeal to “tradition”
(i.e., because all other defensible qualities such as “humaneness” and
“justice” have been monopolized and corrupted by the left) and hence inclined
by default to wrap themselves in the mantle of any entity or practice
traditionally regarded as traditional. But as David Riesman pointed out nearly
three-quarters of a century ago—i.e., when the McDonald’s empire was not yet a
twinkle in Ray Kroc’s eye even if the Howard Johnson’s restaurant chain was
already foreshadowing the Golden Arches’ roadside ubiquity—all modern Western
societies have been post-traditional from their inception, which obviously does
not mean that they have had no use for “knowledge handed down from generation
to generation,” but it does mean that within them knowledge has never been
simply unquestioningly handed down as “what we do” or “what we believe,” that
within them there has always been an explanation or apologia attached to the
transmission of every activity or belief, that within them one must always be
told that one has got believe this or that or how to do this or that because it
is the useful or morally correct thing to believe or (almost always, let it be added, in cautionary
contradistinction from people in other societies or within one’s own society
who refuse or fail to learn how to do it or believe it and are understood to
have consequently come to a bad end [in other words, always with an implicit
understanding that an entirely different way of doing things or understanding
things is at least in principle eminently entertainable {in this respect the
Occidental collective who live in the most “traditional” manner, the Amish, are
the most post-traditional of all Occidental subcultures}]). Accordingly, since
ca. 1500 all naked appeals to tradition tendered within the Occident have
either been erroneous or disingenuous. My informant about the Welsh Turkish
barbershops, while presumably oblivious of the post-traditionality of the
modern Occident insgesamt, is at
least willing to concede that the Occident of the present is post-traditional,
for he styles himself a postmodern
traditionalist in ostensibly rueful acknowledgment of the practical
impossibility of his living exactly in the manner of an inhabitant of what he
regards as the golden age of tradition, which he would appear to regard as
extending at least as far into the near-present as the 1950s. But as sadly
mistaken as he is in supposing that his manner of living is traditional to the
extent that it resembles that of a man of the 1950s, he is no less sadly
mistaken in supposing that in living like a man of the 2020s to the extent that
he cannot avoid doing so he is being “postmodern,” for in the 2020s
“postmodernism” is as much a dead letter as Socinianism was in the 1820s. To be
sure, its name suggests that it
denotes some sort historical ultima thule,
that in being postmodern one is as up-to-date as it will ever be possible to
be, but this is (or was) all “branding,” and even the devisers of the
postmodern “brand” could not have expected postmodernism to “blow up as big” as
it has, for the “modernism” to which it was a “post” was itself a “brand” for a
specifically artistic movement whose
connection to modernity writ large
was as contingent and debatable as any competing ism’s early twentieth-century artistic movement’s connection to its
namesake (e.g., futurism to the
empirical-historical future, fauvism
to actual wild beasts in the jungle, and Dadaism
to anyone’s dad). In any case, whether one defines it is as a body of thought
or a phase of the Weltgeist postmodernism
is a phenomenon indissolubly tethered to the last three decades of the
twentieth century, a phenomenon inalienable from the conditions and relations
of production and consumption that obtained therein and that have seemingly
decisively ceased to obtain since. The postmodernists were united in their
smugness at having supposedly revealed that the world of the late twentieth
century was defined by its super-saturation with signs, by which they did not mean fixed, tangible
information-bearers like the signs outside the Citrus Park McDonald’s but
infinitely portable and replicable symbols; but at least the most illustrious
of these signs turned out to be more implicated in certain fixed tangible
realities than they imagined. The godfather of postmodernism, Jean-Francois
Lyotard (d., significantly, 1998) is said to have positively reveled in the
fact that the professorial chair he occupied at Emory University was funded by
the Coca-Cola corporation because in his view a bottle or can of Coke was the
apotheosis of the postmodern sign and the ultimate two-fingered salute to every
notion of “authenticity” as a function of local provenance and situatedness. But in truth, and as I have impressed upon the
reader at several points in both this essay and “Proprietary Names: The Name,”
although its disembodied and dislocated likeness was encountered in a myriad intangible
forms and settings—on countless ubiquitously disseminated billboards,
television screens, T-shirts, and the like—the bottle or can of Coke was “in
the last instance” a concrete and only finitely fungible object that although
it could be found in every country and region of the world could only be
obtained at a handful of point-of-sale types in any given country or
region—vending machines, convenience stores, supermarkets, and the like.
Moreover (and as I have not yet made a particular point of emphasizing in
either essay), the dissemination of all the billions of bottles of cans of Coke
to their respective vending-sites around the world required a massive and
massively well-organized system of materiel and personnel—of factories,
bottling-plants, workers, shipping clerks, shipping containers, distribution
centers, trucks, drivers, et al. etc.; a system of which every consumer of Coke
was at least dimly aware in virtue of having to repair to one of the
abovementioned points of sale to gratify his Coke jones, and consequently
occasionally having to behold a Coke truck being unloaded or a pallet of
Coke-cans or Coke-bottles being shelved. In today’s post-postmodern
economic-cum-metaphysical dispensation, an entity like a bottle or can of Coke
seems as impossibly quaint or as charmingly old-fashioned as a Chippendale armchair
or a piece of Wedgwood stoneware. To be sure, as I have relentlessly impressed
upon the reader throughout this essay and its predecessor, for all my lingering
and not entirely remorseful metaphysical attachment to certain entities of the
Coke-can or Coke-bottle type, I am at bottom (in two or more senses) a foe of
the fetishization of such entities; indeed, not to put too fine upon on it, I
regard such fetishization as a form of idolatry. All the same, I am even more
wary of the class of entities that have all but completely displaced entities
of the Coke-can or Coke-bottle type as foci of metaphysical investment in the
present century—entities whose presence is not merely temporarily but
permanently exhaustively deputized for by their semblances on television
screens and these screens’ smaller and more portable younger siblings; entities
that, moreover, hail from no specific place or time but are rather exquisite
corpses assembled out of the disjecta membra of entities strewn about every
corner of the globe and along the entire trajectory of history, such that it is
impossible to “access” them by repairing to such-and-such a place at
such-and-such a moment (or even, as in the case of historical personages or
obsolete technological artefacts, to know that had one been at such-and-such a
place at such-and-such a moment one could
have “accessed” them). I am especially wary of these entities not only because
I regard their detachment from temporal and geographical actuality as an evil
in itself but also because, however vociferously well-“platformed” techno-loonies
may continue to cry up the uploading of our minds to “the Cloud” as a
supposedly imminently practicable project, we early twenty-first century
Occidentals are and show no credible sign of ceasing to be as abjectly
dependent on the compliance of our temporally situated material surroundings as
our forebears of five hundred years ago or even five thousand years ago were on
the compliance of theirs (“the Cloud” itself’s dependence on sprawling and
towering quanta of real estate and massive influxes of electricity being a case
in point of illustration of this supinity), and the extinction of our
interaction with entities of the Coke-can or Coke-bottle type in those
surroundings owing to the withdrawal of conventional retail establishments from
our shopping malls, strip malls, and high streets, is causing an atrophying of
our ability to cope with those surroundings, even as the smattering of
unconventional retail establishments that have taken a tiny proportion of their
place—the botanicas, crystal shops, and smoke shops—are only potentiating our
engagement with the abovementioned phantasmagoria of exquisite corpses. And
while I admit to being utterly at a loss for “effective strategies” for restoring
that ability, I can assert with certainty that continuing to party as if it
were still 1999 is not one of them.
THE END